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For the purpose of this study, it is vital to understand the current field of information 
security (later infosec) and its challenges towards the society and its organizations in par-
ticular. This introductory section will begin by illustrating the importance of information 
security to organizations, which will then be followed by some real life examples of in-
formation security breaches. In the final part of this section, the structure of the thesis will 
be presented as a stepping stone to the next sections of the study. 
1.1 Motivation  
Due to the rapid digitalization of products and services, individuals are becoming more 
and more connected in their everyday life. This sets new demands on companies and other 
organizations as the increasing connectedness predisposes both businesses and individu-
als to information security threats. Consequently, it is important to notice, that these 
threats do not only risk the information security of organizations but also the privacy and 
security of their customers and suppliers. In fact, to tackle this issue, the European Union 
is launching a new data protection regulation. The new EU general data protection regu-
lation (GDPR) brings companies greater responsibility over the protection of customer 
data (Hartikainen 2016): violations of the regulation could lead to sanctions as high as 20 
million EUR or 4.0% of the annual global revenue of the company (EU-tietosuojan ko-
konaisuudistus 2016, 6–7). This can be seen as an important change, as data protection 
supervisor Reijo Aarnio estimates that companies still have much room for improvement 
in the data protection field (Hartikainen 2016). In fact, according to the Finnish Commu-
nications Regulatory Authority and its National Cyber Security Center, there have been 
several extortion malware infections in Finnish companies and hospitals in spring 2016 
(Rissanen & Koivuranta 2016). Furthermore, in a study conducted by the consulting com-
pany KPMG in 10 Finnish publicly listed companies in 2013, nearly half of the companies 
had Trojan virus in their data-communications networks, one third other malware and, 
additionally, the networks of four companies had been hacked (Halminen 2014). What is 
even more alarming is, that in spring 2016, a content management system utilized by 
several governmental sites, such as the Ministry of Finance, the Finnish Defence Forces, 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the Family Federation of Finland was sub-
jected to a denial of service (DOS) attack (Ministeriöiden verkkopalveluihin hyökättiin 
jälleen 2016). 
In the business field, on the other hand, the web services provider Yahoo was subjected 
to two information security breaches in 2013 and 2014 that lead to the theft of customer 
names, email addresses, phone numbers and passwords of over a billion customers. Due 
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to the breaches, Verizon, who acquired parts of Yahoo, was able to lower the purchase 
price of the company by 350 million dollars. (Linnake 2017.) The victims of the theft 
included employees of the civil and military administration of the United States, members 
of the White House, federal police officers, congressmen and intelligence authorities from 
the US and, therefore, in the hands of cyber criminals, the information could lead to severe 
national threat to the United States. This has been said to be the largest information secu-
rity breach in the world. (Yahoolta uusi paljastus – – 2016.) Furthermore, in spring-sum-
mer 2017, two global ransomware attacks that affected companies worldwide – 
WannaCry and Petya – were launched causing serious impacts. Petya affected multiple 
organizations in the fields of shipping and transport, pharmaceuticals and oil production, 
in addition to impacting the airport, power grid and governmental bodies in Ukraine, 
whereas WannaCry locked up over 200 000 companies worldwide (Ng 2017). Moreover, 
WannaCry is said to have affected computers in over 150 countries (Virtanen 2017); im-
pacted organizations include hospitals including National Health Service NHS in UK, 
universities, banks and railways, governmental bodies and automobile, transport, telecom 
and gas companies around the globe to name a few (Ransomware cyber-attack – – 2017). 
These examples highlight the importance of information security in different levels of the 
society and demonstrate that information security is a topic no longer to be neglected by 
any organization. 
Meanwhile, the global cyber security market is valued at over $120 billion in 2017 and 
investments in the area between years 2017 and 2021 are expected to cumulatively exceed 
$1 trillion (Morgan 2017). There is a plethora of companies offering products, services 
and solutions related to information security both in Finland and abroad. These solutions 
come in handy as the study conducted by CGI (CGI – – 2016; 1, 8) demonstrated that 
86% of the respondents of the study felt that the risk of a cyber attack had increased within 
a year and, in fact, 74% of respondents saw it likely that they will be subjected to a cyber 
security attack within the next year. Furthermore, 63% of respondents saw it as likely that 
the organization had suffered from a cyber attack without anyone knowing it. Conse-
quently, 81% of the organizations recognize that the need for preparing for cyber threats 
has increased. Yet, half of the organizations do not invest in improving cyber security. 
The study included both public and private organizations from different industries, such 
as retail, services and transport, banking, energy and water and public administration and 
defence in Finland. (CGI – – 2016; 1–2, 8.) 
Despite the increasing infosec risks, the information security services utilized by com-
panies operating in Finland still remain unclear. Thus, identifying and mapping infor-
mation security services and understanding their use in companies will help in building 
both information security knowledge and better information security capabilities in Fin-
land. Furthermore, as the number of information security solutions is growing and new 
types of services enter the market, it is vital to help organizations better understand what 
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kind of information security services are available. Additionally, when more information 
on how to protect themselves against information security threats is available for organi-
zations, it will create more trust towards digital business. Consequently, this thesis aims 
at tackling these issues and bringing new information and knowledge on the topic in order 
to encourage the adoption of digital business within organizations in Finland.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: The first section discusses research meth-
ods, whereas the second section constructs a theoretical background for the study. The 
third section focuses on the systematic literature review and the fourth, in turn, presents 
a survey and its results. After the survey, discussion of the whole study will be presented. 
Finally, the thesis will be concluded in conclusions section. 
1.2 Research gap and Digiwars programme 
1.2.1 Research gap 
The introduction section presented some problems related to digitalization and infor-
mation security. However, these topics also offer numerous opportunities for organiza-
tions. In order to promote the digitalization of commercial and industrial life, the Ministry 
of Transport and Communications – together with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment, industry and commerce – have launched an initiative to create a beneficial 
operational environment for digital services and new business models (Ministry of 
Transport and Communications 2015). As a part of this initiative, an information security 
strategy that promotes trust towards the internet and digital operating methods, will be 
created. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2015.) The strategy aims at 
strengthening the ability to detect and resolve information security discrepancies. Addi-
tionally, the strategy aspires to invite critical information security knowledge and com-
panies providing information security services to Finland. (Toimintasuunnitelma – – 
2016, 76–77.) 
Some of the problems noted in the previous section focused especially on the infor-
mation security service field. With the vast expansion of the information security business 
field, the solution offering is also facing rapid growth. To better understand the current 
information security service field in Finland, it is important to map and categorize the 
different types of solutions utilized in companies operating in Finland. Additionally, the 
concept of information security services is lacking a clear definition as different terms are 
utilized interchangeably to describe these solutions as will be demonstrated in the sys-
tematic literature review section (chapter 3). Therefore, a clear categorization and defini-
tion of information security services will increase the understanding of this field and serve 
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as a valuable asset for both further studies and for rooting this know-how in Finland. This 
thesis aims at clarifying these issues. The thesis will be conducted as a part of a larger 
programme (Digiwars) carried out by the University of Turku. Furthermore, the client of 
the thesis is the Finnish Government (later referred to as the ‘client’). The Digiwars pro-
gramme will be further discussed next. 
1.2.2 Digiwars programme 
As mentioned above, this thesis will be conducted as a part of the Digiwars programme 
by the Ministry of Transport and Communications and the University of Turku. As the 
financial potential of digital business is vast and technological innovations grow rapidly, 
information is needed to promote practices that ensure both privacy and safe use of data 
(Digiwars – – 2017). The Finnish Government regards it as important that the political 
actions of the European Union aim to improve the availability and offering of reliable and 
secure digital commodities in the internal markets. Furthermore, attention needs to be 
directed to the effects that weaken trust towards the digital operating environment, such 
as wide-scale privacy breaches occurring in networks. To tackle the issues, the Digiwars 
programme aims to improve the credibility of digital commodities and business models 
and to strengthen the market and export of digital services in Finland. (Digiwars – – 
2017.) 
The Digiwars programme is seminal as it supports the above mentioned initiative of 
the Ministry of Transport and Communications of the Finnish Government to build a 
favourable operating environment for digital services and new business models. There-
fore, this thesis contributes to the key objectives of digitalization in Finland, focusing on 
the information security – and especially infosec services – perspective. The next section 
presents the research questions and describes the study aims and methods in more detail. 
1.3 The study aims, research questions and scope of the study 
The aim of this thesis is to examine information security services and to shed light on 
these services in Finland.  
The thesis includes the following two research questions: 
 What are information security services and how they can be categorized? 
 What are the information security services that are used in companies of different 
industries in Finland? 
The scope of the study includes the clarification and categorization of the term infor-
mation security service through a systematic literature review (SLR) and a survey aimed 
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at investigating the information security services utilized in companies operating in Fin-
land. The systematic literature review follows a qualitative approach, whereas the survey 
as the empirical part of the thesis employs both qualitative and quantitative characteris-
tics. Therefore, as the study combines both qualitative and quantitative types of research, 
a mixed methods approach has been chosen. The scope of the study has been defined as 
part of the larger Digiwars programme based on client needs. The scope of the study in 
brief consists of: 
 information security service term clarification (SLR and survey) 
 categorization of infosec services (SLR) 
 identification of the infosec services that are used in companies of different in-
dustries Finland (survey). 
1.4 Philosophical background  
This section discusses the philosophical stance of the research. Usually this section is 
handled after the theoretical background but in this study the topic is situated as an intro-
ductory theme as it presents the lens through which the whole research will be observed 
and which guides the execution of the study. Hirsjärvi, Remes and Sajavaara (2003, 117) 
explain that research is based on numerous latent assumptions on aspects such as human, 
the world and data collection methods – these assumptions can be defined as the philo-
sophical worldview of research. Similarly, Hakala (2005, 150) states that there are hidden 
philosophical, methodological and conceptual factors that influence a thesis. These fac-
tors form the foundation for the research, whether or not the researcher is aware of them. 
(Hakala 2005, 150.) Hirsjärvi et al. (2003, 117) note that knowledge on the philosophical 
assumptions will help in understanding the differences in quantitative and qualitative re-
search. Consequently, the knowledge will help the researcher to explain the logic behind 
the research decisions he or she has made. (Hirsjärvi et al. 2003, 117.) Therefore, under-
standing the philosophical stance of the research is important as it affects all the steps of 
the study from the beginning to the end. This will help in planning and conducting a 
coherent study.  
Some of the key aspects related to the basic philosophical assumptions are ontology 
and epistemology, which in turn, affect the choices for suitable methodologies and meth-
ods for the study. Epistemology and ontology debate about the nature of existence and 
knowledge (Tieteenfilosofiset suuntaukset 2015). Ontology concentrates on finding out 
what is reality and what kind of matters are real, whereas epistemology explores the ideas 
of what kind of knowledge is real knowledge and how and what humans can know about 
knowledge (cf. Hirsjärvi et al. 2003, 118). The philosophy of science has various orien-
tations from which positivism and interpretivism form the basic division by supporting 
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opposite ontological and epistemological viewpoints. (Tieteenfilosofiset suuntaukset 
2015.) Positivism assumes that a researcher is separate from the environment and the 
reality he or she is investigating (Weber 2004, 3). Therefore, the reality is formed by facts 
that can be objectively observed (Hirsjärvi et al. 2003, 129). Due to its nature, positivism 
is linked to quantitative study (Hirsjärvi et al. 2003, 129) and it concentrates on testing 
hypotheses and utilizing quantifiable data sources in generalizing findings from a sample 
to a larger population (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991, 5). Interpretivism, on the other hand, 
believes that researchers cannot be separated from their reality (Weber 2004, 3) as they 
interact with their environment, diffuse their own perceptions with it and give meanings 
to the phenomena related to the environment (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991, 5). Thus, re-
searchers create shared interpretations of their environment and the phenomena related 
to it (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991, 5). The interpretivist approach is usually linked to 
qualitative forms of research. 
Additionally, based on the differing worldviews, quantitative research is often seen as 
a deductive (Inductive Approach – – 2016), top-down approach, where theory is utilized 
as a basis for hypotheses and their testing, observations and confirmation (Trochim, Don-
nelly & Arora 2016, 22–23). Qualitative research, on the other hand, is related to an in-
ductive approach (Inductive Approach – – 2016), where the bottom-up process begins 
with observations, continues with attempts of finding patterns based on the observations 
and, in the end of the process, proceeds to forming conclusions or new theories (Trochim 
et al. 2016, 22–23). As this thesis utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods 
through mixed methods methodology, it is vital to understand the profound differences 
in their worldviews. The process of gathering empirical qualitative and quantitative data 
for the thesis is described in section 1.6.1. Despite the fact that these two differing meth-
ods are combined in this study, this research takes the interpretivist stance. Therefore, the 
basic assumption behind this thesis is that the researcher interacts with their environment 
and makes interpretations of the environment that influence their findings. This stance is 
supported by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, 15–16) who claim a purely objective re-
search of being a myth by noting that despite choosing a positivist worldview, researchers 
usually belong to some social groups and make subjective decisions during the research 
process. It could, therefore, be interpreted that the surroundings of researchers influence 
them and lead them into making subjective decisions. Consequently, some interpretivist 
influences can even be found from the positivist worldview. In fact, Weber (2004, 8–9) 
takes the notion further by stating that the discussion on the positivism versus interpre-
tivism paradigm is to a large extent outdated or false and should be ceased. The research 
premise that demonstrates the basic assumptions of the thesis is capsulized in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Research premise for the thesis 
Research premise 
Philosophical worldview Interpretivist 
Methodology Mixed methods 
Methods and techniques Survey with both quantitative and qualitative ques-
tions, qualitative systematic literature review 
 
In conclusion, this thesis adopts an interpretivist worldview and utilizes mixed meth-
ods methodology; these choices support each other well and form a coherent basis for the 
research. The mixed methods approach will be further discussed in the next section. 
1.5 Research methodology  
Various researchers have provided descriptions of a methodology. Van Manen (2016, 
27), for example, notes that methodology refers to the philosophical stance or the basic 
assumptions of research, whereas Creswell and Plano Clark (2007, 4) describe it as “the 
framework that relates to the entire process of research”, which in turn, affects the prac-
tices of research (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007, 4). Crotty (1998, 3), on the other hand, 
describes methodology as the action plan or design that influences the choice of methods 
and links the methods to the desired results. Methods, then, are the means of conducting 
the collection and analysis of data (Creswell & Plano Clark 2007, 4). Similarly, Creswell 
(2003; 6, 13) notes that the researcher merges the knowledge claims or philosophical as-
sumptions to the research design. This implies, that the chosen philosophical viewpoint 
determines the type of design and methods for the research. 
The methodology chosen for this study is mixed methods: As the study combines both 
quantitative and qualitative elements, it is natural to choose a multi-method approach. 
According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2007, 5), mixed methods combines quantitative 
and qualitative data in one or multiple studies. Furthermore, the authors explain that 
mixed methods can utilize one worldview or adopt multiple worldviews (Creswell & 
Plano Clark 2007, 5). Additionally, mixed method approach offers multiple advantages. 
As it combines qualitative and quantitative research, it can offer benefits from both sides 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004, 21, 23). Consequently, as the researcher is not limited to 
utilizing the methods of a single approach, they can investigate a wider set of research 
questions. Mixed methods methodology helps in finding more fruitful insights and in 
compensating the weaknesses of one method with the strengths of the other. (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie 2004, 21.) Therefore, the combination of both data types enables both 
achieving a more holistic understanding of the research problems examined in the study 
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(Creswell & Plano Clark 2007, 5) and discovering more evidence for the research findings 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004, 21). 
On the other hand, mixed methods methodology also bears some weaknesses as it will 
require more resources, such as time, money and, sometimes, human resources. Further-
more, researchers utilizing mixed methods will need to understand how to use and com-
bine both methods appropriately. Moreover, researchers that pursue distinct philosophical 
worldviews, the purists, will not accept the mixing of quantitative and qualitative methods 
due to their fundamental differences. (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004, 21.) The counter 
argument to this stance was already presented in the previous section where Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004, 15) noted that researchers are surrounded by various social groups 
and subjective decisions are inevitably made during the research process. Nevertheless, 
this confrontation that is based on differing worldviews, acts as the basis for the philo-
sophical discussion regarding mixed methods.  
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) and Greene (2008) (according to Creswell 2010, 10–
11) have presented various stances that describe the different views regarding the debate 
of mixing philosophical frameworks or paradigms in mixed methods. Three of these 
stances will be presented next based on the notions of Greene (2008, 10–12): According 
to the first view, the purist stance, different paradigms are incompatible and, thus, cannot 
be combined in a research. The second view named the complementary strengths stance, 
on the other hand, proposes that the paradigms are not inconsistent but differ from each 
other and, therefore, should be separated in a research. However, it relies on the notion 
that these differences are valuable in strengthening the research. The third view, the a-
paradigmatic stance, in turn, relies on the notion that the different paradigms are inde-
pendent and can be freely combined in various ways in research. (Greene 2008, 10–12.) 
When choosing mixed methods, questions on the primary dimensions of research de-
sign arise (Creswell 2010, 14). According to Greene (2008, 13–14) such dimensions in-
clude interaction, status and timing. Interaction refers to which degree the different meth-
ods utilized in mixed methods research are designed and implemented independently or 
interactively. Status, on the other hand, refers to whether one methodology is prioritized 
over the others or whether different methodologies are considered as equal in the study. 
Furthermore, timing determines whether the distinct methods are conducted in parallel or 
sequentially. (Greene 2008, 13–14.) In this study, quantitative and qualitative research 
parts are regarded as equal as they both seek to find an answer to specific research ques-
tions. On the other hand, the types are combined as they complement each other and con-
tribute to the larger theme of information security services. From a process perspective, 
this cross sectional study is conducted in sequence as the systematic literature review 
(SLR) is executed first which is then proceeded by the quantitative survey; the results of 
the literature review will be utilized in the survey. From an empirical perspective, on the 
other hand, the study is conducted in parallel as the survey part examines both quantitative 
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and qualitative questions simultaneously. To understand the relevance of the SLR to this 
study, it is noteworthy to mention, that instead of being a traditional literature review, the 
SLR conducted in this study represents a type of concept analysis that does not focus on 
the output of the articles but on the terminology utilized in them. Final conclusions of the 
results from both research parts will be done concurrently and presented in Discussion 
(chapter 5). The interconnections between the systematic literature review and the empir-
ical part are described in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Interconnections between the systematic literature review and the survey 
In conclusion it can be stated, that mixed methods as the chosen methodology supports 
the study aims and research questions well and enables richer results through the mixing 
of different types of data – qualitative and quantitative. As the study combines different 
types of research questions, differing approaches and triangulation of different types of 
data is consequently needed. Utilizing the mixed methods approach in this thesis is further 
supported as the study combines the survey consisting of quantitative and qualitative el-
ements with a systematic literature review which itself adopts a qualitative perspective. 
This approach will, therefore, yield best results. Kananen (2008, 11) concludes this idea 
well by stating that more reliable results can be achieved by utilizing different perspec-
tives. The next section will describe the process for collecting and analysing empirical 
data in this thesis. 
1.6 Data collection and analysis methods  
From the empirical viewpoint, this thesis process includes a quantitative survey. The sur-
vey part aims at complementing the findings of the systematic literature review (SLR) 
regarding infosec services and identifying the information security services that are used 
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in companies operating in Finland. Therefore, the survey utilizes the information gained 
and categorization created in the SLR and elaborates on that knowledge. The following 
sections describe both the survey data collection and analysis methods utilized in this 
study. 
1.6.1 Data collection 
A quantitative research aims at generalizing information from a small group into a popu-
lation (Kananen 2008, 10). It requires a sample that is both representative and sufficiently 
large (Heikkilä 2008, 16). Furthermore, quantitative research utilizes numerical infor-
mation and statistical inference to describe the phenomenon at hand (Heikkilä 2008, 16–
17). Qualitative research, on the other hand, utilizes non-numerical information, such as 
text (Kananen 2008, 11). Furthermore, it aims at understanding the phenomenon through 
soft information instead of providing statistical generalizations (Heikkilä 2008, 16–17). 
Although mainly quantitative, the survey in this study also has qualitative characteristics 
as it includes open-ended questions. The population for this study, in turn, consists of 
companies operating in Finland. The survey process is described in detail in section 4.1. 
The survey will utilize a questionnaire created with Webropol data survey and analysis 
tool. A good questionnaire is, for example, clear and presentable, the instructions are ex-
plicit and the questions proceed in a logical order (Heikkilä, 2008, 48). The questionnaire 
of the survey consists of both closed-ended and open-ended questions. The closed-ended 
questions include both multiple-choice questions and a combination of multiple-ended 
and open-ended questions; an example of such a question would be one that includes the 
option ‘Other, what?’. Heikkilä (2008, 52) notes that the use of these hybrid questions is 
useful when it is uncertain if the response options include all possible versions. Another 
type of closed-ended questions in the questionnaire include scaled questions. These ques-
tions utilize five ordered response levels from Likert scale. Likert scale is often utilized 
in measuring the opinions of the respondent; the scale presents opposite claims at both 
ends of the scale (Heikkilä 2008, 53). Additionally, the option ‘I don’t know or do not 
want to answer’ has been added to separate it from the answer option ‘Neither agree nor 
disagree’ and to give the respondent a possibility to leave the question unanswered. This 
is supported by Kananen (2008, 24), who notes that to differentiate the unwillingness and 
inability of the respondent to answer, it should first be clarified whether the respondent 
can or is willing to answer the question. Furthermore, the lack of the additional option 
could cause the mixing of neutral opinions, such as ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ with the 
respondent’s unwillingness to answer (Kananen 2008, 24). When observing this through 
the topic of the survey, questions related to the information security issues of organiza-
tions can be delicate and, therefore, respondents might feel reluctant to answer them. 
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Quantitative surveys may include open-ended questions but, opposite to the unlimited 
questions that utilize associations in qualitative research, they are formed in a way that 
limit the direction of the respondent’s thoughts (Heikkilä 2008, 49). On the positive side, 
open-ended questions may produce information that cannot be obtained with closed-
ended questions (Kananen 2008, 26). However, open-ended questions are laborious to 
process and categorize (Heikkilä 2008, 49). Moreover, a poorly phrased open-ended ques-
tion may yield answers that do not benefit the research (Kananen 2008, 25). Furthermore, 
the respondents may be tempted to leave them unanswered (Heikkilä 2008, 49). This 
study utilizes open-ended questions as they may bring information that would not be pos-
sible to capture with closed-ended questions; therefore it is expected, that the open-ended 
questions bring more fertile data to certain questions. In general, the survey questions 
should be clear, necessary for the research, unambiguous, polite and the language used 
should be correct (Heikkilä 2008, 57). Furthermore, the questions should not be too long, 
complex or leading and they should address only one topic at a time (Heikkilä 2008, 57.) 
Therefore, multiple aspects should be taken into account when building a questionnaire. 
The questionnaire for this survey is available in Appendix 3.2. 
According to Heikkilä (2008, 61–62) a survey consists of both a questionnaire and a 
cover letter. In fact, the cover letter may determine, whether the respondent is willing to 
answer the questionnaire. Therefore, the cover letter should be polite and inform the re-
spondent of, for example, who is conducting the study, the purpose of the study, how the 
data of the survey will be utilized and how the respondents for the survey have been 
chosen. (Heikkilä 2008, 61–62.) These aspects have been taken into consideration in the 
survey of this study. The next section will discuss the data analysis of the survey. 
1.6.2 Data analysis  
The data gathered through the survey of this study will be analysed by utilizing both sta-
tistical and qualitative methods; the statistical methods will be utilized for the closed-
ended questions, whereas the qualitative approach will be utilized for the open-ended 
questions and for similar options in closed-ended questions. The statistical part will be 
conducted with Webropol data survey and analysis tool and complemented with analysis. 
Hypotheses will not be presented in this study as Hirsjärvi et al. (2003, 148) state that 
hypotheses should be based on theory, theoretical models and prior studies and if such 
are unavailable, hypotheses should not be utilized. Furthermore, the authors explain that 
hypotheses are usually utilized in explanatory and comparative studies, whereas in de-
scriptive and exploratory studies not (Hirsjärvi et al. 2003, 148). The latter characteristics 
better describe this study and, therefore, the exclusion of hypotheses is justified. 
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The qualitative, open-ended questions will be analysed and, in case of large amounts 
of data, coded. Yin (2011, 186–187) essentially nominates coding as the disassembling 
of data and describes it as classifying words or parts of the text with codes or labels. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998, 143), in turn, present various types of coding data, such as 
selective coding for “integrating and refining the theory”, open coding where categories 
and their characteristics are determined and the differences in the dimensions of those 
categories examined and, finally, axial coding for systematically developing and linking 
categories to subcategories. Yin (2011, 186–187), on the other hand, notes that the re-
searcher can also utilize a self-developed method for handling the data. The coding uti-
lized in this study will strive to find main themes or categories within the data. 
The findings of the empirical part will be later combined with the findings of the sys-
tematic literature review in section 5.1; these will form the final results of this study. The 
mixing of qualitative and quantitative data will produce better understanding of the re-
search questions (Creswell & Plano Clark 2007, 5) as has been described earlier in this 
study in section 1.5. The process of combining different datasets was pictured earlier in 
Figure 1. Next, however, the study will discuss the ethical aspects of research. 
1.7 Ethical considerations of the research 
Ethical aspects are an important topic to be considered throughout the thesis process. This 
thought is supported by Vilkka (2015, 41), who notes that research ethics – referring to 
the commonly agreed rules of research – follow the research process from the brainstorm-
ing phase through the research results to communication (Vilkka 2015, 41). Responsible 
conduct of research, which is a topic closely related to research ethics, refers to following 
ethical research and information sourcing methods accepted by the scientific community 
(Vilkka 2015, 41). To promote responsible conduct of research, the Finnish Advisory 
Board on Research Integrity (TENK) (Responsible conduct of research – – 2012, 28–31) 
has released a guide that presents nine premises for research integrity. Research integrity, 
according to TENK, refers to the following of ethically responsible and justified modes 
of operation in research and to the identification and elimination of violations and dis-
honesty in all fields of research. These principles for the responsible conduct of research 
state, for example, that research should follow the modes of operation accepted by the 
scientific community, including integrity, accuracy and meticulousness. Additionally, re-
search should utilize ethically sustainable research, information sourcing and evaluation 
methods and the publication of results should be done in a responsible and open manner. 
Furthermore, researchers should appropriately respect the work of other researchers and 
acknowledge the achievements of others by giving their work proper credit in their own 
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work. (Responsible conduct of research 2012, 28–31.) This thesis promotes the said prin-
ciples of ethical research, for example, by following ethical ways of conducting, reporting 
and evaluating the research throughout the research process and by using proper citations 
to the work of other researchers. 
When discussing the ethical perspective of research, it is useful to consider how relia-
bility and validity can be considered in individual research. Hirsjärvi et al. (2003, 213–
214) refers to reliability as the repeatability of research which means that the results of a 
reliable research should be repeatable by other researchers. Validity, on the other hand, 
refers to the ability of the chosen research methods in measuring what was intended to be 
measured. Validity can prove to be a problem, for example, in surveys if the respondents 
do not understand the survey questions similarly to the researcher. Furthermore, Hirsjärvi 
et al. (2003, 214–215) note, that even though the concepts of reliability and validity are 
often linked to quantitative research, the fulfilment of these concepts should be evaluated 
in all research. In fact, in qualitative research, reliability can be improved by carefully 
explaining how the research was conducted. The validity of both quantitative and quali-
tative research, in turn, can be improved by using triangulation. (Hirsjärvi et al. 2003, 
214–215.) Denzin (2009, 301–303) divides triangulation into four main types that include 
methodological, data, investigator and theoretical triangulation. Methodological triangu-
lation refers to the triangulation of research methodologies, data triangulation refers to 
mixing various data sources, theoretical triangulation refers to using various perspectives 
and hypotheses when interpreting data and, finally, investigator triangulation refers to 
the use of multiple observers (Denzin 2009, 301–303.) In the latter type, the observers 
can be interpreted as the researchers of a study. 
To increase the validity and reliability of this study, careful descriptions of the steps 
of the research process, such as of the systematic literature review (SLR), categorization 
and survey processes, have been included in this thesis. To support these descriptions, in 
turn, meticulous planning of the phases and reporting of the outcomes of each phase of 
the research has been done. This is important to ensure coherent, justified and repeatable 
results from the research. Examples of this are the planning and pre-testing of the survey 
questions before the survey release, the SLR article inclusion criteria presented in section 
3.1 and the inclusion of detailed lists of the identified and accepted services from the SLR. 
Furthermore, the validity of the research is increased through methodological and data 
triangulation as the study combines both quantitative and qualitative research through a 
mixed methods approach. The fulfilment of the validity and reliability aspects in this 
study is discussed at the end of the research in section 5.2. 
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2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Background aims and methods 
The aim of this section is to introduce the basic concepts related to information security 
and information security services and to provide information to support the research ques-
tions presented earlier in this study (section 1.3). This information will operate as an in-
troductory pathway to the systematic literature review (SLR) that examines and analyses 
information security services through academic research. Additionally, the aim of the lit-
erature review is to support the research in overall. Furthermore, the literature review 
section will be named as background in this thesis to separate it from the systematic lit-
erature review; the SLR process and results will be presented later in chapter 3. Next the 
methods for gathering information for the background will be discussed. 
Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008, 11–12) suggest finding key words related to one’s 
own research question which helps in finding synonyms and more sources used by other 
researchers. The authors propose choosing a strategy for conducting the literature review 
and introduce two different methods for the review: subject key words and citations 
based. In the subject key words based strategy, key words related to the topic of the re-
search are identified and utilized in the literature search. In the citations based strategy, 
the emphasis is in finding new references from the reference lists of articles and other 
publications. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 11–12.) In this thesis, both subject key word 
and citations based strategies will be utilized as using different methods in the literature 
search process supports the aim of finding rich information on key literature. 
The background section will next present the key concepts related to information se-
curity and services; the prior topic will be discussed first. 
2.2 Information security 
2.2.1 Characteristics of information security 
As societies are becoming increasingly dependent on information systems and engaging 
in the continuous use of information, it places increasing demands on information security 
in protecting vital information under different conditions. Information security, therefore, 
can be seen as a fundamental factor in enabling operations. (Effective information secu-
rity 2009, 9.) More precisely, the aim of information security is to safeguard the sustain-
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able prosperity and continuity of business and to minimize threats (SFS 2012, 18). Con-
sequently, information security includes the application and management of suitable se-
curity mechanisms; taking different threats into consideration is also included in this. 
(SFS 2012, 18.) It is also important to understand what information security is; therefore, 
this section discusses the concept of information security.  
The information security related ISO/IEC 17799:fi standard by the International Or-
ganization for Standardization (ISO) defines information security as the act of maintain-
ing the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA triad) of information (SFS 2012, 
18, 75). Confidentiality denotes that the information stored in an information system is 
only available to authorized users (Hakala, Vainio & Vuorinen 2006, 4). Confidentiality 
is usually carried out by access control; users are only given rights to use the systems in 
the extent necessary for their work. The more critical the information system used is, the 
more important it is to maintain the integrity of data and the ability to return data from a 
backup file if unwanted changes in the information occur. (Rousku 2014, 47–48.) User 
names, passwords and encryption are ways of maintaining confidentiality (Hakala et al. 
2006, 4). 
Integrity, on the other hand, refers to prohibiting uncontrolled changes in information; 
in an organizational context this means that only those people with the permission to make 
changes can alter the information with the means assigned by the organization. This in-
formation includes data sources, such as personal data, banking systems, taxation and 
insurance information. This information cannot change uncontrollably and there has to 
be a possibility to return the information at any circumstances. (Rousku 2014, 49.) Con-
sequently, integrity also refers to the conception that the information contained by an 
information system is accurate and does not include accidental or intentional errors (Ha-
kala et al. 2006, 4). Integrity can be maintained through different solutions, such as setting 
restrictions to inserted information and utilizing solutions that detect and fix errors (Ha-
kala et al. 2006, 5). 
Finally, availability refers to information restored in information systems to be avail-
able to users with the response time agreed in service level agreements (Rousku 2014, 
50). As the world is becoming increasingly digitalized and adopting a 24/7/365 rhythm, 
information and services need to be constantly available. (Rousku 2014, 50.) Therefore, 
information should be obtainable from the system quickly enough and in the right format. 
Availability can be maintained by ensuring that the hardware utilized by information and 
communications systems is efficient enough and that the utilized software supports infor-
mation handling in the system. (Hakala et al. 2006, 4.) Additionally, information handling 
should be automatized as much as possible (Hakala et al. 2006, 5). It can be stated, that 
information security seeks to protect these three characteristics of information from both 
threats and accidents (Effective information security 2009, 9). 
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An example of information that has to maintain its confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability is customer data. If unwanted changes in the data occur, such as changing bank 
account information, it may result in economic and reputational losses for the company. 
Similarly, losing customer data through theft can have devastating effects not just on the 
company but on the customers also. On the other hand, the information has to be available 
to authorized users according to predefined rules to ensure fluent customer experience 
and business. As the use of digital services is increasing, companies should pay more 
attention to securing their customer data. For this, EU has launched the aforementioned 
general data protection regulation that places increasing demands on organizations to pro-
tect and correctly handle their customer data. 
Limiting information security to the three above mentioned three components is chal-
lenging and, thus, there are numerous additions to the classic triad definition of infor-
mation security. Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen (2007, 62) add another dimension to the 
information security triad (CIA) – non-repudiation. This refers to an individual not being 
able to deny an action, such as signing a contract, afterwards (Siponen & Oinas-Kukko-
nen 2007, 62). Therefore, the system should include the ability to reliably recognize and 
record the information of the user; non-repudiation can be carried out through encryption 
solutions with time-limited user rights or by utilizing biometric identification, such as 
fingerprint identification. Non-repudiation supports the identification of both the origins 
of information and unauthorized use of information. (Hakala et al. 2006, 5.) Hakala et al. 
(2006, 5) also note that the classical information security triad is seen as insufficient as it 
neither pays enough attention to the identity of the information provider and owner, nor 
recognizes the value of hardware and information and communications systems. They 
present a wider definition for information security that include CIA, non-repudiation and 
access control. Access control refers to restricting the use of information handling infra-
structure, such as data-communications connections and hardware for personal purposes 
as they burden the connections, weaken usability and might subject the company to mal-
ware exposure. Another possible feature to include is authentication, which refers to the 
reliable authentication of information system users and equipment. (Hakala et al. 2006, 
5–6.) ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard also recognizes non-repudiation as an important fac-
tor and, additionally, proposes authenticity, responsibility and reliability as characteris-
tics of information security (SFS 2012, 75). It is noteworthy to mention that the various 
definitions are not clearly distinctive but can be regarded as overlapping. 
Information security is obtained by implementing security mechanisms that have been 
chosen through a risk management process and are managed through an information se-
curity management system. The information management system includes a policy, pro-
cesses, procedures, organizational structures, software and hardware, that are utilized to 
protect information assets. These security mechanisms need to be defined, implemented, 
managed, reviewed and improved if necessary to guarantee that the security and business 
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objectives of an organization are met. These information security mechanisms need to be 
seamlessly integrated with the business processes of an organization (SFS 2012, 18.) 
Nonetheless, policies and systems do not alone guarantee the security of information. 
According to ENISA (2006, 8), people are a more important factor in information security 
than technology. Additionally, employees pose a far higher threat on information security 
than external intruders. Therefore, information security cannot be viewed merely as a 
technical issue but a management issue (ENISA 2006, 8) and, similarly to information 
systems, people possess a key role in it. In conclusion, information security can be de-
scribed as a chain where the weakest link determines the strength of the whole chain 
(ENISA 2006, 8). The next section, in turn, will distinguish and discuss some key con-
cepts related to information security. 
2.2.2 Information security, cyber security or data privacy? 
When discussing information security, the terms cyber security and privacy also emerge. 
To distinguish the three terms from each other, the latter two terms will be briefly dis-
cussed next. As von Solms and van Niekerk (2013, 97) note, information and cyber secu-
rity are often referred to as synonyms but, in fact, bear differences. According to the au-
thors, information security refers to the protection of information from mischief caused 
by both vulnerabilities and threats. Information in this concept is regarded as an asset and 
human aspect as the role of people participating in the infosec process. Cyber security, in 
turn, extends to safeguarding other assets besides information, and people are not only 
regarded as vulnerabilities or possible sources of cyber threats but also as the targets of 
such threats. Thus, people should be regarded as assets that need to be protected. The 
authors conclude that cyber security, therefore, does not merely refer to safeguarding cy-
berspace but to protecting any actors and their assets that operate and are accessible in 
cyberspace. (Von Solms & van Niekerk 2013; 97, 101.) Furthermore, the authors distin-
guish information and communication technology (ICT) security from the two prior con-
cepts and depict their interrelations in Figure 2 (von Solms & van Niekerk 2013, 101). 
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Figure 2 Information, cyber and ICT security (adapted from von Solms & van 
Niekerk 2013, 101) 
The depiction illustrates that information security comprises both information that are 
handled with information communication technology and with other means, whereas 
cyber security refers to both information and other assets vulnerable to threats via infor-
mation and communication technology. Furthermore, ICT security is a component of in-
formation security, whereas information security is a component of cyber security (von 
Solms & van Niekerk 2013, 101); this affirms the intersections between these concepts. 
Other authors have also attempted to make a distinction between infosec and cyber 
security. Similarly to von Solms and van Niekerk (2013), Rousku (2014, 54–56) states 
that cyber security as a term is much more comprehensive than information security. 
Where information security refers to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of in-
formation, cyber security, in turn, refers to guaranteeing a reliable cyber operating envi-
ronment and ensuring the appropriate use of that environment. A cyber operating envi-
ronment, in turn, consists of multiple information systems and is meant for electronic data 
processing. (Rousku 2014, 56.) Furthermore, cyber security focuses on safeguarding in-
formation systems against risks that threaten their operations, especially emphasizing 
those key environments that are connected to networks and internet (Rousku 2014, 57). 
The threats targeted at cyber security environments not only consist of threats towards 
information security, operational continuity and privacy but also include threats that can 
be caused by non-electronic sources, such as human error or natural disasters. (Rousku 
2014, 54–57.) 
Tonge, Kasture and Chaudhari (2013, 67–68), in turn, define cyber security as a func-
tion that aims at safeguarding information systems, such as databases, networks and ap-
plications, and information itself through technological security and suitable processes. 
Furthermore, it covers the physical protection of “personal information and technology 
resources”, including software and hardware, from unauthorized access. Cyber security 
25 
not only comprises the security of IT systems but also of digital networks including crit-
ical infrastructures and cyber space within which they operate. However, according to the 
authors, mere technological measures are not sufficient to protect those information sys-
tems and information but a human aspect must be taken into account in the form of edu-
cation. (Tonge et al. 2013, 67–68.) In conclusion it can be stated, that if a difference be-
tween information and cyber security ought to be drawn, cyber security as a concept is 
considered more comprehensive than information security.  
Privacy is another concept often linked to information security. Privacy protection re-
fers to safeguarding the privacy of individuals and other supportive rights when handling 
personal data (Valtionhallinnon tietoturvasanasto 2008, 105). Privacy protection in-
cludes, for example, prohibiting unauthorized access to personal information, maintain-
ing the confidentiality of information and protecting personal data from unauthorized or 
harmful use. (Valtionhallinnon tietoturvasanasto 2008, 105.) 
Smith, Dinev and Xu (2011, 990–991), in turn, differentiate information, physical and 
general privacy: Information privacy refers to access to identifiable personal information, 
whereas physical privacy refers to physical access either to an individual or to their per-
sonal space. General privacy, then, comprises the two types. The authors note that the 
difference between information and physical privacy is rarely pronounced in either re-
search or public discussion; however, they interpret information privacy as privacy in 
their study. (Smith et al. 2011, 990–91.) 
Even though privacy is not the main topic of this thesis, it is important to recognize 
that the new general data protection regulation (GDPR) will compel companies to pay 
more attention to and invest in their information security. Therefore, understanding the 
influence of the new regulation on companies is important in this thesis: Investing in 
information security will most likely result in increased investments in information secu-
rity products, solutions and services. 
2.3 Aspects on information security 
There are various types of information security and ways of categorizing the concept; this 
section observes some of these categorizations. 
The Finnish Ministry of Finance has set a management group for the digital security 
of the public administration – VAHTI – that operates as the cooperation, preparation and 
coordination body for the organizations responsible for the development and control of 
the digital security of the public administration (VAHTI-toiminta 2017). As part of their 
operations, the Ministry of Finance and VAHTI have released VAHTI instructions. 
VAHTI instructions divide information security into the following eight information se-
curity areas (Classification of instructions 2017): 
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 physical security 
 administrative information security 
 personnel security 
 operations security 
 equipment security 
 software security 
 information material security 
 data-communications security. 
Similarly to VAHTI instructions, Hakala et al. (2006, 10–12) present the same infor-
mation security areas but distinguish operations security as an area that is embedded in 
all of the other areas. All of the eight information security areas will be presented in more 
detail next. 
The first three areas handle personnel, physical and administrative information secu-
rity. The first area, administrative information security seeks to guarantee the develop-
ment and management of information security in an organization (Hakala et al. 2006, 10) 
by utilizing administrative measures, such as organizational arrangements, specifications 
of tasks and responsibilities, guidance, training and supervision of staff (Valtionhallinnon 
tietoturvasanasto 2008, 31). It includes communication with both the parties responsible 
for security within the organization and with external authorities. Additionally, adminis-
trative information security evaluates the impact of law and different contracts to the in-
formation security practices of the organization. (Hakala et al. 2006, 10–11.) The second 
area, physical security, on the other hand, includes the protection of – for example – peo-
ple, premises, equipment and materials (Valtionhallinnon tietoturvasanasto 2008, 30) 
against both physical threats, such as mischief and burglaries, and environmental threats, 
such as malfunctions in the heating system and damages caused by fire or water (Hakala 
et al. 2006, 11). Physical security includes measures, such as guarding and physical access 
control (Valtionhallinnon tietoturvasanasto 2008, 30). A clear example of this type of 
security would be electronic locks and key tags. The third area, personnel security, refers 
to managing security factors related to, for example, personnel reliability and suitability, 
substitution arrangements and personnel protection (Valtionhallinnon tietoturvasanasto 
2008, 33). It seeks to guarantee the performance of information system users and limit 
their access rights to organizational information and information systems. It utilizes meth-
ods, such as information system related training, defining rights and responsibilities re-
garding information systems and checking employee criminal records. (Hakala et al. 
2006, 11.) 
The next areas handle information material, software and equipment security. The 
fourth area, information material security or data security, refers to measures to maintain 
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of documents, files and other information 
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materials (Valtionhallinnon tietoturvasanasto 2008, 101). Furthermore, information ma-
terial security includes cataloguing, categorizing (Valtionhallinnon tietoturvasanasto 
2008, 101), storing, verifying, restoring and destroying information material (Hakala et 
al. 2006, 11). The fifth area, software security, in turn, includes software-related security 
measures, such as identification, observation, logging and quality control measures 
(Valtionhallinnon tietoturvasanasto 2008, 68). Other related activities include software 
testing to ensure the suitability of applications for their planned use, the reciprocal com-
patibility of software and the reliability and faultlessness of operations. Furthermore, soft-
ware security includes software version and licence management. (Hakala et al. 2006, 
11–12.) The sixth area, equipment security or hardware security, on the other hand, refers 
to activities related to computers and other equipment that are connected to the infor-
mation systems of an organization (Hakala et al. 2006, 12). Equipment security consists 
of activities that ensure the usability, operation, maintenance and availability of equip-
ment (Valtionhallinnon tietoturvasanasto 2008, 57). These activities include, for example, 
testing, maintenance and preparation for equipment ageing (Hakala et al. 2006, 12). Fur-
thermore, equipment security is utilized for ensuring the lifespan of equipment with the 
help of measures, such as installation, guarantee, maintenance, support services, contracts 
and safe omission of equipment at the end of its lifespan (Valtionhallinnon tietotur-
vasanasto 2008, 57). In addition, tasks related to evaluating and minimizing risks derived 
from the use of equipment, such as the risk of injuries, are included in equipment security 
(Hakala et al. 2006, 12). 
The last two areas include data-communications and operations security. The seventh 
area, data-communications security or telecommunications security, includes the protec-
tion of communication solutions, such as local area networks and other communication 
systems (Hakala et al. 2006, 12). The area includes safety measures to ensure, for exam-
ple, the usability of data transfer connections, the protection and encryption of data trans-
fer and user identification; additionally, it includes laws, norms and actions that strive to 
achieve data-communications security (Valtionhallinnon tietoturvasanasto 2008, 103). 
Finally, operations security includes preparing for risks derived from system usage (Ha-
kala et al. 2006, 12). It includes measures related to the use of IT, the operating environ-
ment, data processing and its continuity; furthermore, other measures include support, 
development and maintenance activities in order to improve information security 
(Valtionhallinnon tietoturvakäsitteistö 2003, 22). 
Hakala et al. (2006, 12) conclude that the division between different information se-
curity areas can be seen as artificial as all the areas influence each other and share com-
mon factors. However, the division, in addition to the three main components of infor-
mation security discussed earlier, helps in planning organizational information security. 
(Hakala et al. 2006, 12.) In fact, identifying the different areas of information security 
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enables organizations to understand that instead of homogenous information security, 
there are various types of it. 
Whitman and Mattord (2012, 8), on the other hand, presented a more compressed ver-
sion of the information security areas. These six information security layers are: 
 physical security 
 operations security 
 personnel security 
 communications security 
 network security 
 information security. 
Similarly to the previous examples, Whitman and Mattord (2012, 8) define the security 
layers as safeguarding physical areas from unauthorized access (physical security), pro-
tecting people authorized to access the organization (personnel security), ensuring oper-
ations and activities (operations security), securing content and media (communications 
security), shielding networks, their contents and connections (network security) and, fi-
nally, ensuring the CIA properties of information assets via awareness building, technol-
ogy and policies (information security). 
ISO 27002 standard (ISO/IEC 27002 2013, 1), on the other hand, discusses infor-
mation security controls and divides them into 14 categories that are referred to as security 
control clauses; these categories are further divided into 35 main security categories. The 
14 security control clause categories (ISO/IEC 27002 2013) have been pictured in Figure 
3; the number in front of the name refers to the category number in the standard. 
 
Figure 3 The 14 security control clauses of ISO 27002 standard 
The categories address different aspects of information security; each of them will be 
presented next. The first five categories discuss topics of information security in policies, 
human resources, asset management and access control; furthermore, organizing infor-
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mation within the organization is examined. Information security policies (5) concen-
trates on the management perspective and policies to promote and direct information se-
curity within the organization (ISO/IEC 27002 2013, 2). Organization of information se-
curity (6) proceeds with the management approach and focuses on constituting a manage-
ment framework for the implementation, operation and control of information security 
within the organization. This area includes tasks, such as setting roles and responsibilities 
regarding information security, maintaining relationships with stakeholder groups, such 
as authorities, and determining policies and security controls for telework and mobile 
devices. Human resource security (7) extends the roles and responsibilities viewpoint and 
presents measures to be taken into account with both suppliers and employees before, 
during and after an employment. Asset management (8), on the other hand, discusses the 
identification and safeguarding of assets within the organization. It consists of defining 
responsibilities for assets, classification of information and handling of media. The next 
information security control clause, Access control (9), focuses on controlling access to 
the information of an organization through business requirements, user responsibilities 
and user access management. Additionally, this area takes into consideration access con-
trol to applications and systems. (ISO/IEC 27002 2013, 2–28.) 
The next five categories address the security of operations, communications and phys-
ical environment. In addition, cryptography and secure system development is discussed. 
From the aforementioned areas, Cryptography (10) aims to guarantee the suitable use of 
cryptography in information security and provides guidance on the implementation of 
cryptographic controls. Physical and environmental security (11), on the other hand, 
adopts a physical perspective and discusses the protection of the facilities and equipment 
of an organization. Operations security (12), in turn, observes information security from 
the perspective of securing the information and information processing facilities of an 
organization with the help of operational procedures, backups and audits. Additionally, 
the category discusses event monitoring and logging, technical vulnerability management 
and protecting the information processing facilities of the organization from malware. 
The next security control clause, Communications security (13), concentrates on safe-
guarding information and information transfers within networks and securing the facili-
ties processing the information, whereas System acquisition, development and mainte-
nance (14) aims to guarantee information security in information systems throughout 
their lifespan. The category discusses topics, such as security requirements for the sys-
tems, protection of test data and security aspect considerations during the development of 
information systems. (ISO/IEC 27002 2013, 28–62.) 
The last four categories concentrate on business continuity, compliance, incident man-
agement and supplier relationships. The latter (15 supplier relationships) aims to safe-
guard the assets of an organization from its suppliers and maintain an appropriate level 
of security in service deliveries; the suggested means include policies, agreements and 
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both supplier monitoring and auditing. Information security incident management (16), 
on the other hand, aims to secure efficient management of security incidents with the help 
of methods, such as defining responsibilities and procedures, reporting and assessing 
weaknesses, learning form incidents and collecting evidence. Information security as-
pects of business continuity management (17), in turn, strives to incorporate information 
security continuity into the business continuity management systems of an organization 
and suggest redundancies to guarantee that the information processing facilities of the 
organization fulfil their availability requirements. Finally, Compliance (18) refers to se-
curing an organization of any legal or contractual violations related to information secu-
rity or its requirements; such requirements include, for example, intellectual property 
rights and privacy. Additionally, the category includes information security reviews to 
guarantee the compliance of information security operations to the policies and proce-
dures of the organization. (ISO/IEC 27002 2013, 62–78.) 
The above presented examples of aspects on information security demonstrate that 
various parallel ways of categorizing information security exist. Despite their differences, 
it can be concluded that the different categorizations all strive to both clarify the concept 
and present the differences between the different types of information security. This study 
will next, however, focus on another topic important for this research – services. 
2.4 Services 
In order to understand how information security services can be defined, it is seminal to 
understand what the basic components behind them – services – are. This section not only 
discusses how services can be characterized, but also examines what are the different 
ways of categorizing them. 
There are various ways of describing services. Kotler and Keller (2011, 356) define a 
service as “any act or performance one party can offer to another that is essentially intan-
gible and does not result in the ownership of anything”. Vargo and Lusch (2004, 2), on 
the other hand, parallel services to “the application of specialized competences" with the 
help of actions and processes that benefit either the entity itself or another entity. Exam-
ples of these specialized competences include skills and knowledge. Yet another defini-
tion is presented by Wirtz and Lovelock (2016, 21), who state that services are often time-
based economic deeds that are conducted by one entity to another one – these deeds or 
activities provide desired outcomes to their recipients or objects. Furthermore, instead of 
regarding services as the transferring of ownership, the authors emphasize characteristics 
of value exchange through economic activities between the two parties involved. (Wirtz 
& Lovelock 2016, 21.) Following the notions of Wirtz and Lovelock (2016, 21), Kotler 
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and Keller (2011, 358) present the four pivotal characteristics of services, which are de-
picted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 The four distinctive characteristics of services 
The first two characteristics are intangibility and inseparability. From these the prior 
trait, intangibility, signifies that services cannot be sensed – in other words seen, felt, 
smelled, heard or tasted – prior to their purchase (Levitt 1981, 37; Kotler & Keller 2011, 
358). Additionally, these services can rarely be experienced or inspected beforehand 
(Levitt 1981, 37). This is the case with, for example, accommodation or application 
maintenance services. Inseparability, on the other hand, refers to the simultaneous pro-
duction and consumption of services. The provider of the service plays a major role in the 
distribution of the service as the party purchasing the service may have preferences re-
garding the provider. (Kotler & Keller 2011, 359.) For example, a customer might feel 
reluctant to accept the substitution of a senior doctor or consultant with a junior one. 
The last two characteristics of a service are variability and perishability. Variability 
illustrates the varied nature of services (Kotler & Keller 2011, 359). It refers to the fact 
that the provided service varies based on where, when and to whom it is being provided. 
Additionally, the service provider will influence the service – one customer service rep-
resentative might be less willing or able to provide good customer service to the customer 
than the other. Therefore, services can be described as a subjective experience. To de-
crease the risks of the variability of services, buyers turn to other buyers for feedback of 
the service, whereas service providers utilize marketing and service guarantees. The final 
trait, perishability, refers to the service being available only when it is being produced; 
this means that a service cannot be stored which, in turn, can cause problems to the service 
provider. (Kotler & Keller 2011, 359–361.) Car repair firms, for example, become 
crowded with customer orders during spring and autumn when the mandatory tire chang-
ing period in Finland occurs. Similarly, Kotler and Keller (2011, 361) name public trans-
portation during rush hours as an example of such a service: The service providers need 
to be prepared for the peak hours with a larger amount of vehicles than would be needed 
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in the case of even consumption of transportation services throughout the day. Service 
providers may utilize various methods to level the peaks in demand, such as reservation 
systems and off-peak discounts. (Kotler & Keller 2011, 361.) 
Additionally, the production of services may be, but is not necessarily, connected with 
physical products. Kotler and Keller (2011, 356) present various service mix categories, 
in which the role of services in offering varies from low to high. In pure tangible good, 
the offering consists merely of products, such as toothpaste, whereas in tangible good 
with accompanying services, the product is supplemented with a service. (Kotler & Keller 
2011, 356.) An example of the latter would be a new car that includes emergency call 
services. A hybrid, in turn, combines products and services equally, such as restaurant 
meals that combine food with food preparations and serving (Kotler & Keller 2011, 356) 
or an ERP system with maintenance services. In major service with accompanying minor 
goods and services, on the other hand, the offering mainly consists of the service but is 
supplemented with minor products or services, such as a flight ticket is accompanied with 
refreshments. Finally, in a pure service, the offering consists only of the intangible ser-
vice, such as massage. (Kotler & Keller 2011, 356–357.) Another example of a pure ser-
vice is virtual training. 
In addition to the service mix categories, services differ from each other in various 
ways. Firstly, they can be people or equipment based (Kotler & Keller 2011, 357). An 
example of the former would be a haircut in a barbershop, whereas launderettes exemplify 
the latter. Secondly, services can have different delivery processes (Kotler & Keller 2011, 
357), such as offering training services through physical lessons or an eLearning course. 
Thirdly, services meet different needs, which are either personal or business require-
ments. Fourthly, the need for the presence of the customer varies. (Kotler & Keller 2011, 
357.) If we utilize the prior example of a haircut, a customer needs to be present for the 
service, whereas in the case of dry cleaning or overnight software updates, customer pres-
ence is not needed. Finally, services can de differentiated based on their objectives, such 
as non-profit and profit, and based on their ownership referring to public or private own-
ership (Kotler & Keller 2011, 357). 
Understanding the basic concepts of services is important when moving on to the sys-
tematic literature review (SLR) that focuses on the services topic from the information 
security perspective. The SLR process will be presented next. 
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3 SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Systematic literature review process 
Kitchenham and Charters (2007, 3) explain that a systematic literature review (SLR) re-
fers to a method where a certain research topic is examined through identifying and in-
terpreting all information related to that topic. Systematic literature reviews can be uti-
lized to summarize evidence, to identify gaps in literature or to build a base for new re-
search. The method follows a predefined search plan; therefore, it should present both 
material that supports the researcher’s research question and material that does not sup-
port it. (Kitchenham & Charters 2007, 3.)  
The benefits of SLR include impartiality and a wide perspective on the research ques-
tion as the review may include materials that utilize different research methods. On the 
other hand, systematic literature reviews are more laborious than traditional literature re-
views. (Kitchenham & Charters 2007, 4.) This method was chosen for this study as it 
supported the aim of the research. With the help of SLR, it is possible to handle a wide 
set of material from which the most suitable articles are chosen for the research. 
Kitchenham and Charters (2007, 6) suggest dividing the review process into three 
phases. These three main phases are planning, conducting and reporting the review which 
will be referred to as planning, implementation and reporting phases in this study. Each 
phase includes several steps. (Kitchenham & Charters 2007, 6). The planning phase con-
sists of steps, such as identifying the need for a systematic literature review, defining 
research questions and building a review protocol. (Kitchenham & Charters 2007, 6). A 
review protocol states the methods chosen for the literature review (Kitchenham & Char-
ters 2007, 12). Additionally, it defines the background for the review, the research ques-
tions examined, strategy, criteria and practices for selecting studies, how the quality of 
studies will be assessed, timetable and strategy and synthesis for data extraction (Kitch-
enham & Charters 2007, 13). The second phase, implementation, consists of steps, such 
as the selection of initial studies and data collection. The third phase, reporting, includes, 
for example, creating and evaluating the review report. Many steps of the review are it-
erative as many activities are launched in the planning phase but refined in the implemen-
tation phase. (Kitchenham & Charters 2007, 6.) In this study, the review report refers to 
the SLR analysis and findings sections of the research. The systematic literature review 
executed in this study follows the three phases previously described. Additionally, the 
phases have been further divided into seven steps. The whole SLR process is pictured in 
Figure 5 and presented in more detail next. 
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Figure 5 Systematic literature review process (cf. Kitchenham & Charters 2007, 6) 
The first step of the SLR included the groundwork for the review and creating the 
review protocol which included, for example, the search terms and article databases to be 
used. The need for the SLR, background and research questions for the SLR have been 
presented earlier in Introduction (chapter 1). In the second step, in turn, the selection of 
article databases and search terms was finalized and an initial search was conducted. The 
chosen article databases included: 
 IEEE 
 Elsevier ScienceDirect 
 Emerald Insight 
 ACM – Association for Computing Machinery 
 Proquest 
 SpringerLink. 
These databases were chosen as they are among the most well-known databases in the 
information systems science research field. The initial idea was to utilise Google Scholar 
in the search but it soon became evident that, due to practical reasons, it would be better 
to use the article databases directly as they enable the transfer of material to a reference 
management software. Therefore, Google was used as a tool for an initial search when 
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testing search terms. Regarding the reference management software, EndNote was uti-
lized in the first phases of the systematic literature review but this was replaced with 
Mendeley as it provided better possibilities to handle the documents and make notes and 
markings during the literature exploration phase. The article search was conducted 
through advanced search where the search was limited to include journals, scholarly jour-
nals, conference papers and proceedings and, in some cases, books. If the books were 
among the journal search results, they were included in the search but if they were given 
as a separate list, they were excluded as books were not the main focus point of this re-
search. Only the material that was accessible, was included in the review. The search 
material will later be addressed as articles in this thesis. The chosen search terms were: 
 information security service(s) 
 infosec service(s) 
 infosecurity service(s) 
 IS security service(s) 
 IT security service(s). 
The terms were chosen based on information security related terms found in literature. 
To amplify the spectrum of search results, both singular and plural forms of the terms 
were utilized simultaneously with the help of the search term ‘OR’. Quotation marks, on 
the other hand, were utilized around the terms to limit the amount of irrelevant search 
results. The initial idea of the study was to utilize the term ‘commodity’ instead of ‘ser-
vice’ but as the initial search with the term conducted in Google did not provide accepta-
ble search results, the term was replaced. These search results were supported with iden-
tical results from IEEE, Emerald Insight and Elsevier ScienceDirect databases. After the 
literature search, all search results were included and transferred to EndNote into separate 
folders based on article database and search term. The total number of articles at this point 
was 656. The article search was conducted 4.9.2016. 
In the third step, only articles that fulfilled selection criteria were chosen for the next 
phase. The inclusion criteria required that the term was in some form included in either 
the title, abstract or key words of the article. The main purpose of the selection criteria 
was to ensure validity by helping the research focus on the most relevant articles. The 
number of articles, that fulfilled the selection criteria, was 60. Most of the articles in step 
two were collected from ScienceDirect and IEEE databases (226 and 167 articles). How-
ever, in the third step, most of the articles that fulfilled the inclusion criteria were collected 
from IEEE (35 articles). In addition to the selected articles, all articles were browsed 
through to separate those articles that did discuss the topic but did not fulfil the selection 
criteria. These articles were saved in case the literature review would not otherwise yield 
a sufficient amount of results. The amount of these additional articles was 141. The divi-
sion of articles per database in steps two and three is presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Amount of articles per database (SLR steps 2 and 3) 









167 226 3 20 121 119 656 
25.5% 34.5% 0.5% 3.0% 18.4% 18.1% 100.0% 
Step 3 
% 
35 5 1 2 12 5 60 
58.3% 8.3% 1.7% 3.3% 20.0% 8.3% 100.0% 
 
In the fourth step of the SLR, the findings were transferred to Mendeley reference 
management software for better handling. All the articles included in this step were com-
bined and browsed through. Additionally, various search terms were utilised when 
searching for suitable content from the articles. In total, the results included nine dupli-
cates which were removed. Additionally, other exclusion criteria included both articles 
that were written in other languages than English and those that did not address the topic. 
Furthermore, the quality of the articles was estimated and those of very poor quality, such 
as ones with such poor linguistic quality that they were difficult to read and mistakes in 
the interpretations could have been easily made, were omitted from the review. Addition-
ally, due to practical reasons, articles that fulfilled the inclusion criteria but were unavail-
able or did not contain useful material in the abstract, were excluded at this point. In the 
fifth step, the chosen articles were examined in more detail and the findings from them 
were recorded into excel. Additionally, an overview of each article was recorded. The 
amount of chosen articles in the fifth step was 36. As the amount of search results in the 
final phase was sufficient, the earlier collected additional articles were not included in the 
review. However, some of these publications were utilized in the SLR findings section to 
support the SLR analysis. 
The sixth step of the SLR included the analysis of the systematic literature review. 
Even though the writing of the analysis was conducted after the selection of final articles, 
it must be noted that the analysis of the articles and collection of findings began already 
during the first steps of the SLR. In fact, the analysis phase consisted of multiple rounds 
as more services were identified from the articles. This supports the prior notion of the 
iterative nature of the review process by Kitchenham and Charters (2007). Similarly, the 
forming of both the analysis and the findings occurred simultaneously during the process. 
The seventh and final step of the SLR included writing the results and building a catego-
rization in FreeMind mind mapping software based on the findings from the analysis. 
This task too adopted an iterative nature. The analysis and findings of the systematic lit-
erature review will be presented in the following sections. 
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3.2 Systematic literature review analysis 
This section focuses on analysing the findings from the articles qualified into the system-
atic literature review (SLR). During the SLR, a noteworthy amount of information secu-
rity services was found. All of the synonyms that appear in the articles are not listed in 
the analysis text; however, comprehensive summaries of the identified and accepted in-
fosec services have been listed after each section. Furthermore, detailed lists containing 
all of the accepted services from the SLR are presented in appendices 2.1 and 2.2. The 
articles have been grouped in the analysis based on similar services or other similar fac-
tors presented in the text. These groups discuss, for example, articles that rely on stand-
ards, concentrate on outsourced security services or embrace the information security 
triad (CIA) view on security services. Even though the articles have been divided into 
these perspectives, it by no means signifies that the positions of the articles are absolute. 
Instead, during the analysis it can be detected that the articles often include various per-
spectives, based on which they could be positioned into various groups. However, for 
reasons of clarity, the presented division of articles has been selected. Next we will pre-
sent the different perspectives, starting with the CIA stance. 
3.2.1 Security services through CIA 
A substantial portion of the SLR articles presented information security services as very 
similar to the definition of information security, from which some abided by the infor-
mation security triad of confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA), whereas some 
presented additions or modifications to this traditional listing. 
AbdElnapi, Omara & Omran (2016, 175–176) focus on a cloud security context and 
list confidentiality, integrity and data integrity, availability, non-repudiation and authori-
zation as information security services. According to them, confidentiality strives to pro-
hibit the illicit distribution of data, whereas integrity is important in a cloud storage envi-
ronment as it helps to safeguard information from illicit actions, such as content changes 
or removal. They continue by noting that digital signature can be utilized to maintain data 
integrity. Availability, on the other hand, refers to the availability of data, software or 
cloud storage to authorized users, whereas authorization helps to specify the people al-
lowed to access certain systems and information. Additionally, the authors refer to the 
article by Zissis and Lekkas (2012, 586) by noting that availability also includes the ca-
pability of a system to perform actions despite misbehaviour from authorized users. Fi-
nally, the authors describe that non-repudiation refers to the sender of a message not being 
able to deny sending the message afterwards (Feng, Chen, Ku & Liu 2010, 256), there-
fore, verifying the sender’s signature or message transmission. In addition to being a 
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method for integrity, digital signature alongside encryption algorithms and hash func-
tions, are described as techniques that provide security services. (AbdElnapi et al. 2016, 
175–176.) Interestingly, the analysis will later demonstrate that similar solutions have 
been described as services by other authors such as Xia and Hu (2006), Tamilarasan, 
Shankarapani, Qin, Mukkamala and Sung (2008) and Lin and Zhixin (2010). Neverthe-
less, these terms will not be included in the categorization from AbdElnapi et al. (2016). 
Miguel, Caballé, Xhafa and Snasel (2015) take a stance similar to AbdElnapi et al. 
(2016) concerning information security services by naming CIA as infosec services. The 
authors (Miguel et al. 2015, 490–492) concentrate on information security services and 
properties in an eLearning context and describe confidentiality and access control as in-
formation security services that both limit students’ access rights only to those e-assess-
ment results that have been addressed to them and guide tutors to access the e-assessment 
information through predefined processes. Additional services mentioned include availa-
bility, integrity, non-repudiation, time stamping, authentication, identification, failure 
control and audit. According to them, availability refers to both the student and the tutor 
being able to access the e-assessment and integrity, on the other hand, refers to inhibiting 
any unintentional or unauthorized modifications to the description of an e-assessment. 
Furthermore, the authors note that integrity should be regarded as both data integrity and 
authorship. To support non-repudiation, which they refer to as protection against untruth-
ful denial of involvement, the authors suggest time stamping that showcases the existence 
of the data prior to a specific time. Authentication and identification, in turn, are important 
services in confirming the identity of the student performing a given task to be assessed 
and in making sure that the outcome and task at hand match. Audit service, on the other 
hand, supports e-assessment accountability by registering the evaluation process, whereas 
failure control safeguards e-assessment against vulnerabilities and negative effects by 
supplying recovery for the evaluation process in cases of disruptions. Furthermore, the 
authors note that information security has evolved from singular security methods to mul-
tifaceted solutions; examples of these include public key infrastructure (PKI), biometric 
models and solutions that combine various fields of research. (Miguel et al. 2015, 490–
492). These solutions have been included in the categorization. Data integrity and author-
ship are regarded as descriptions and are, therefore, excluded from the categorization. 
Similarly to AbdElnapi et al. (2016) and Miguel et al. (2015), Lee, Kim and Kim 
(2006, 852–853) regard the three components of information security – confidentiality, 
integrity and availability – as information security services but do not provide further 
descriptions of them. However, the authors focus on peer-to-peer (P2P) function in their 
article and contrast the CIA services with the vulnerabilities in P2P. Wahab, Bahaweres, 
Alaydrus, Muhaemin and Sarno (2013, 4–5), on the other hand, mention data confidenti-
ality, data integrity and availability as security services but, similarly to Lee et al. (2006), 
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the authors do not provide further information on them. Interestingly, the authors also 
name the listed services as parameters. 
Rachedi and Benslimane (2016, 1–3) regard security services as important for arising 
applications in the area of internet of things (IoT) and reinforce the ideas of Lee et al. 
(2006) and Wahab et al. (2013) by naming confidentiality and integrity as infosec ser-
vices. Correspondingly to the notion of Miguel et al. (2015), the authors mention that 
confidentiality secures that information is only distributed to authorized parties. However, 
instead of availability, the authors raise authentication as a security service. Accordingly, 
Rachedi and Benslimane (2016, 1–3) amplify this group of security services by listing 
examples, such as mutual authentication, relayed-nodes authentication and integrity ser-
vice, end-to-end authentication and integrity service, end-to-end data confidentiality ser-
vice and data integrity as infosec services. In addition to these, the authors list parameters, 
such as message authentication code (MAC), MAC length and encryption key that are 
related to information security services. (Rachedi & Benslimane 2016, 1–3.) Nonetheless, 
these parameters will not be regarded as information security services in this study be-
cause they were not expressed as such. 
Chappell, Marlow, Irey IV and O’Donoghue (1999, 218) discuss information security 
in the naval shipboard platform context and name confidentiality and authentication as 
services. Although the authors do not emphasize these as information security services, 
they will be considered as such in the categorization as they have been identified as ser-
vices by other authors (e.g., Rachedi and Benslimane 2016 and Miguel et al. 2015). Ad-
ditionally, Chappell et al. (1999, 218) mention IPSEC as both an internet protocol (IP) 
security service and an IP security protocol from which the latter is described as a tech-
nology that can be utilized to provide security services. Thus, IP security service will be 
regarded as an infosec service in this study. 
Asgarnezhad, Nasiri and Sahebhonar (2010; 562, 565), on the other hand, list integrity, 
authentication, audit, identity, authorization and confidentiality services as IT security 
services but concentrate on the two latter. They define confidentiality similarly to Ab-
dElnapi et al. (2016) by stating that it safeguards the non-disclosure of sensitive infor-
mation that is either transferred through networks or located in data storages. Further-
more, confidentiality is often enabled by cryptographic techniques, such as encryption. 
Authorization, on the other hand, is a service occurring after the authentication of a user; 
authorization service refers to determining whether either an authorized or unauthorized 
user will be granted access. (Asgarnezhad et al. 2010, 565.) Encryption, although de-
scribed as an enabler of other security services, has been accepted into the categorization 
as it is nominated as a service by other authors and as it can be interpreted as part of the 
confidentiality service based on the description in the article. Cryptographic techniques 
have also been accepted into the categorization as encryption is named as an example of 
them. 
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Tamilarasan et al. (2008, 2396–2398) discuss security services and objectives which 
they exemplify with the notions of Potlapally, Ravi, Raghunathan and Jha (2006, 130–
131) by confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and authentication. The authors see 
confidentiality as a seminal information security service which preservation is important 
and define it as a service that ensures the confidentiality of information being transmitted 
from one party to another. Additionally, confidentiality ensures that the information is 
only available to the receiver and is protected against third party interceptions. Finally, 
the authors discuss security protocols and cryptographic algorithms in the security ser-
vices context, although it remains ambiguous whether they are referred to as information 
security services. Tamilarasan et al. (2008, 2397–2398) remark that cryptographic algo-
rithms can be utilized in providing security services, such as integrity, non-repudiation 
and confidentiality of data. Furthermore, these cryptographic algorithms – such as RSA 
(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), DES (data encryption standard) and AES (advanced encryp-
tion standard) – can be divided into symmetric, asymmetric and hash algorithms. (Ta-
milarasan et al. 2008, 2396–2398.) Algorithms and security protocols will be regarded as 
infosec services in this study. 
Peiris, Soysa and Palliyaguru (2008, 307–308) observe information security services 
in an e-governance setting and state that means to provide security services, such as con-
fidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, authentication and access control must be ensured 
for transactions between organizations, governmental institutions and citizen. The authors 
concentrate on non-repudiation and note that the service must meet the following needs: 
Proof of origin where there has to be an indisputable relation between the creator of a 
document and the document itself, proof of integrity where the document cannot be sub-
ject to changes after submission and, finally, a third party should be able to verify the 
non-repudiation of the document. Furthermore, non-repudiation assures the integrity and 
origin of data. The authors present three types of non-repudiation, which include (Peiris 
et al. 2008, 307–308): 
 non-repudiation of origin 
 non-repudiation of submission 
 non-repudiation of delivery. 
The authors describe that the first type refers to verifying the identity of the creator of 
a document and the integrity of the document itself (Peiris et al. 2008, 307–308), whereas 
for the second type they adopt the ideas of Zhou and Gollmann (1997, 268) by stating 
that it refers to verifying to the creator of a document that the document has been released 
to a delivery agent for distribution. The third type of non-repudiation, in turn, refers to 
giving assurance that the document reached its intended receiver without endangering the 
integrity of the message (Burnett & Paine 2001, 297 according to Peiris et al. 2008, 308). 
Peiris et al. (2008, 308–309) discuss the implementation of digital signatures to infor-
mation security services – especially non-repudiation – and present two models, Pretty 
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Good Privacy and Public Key Infrastructure, from which the first one utilizes web of trust, 
whereas the second one relies on certificate authority. Additionally, the authors describe 
digital signature as the hash of a document that has been encrypted with the private key 
of the document creator. (Peiris et al. 2008, 307–309.) Digital signatures have been in-
cluded in the security service categorization, whereas certificate authority, web of trust 
and private key have been excluded from it.  
Liping and Lei (2011, 232–234), in turn, name both services that support the CIA triad 
view but also provide a number of other types of security services. The authors list the 
following security services (Liping & Lei 2011, 233–234): 
 message confidentiality 
 information integrity 
 transaction non-repudiation services 
 authentication 
 access control 
 session privacy 
 source of undeniable 
 undeniable purpose 
 communications 
 key recovery 
 security. 
Furthermore, the authors recognize public key infrastructure (PKI) as a security ser-
vice but, simultaneously, note that PKI can offer information security services or needs, 
such as integrity, access control, authentication, session privacy, key recovery, commu-
nications, security, undeniable purpose and source of undeniable (Liping & Lei 2011, 
232, 234). Other services provided by PKI include encryption and digital signature ser-
vices that include certificates and passwords. The handling of PKI in the article demon-
strates the inconsistent use of terms regarding security services in the articles. Finally, 
applications with digital signatures and transparent data encryption and other security 
services concerning certificate and key management have been linked to PKI in the article 
(Liping & Lei 2011, 234). As the description of some of the services – referring to com-
munications, security, source of undeniable and undeniable purpose – remains vague, 
they have been left out of the categorization. 
 Correspondingly to the notions of other authors (e.g., Liping & Lei 2011, Peiris et al. 
2008 and Miguel et al. 2015) in promoting access control as an infosec service, Jeong, 
Joo and Jeong (2010, 3) link access control methods with information security services. 
The authors also mention dynamic and mobile security services but do not provide clear 
descriptions on them; therefore, due to their generic nature, these two services have been 
left out of the categorization. 
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Some of the articles in this group adopted the CIA triad view, whereas some presented 
a divergent approach to the traditional approach by proposing alternative or additional 
infosec services. Examples of such services include authentication and access control. All 
of the accepted services from the CIA section have been listed below in Table 3; the table 
presents the pure CIA services and other services including CIA modifications by article.  
Table 3 CIA perspective: Identified infosec services 
Authors CIA services Other services 




Authorization, data integrity, non-repudiation 






Audit services, authentication, authentication services, authoriza-
tion, authorization service(s), cryptographic techniques, encryp-
tion (cryptographic technique), identity services 
Chappell et al. (1999) Confidentiality Authentication, IP security (IPSEC) services, IPSEC service 
Jeong et al. (2010) - Access control (method) 
Lee et al. (2006) Availability, confi-
dentiality, integrity 
- 
Liping & Lei (2011)  Integrity Access control, applications with digital signatures, applications 
with transparent data encryption, authentication, certificates, digi-
tal signature services, encryption services, information integrity, 
key recovery, message confidentiality, passwords, PKI, public key 
infrastructure, PKI security services, security services to certifi-
cate management, security services to key management, session 
privacy, transaction non-repudiation services  
Miguel et al. (2015) Availability, confi-
dentiality, integrity 
Access control, audit service, authentication, biometric models 
(solution), failure control, non-repudiation, identification, public 
key infrastructures (solution), time stamping 
 
Descriptions: Holistic models, multidisciplinary approaches to 
security solutions (solution) 
Peiris et al. (2008) Confidentiality, 
integrity 
Access control, authentication, digital signatures (for security ser-
vices), non-repudiation, non-repudiation of delivery, non-repudia-






Authentication, end-to-end authentication and integrity service, 
end-to-end data confidentiality, data integrity, mutual authentica-
tion, relayed nodes authentication and integrity service 




Authentication, non-repudiation, security protocols 
AES algorithm, cryptographic algorithms, DES algorithm, RSA 
algorithm 
Asymmetric algorithm(s), hash algorithm(s), symmetric algo-
rithm(s) (types of algorithms) 
Wahab et al. (2013) Availability Data confidentiality, data integrity 
 
The use of CIA as services and its additions and modifications demonstrate that the 
field of security services is rather scattered. The next group focuses on the use of interna-
tional standards in defining security services. 
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3.2.2 Information security standards as a basis for security services 
Another approach into defining security services included the adoption of information 
security related standards; these include especially the standards by the International Or-
ganization for Standardization (ISO). 
Claassen, Kühn and Penzhorn (1992, 35) utilize ISO 7498-2 standard in describing 
information security services. The authors mention confidentiality, integrity, authentica-
tion, non-repudiation, access control and security audit as security services (ISO 7498-2 
standard (1987) according to Claassen et al. 1992, 35). Furthermore, they utilize OSI 
Basic Reference Model from the ISO 7498 standard and mention that the security services 
can be placed on different layers of the model but the location influences the meaning of 
the service. As an example the authors mention, that authentication can be seen as either 
user, process or host authentication depending on the layer. (Claassen et al. 1992, 35.) 
Claassen et al. (1992, 36) identify the following services in the layers of the model: 
 peer entity and data origin authentication 
 access control 
 connection and connectionless confidentiality 
 traffic flow and selective field confidentiality 
 connection integrity with and without recovery 
 selective field connection integrity 
 connectionless integrity and selective field connectionless integrity 
 non-repudiation (origin) and non-repudiation (delivery). 
Additionally, Claassen et al. (1992, 35) note that ISO 7498 separates information se-
curity services from the mechanisms that provide them; as an example they mention en-
cryption. 
Similarly to Claassen et al. (1992), Sun and Chen (2008, 199–200) revert to an ISO 
standard in defining information security services: The authors suggest defining security 
services based on the ISO/IEC 27002 code of practice and infosec industry best practices. 
Consequently, the authors suggest utilizing the “information security and risk controlling 
activities” in the standard as services. As examples of information security services the 
authors mention privileged ID monitoring, identity activity monitoring, network access 
control and network change control, directory management, server change control, exter-
nal connection review and other security services. They also propose a definition for a 
security service based on the description of a service-oriented service in the ISO27002 
standard; according to them, an information security service is an information security 
software entity (Sun & Chen 2008, 199) that is “well-defined, self-contained, coarse-
grained, loosely coupled and does not depend on the context or state of other services” 
(ISO 27002 standard according to Sun & Chen 2008, 199). Additionally, the authors de-
scribe it as a compilation of technologies that enable a developer to “publish, discover, 
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and invoke application logic using ubiquitous and standard web technologies” (Sun & 
Chen 2008, 199). The service ‘other security service’ has been left out of the categoriza-
tion due to its ambiguity. 
In this section, the authors identified infosec services through standards, especially 
focusing on the globally acknowledged ISO standards. All of the services accepted from 
these articles have been listed in Table 4. The next section, however, focuses on models 
and frameworks. 
Table 4 Infosec services through standards: Identified infosec services 
Authors Services 
Claassen et al. 
(1992) 
Access control, audit, security audit 
Authentication, user authentication, process authentication, host authentication, peer entity au-
thentication, data origin authentication 
Confidentiality, connection confidentiality, connectionless confidentiality, selective field confi-
dentiality, traffic flow confidentiality 
Non-repudiation, non-repudiation (origin), non-repudiation (delivery) 
Integrity, connection integrity with recovery, connection integrity without recovery, selective 
field connection integrity, connectionless integrity, selective field connectionless integrity 
Sun & Chen 
(2008) 
Directory management service, external connection review service, ID activity monitoring ser-
vice, network access control service, network change control service, privileged ID monitoring 
service, server change control service 
 
3.2.3 Models and frameworks incorporating information security services 
Some of the articles present models or frameworks that are connected to information se-
curity services; furthermore, some authors develop and introduce new security services. 
These articles will be introduced next. 
Deng, Bhonsle, Wang and Lazar (1995, 50, 52–53, 60) introduce a distributed security 
architecture to be implemented into object-oriented distributed computing systems, such 
as the common object request broker architecture (CORBA). As part of the security ar-
chitecture, security services are needed to prevent threats, such as masquerade where the 
identity of an authorized party is adopted and abused, information disclosure where in-
formation is given to an unauthorized party and integrity violation where illicit creation, 
destruction or modification of data jeopardizes the consistence of the data. As examples 
of such information security services Deng et al. (1995, 52) mention: 
 message confidentiality and integrity protections 
 client or object authentication 
 security audit 
 intrusion detection 
 object access control. 
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According to the authors, authentication occurs between a claimant that wishes to be 
recognized as authentic and a verifier that aims to ensure the authenticity of the claimant. 
Consequently, authentication helps in verifying the identity of the claimant and provides 
protection against masquerade. In addition to this, the authors discuss message origin au-
thentication and message authentication, confidentiality and integrity services. Similarly 
to the previously mentioned authentication, message origin authentication verifies the 
identity of the client or object of a message, whereas message integrity safeguards the 
message against unauthorized modifications, replacement or replay. Message confidenti-
ality, on the other hand, refers to the preservation of the message information against any 
changes or substitutions and distribution to unauthorized parties. Similarly to the notion 
of Tamilarasan et al. (2008) regarding the provision of services through algorithms, the 
authors mention that message confidentiality, integrity and authentication are offered 
through mechanisms, such as digest algorithms (e.g., MD5 message digest algorithm), 
symmetric and public-key cryptosystems, such as DES and RSA, and timestamps (Deng 
et al. 1995, 53). Lastly, Deng et al. (1995, 53) describe that access control safeguards 
against the threats of integrity violation and information disclosure by managing the ac-
cess rights and activities of a client. The authors divide access controls into mandatory 
and discretionary, where the former refers to limiting access rights by granting clients 
certain security levels according to security policy. The latter, on the other hand, limits 
the requests a client can perform on a server object. (Deng et al. 1995, 53.) As the mech-
anisms have been regarded as security services by other authors (e.g., various algorithms 
by Xia & Hu 2006 and Tamilarasan et al. 2008, cryptographic mechanisms by Kovač & 
Trček 2009 and time stamping by Miguel et al. 2015) they will be regarded as security 
services in this study. 
In their article, Jin, Cho, Choi and Ryou (2003, 793–794, 796–798) also adopt the 
framework-oriented approach and develop a unified security framework for providing 
security services. The authors note that in order to manage information security concerns, 
such as disclosure and misuse of data, appropriate information security services must be 
in place. As examples of such security services they mention authentication, authorization 
and audit. The authors highlight the importance of integrating and managing security ser-
vices to prevent emerging security vulnerabilities and rising administrative costs; these 
integrated services are named as unified security services or unified management ser-
vices. As examples of security services tackling new types of threats they list authentica-
tion, authorization, identity management and single-sign-on (SSO). The authors also de-
scribe services needed for application integration security in more detail: As the para-
mount service they nominate identity (ID) management and describe it as managing and 
allocating both personal and identifier information. They link ID management to authen-
tication by proposing a unified authentication and identity management service as they 
state that the purpose of authentication is to confirm the identity of a user. Authentication, 
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on the other hand, includes various methods, from which biometric identification is men-
tioned. The authors note that if ID management and authentication services are integrated, 
it will enable the user to enter services with a single password and single authentication. 
Furthermore, the authors continue that multiple processes, such as utilizing authorization 
information for an access control decision, may together form a single service. SSO, on 
the other hand, is described as a service that enables single login to an application without 
a need for multiple logins when entering other applications. Privilege management and 
access control, in turn, are given as synonyms for the authorization service. Authorization 
refers to making decisions about granting access to an application based on predefined 
policy. Authorization decisions become complicated in the case of integrated and com-
plex applications. Additionally, the authors parallel authorization with audit by stating 
that the former refers to monitoring before executing an action, whereas the latter refers 
to monitoring after it. Due to this linkage, both services have similar requirements. 
 In addition to these services, Jin et al. (2003, 798) mention consolidated billing which 
is referred to as both a service and a security requirement. The authors describe it as a 
method for providing a tailored and value-added service that enables both unified pay-
ments for multiple services at once and reduced payment collection costs. Furthermore, 
Jin et al. (2003, 796), give examples of services that support unified authentication and 
identity management – Microsoft Passport service, LibertyAlliance and Security Asser-
tion Mark-up Language (SAML), but at the same time note that these are considered ei-
ther more as of standards and frameworks or lack some security services, such as anonym 
and pseudonym for privacy protection. (Jin et al. 2003, 796.)  
Keeratiwintakorn and Krishnamurthy (2006, 1–2, 4) observe information security ser-
vices from an energy consumption perspective and develop a model that combines infor-
mation security services with energy efficiency. Furthermore, the authors develop an en-
ergy efficient information security service. As security services, the authors list encryp-
tion service and encryption in pervasive networks, confidentiality and message authenti-
cation. However, the authors also state that message authentication and packet encryption 
are enabled by the developed security service. Additionally, the authors note that instead 
of a fixed security level, there are varying security levels, such as low, medium and high 
(Irvine & Levin 2000, 93–94); the authors utilize this idea in the model. (Keeratiwin-
takorn & Krishnamurthy 2006, 1–2, 4.) Packet encryption alongside message authentica-
tion will be regarded as security services in this study. 
El Yamany and Capretz (2008, 551–552, 558), in turn, develop a security service for 
a service oriented architecture (SOA) that utilizes data mining and an intelligent core. 
According to the authors, a SOA environment consists of various layers, from which one 
contains information security services. The authors do not describe the services in detail 
but list authentication, audit and authorization as examples of information security ser-
vices, from which the authentication service is especially important as it interacts with 
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the security service developed in the article to both enable the authentication process and 
to provide protection against security attacks. In addition to information security services, 
the authors mention traditional security techniques and list secure sockets layer (SSL) 
technology and virtual private networks (VPN) as examples of these methods. These too 
will be regarded as information security services in this study. 
Lu et al. (2015, 42, 47) develop a framework for emergency ocean oil spill command 
information systems in their article. Similarly to the SOA environment in the article of El 
Yamany and Capretz (2008), the framework consists of layers, from which one includes 
information security services. The authors do not immerse in IT security services but 
mention a few of them as an example; the listed services include identity authentication, 
access control, intrusion detection and information encryption. After the framework per-
spective the study will next discuss outsourced information security services. 
This section focused on the various models and frameworks through which infosec 
services were mirrored in the articles; furthermore, the section also noted that some of the 
authors developed infosec services of their own. The models ranged from energy effi-
ciency to oceanic emergency systems and SOA architectures. This demonstrates that the 
context of the articles in the SRL varies significantly between the articles, which could 
affect the types of services presented in the articles. All of the accepted infosec services 
have been listed in Table 5. After frameworks, the analysis will focus on managed secu-
rity services. 
Table 5 Frameworks perspective: Identified services 
Authors Framework / model Services 
Deng et al. 
(1995) 
CORBA (common 
object request broker 
architecture) architec-
ture 
Access control, access control service, object access control 
Access controls: Mandatory access control, discretionary access 
control 
Authentication, authentication service, client authentication, mes-
sage authentication services, message origin authentication, object 
authentication 
Message confidentiality, message confidentiality protections, mes-
sage confidentiality services 
Message integrity, message integrity protections, message integrity 
services 
Intrusion detection, security audit 
Digest algorithms (e.g., MD5) (mechanism to provide services) 
Public-key cryptosystems (e.g., RSA) (mechanism to provide ser-
vices) 
Symmetric cryptosystems (e.g., DES) (mechanism to provide ser-
vices) 
Timestamps (mechanism to provide services) 
El Yamany & 
Capretz (2008) 
SOA (service oriented 
architecture) 
Audit service, authentication service, authorization service 
Secure sockets layer (SSL) technology (traditional security tech-
nique), virtual private networks (traditional security technique)  
Jin et al. (2003) UASI (unified appli-
cation security infra-
structure) framework  
Access control, audit, anonym (for privacy protection), authentica-
tion, authentication service(s), authorization, biometric identifica-
tion (authentication mechanism), consolidated billing, ID manage-
ment, identity management, identity management services, privacy 
protection, privilege management, pseudonym (for privacy protec-
tion), single-sign-on (SSO), unified authentication and identity man-
agement, unified authentication and identity management service(s), 
authentication and identity management service 
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Encryption, encryption in pervasive networks, encryption service, 
confidentiality, message authentication, message authentication ser-
vice, packet encryption 
 
Descriptions: Energy efficient security service(s) 
Lu et al. (2015) A framework for 
emergency ocean oil 
spill command infor-
mation systems 
Access control, identity authentication, information encryption, in-
trusion detection 
 
3.2.4 Managed security services 
Some of the articles observe information security services through outsourcing as organ-
izations are often interested in outsourcing some or all of their information security ser-
vices to an external service provider. These articles discussing managed security services 
will be introduced next. 
Karyda, Mitrou and Quirchmayr (2006, 405–407) focus on the outsourcing of infor-
mation security services theme and present a comprehensive list of managed security ser-
vices. The authors explain that the concept of managed security services refers to the 
management of the human and physical resources – that support the security operations 
of an organization – by an external provider that has expertise in information system and 
IT security. However, Karyda et al. (2006, 407) continue that despite the increase in the 
outsourcing of infosec services, services regarded as sensitive ones are likely to be man-
aged within the organization; these services are nominated as in-house security services. 
Additionally, the authors note that finding a balance between outsourced and in-house 
security services will enable better management of information security within the organ-
ization. Karyda et al. (2006, 407) provide an extensive list of outsourced security services 
that include: 
 security training and education 
 user access management 
 IT auditing 
 network monitoring 
 server management 
 virus protection and email virus and spam filtering 
 firewalls and firewall management and configuration 
 management of virtual private networks (VPN) 
 intrusion monitoring and management of intrusion detection systems 
 security upgrades 
 penetration testing 
 disaster recovery 
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 data classification 
 security systems management and monitoring 
 business continuity planning and contingency planning 
 application and development of security policies. 
In addition to these infosec services, the authors revert to the article by Allen, Gabbard 
and May (2003, 3) and name content filtering services, data archiving and restoration, 
network boundary protection that includes managed services for firewalls and incident 
management that includes emergency response as information security services that are 
often outsourced to managed security service providers. Furthermore, the authors name 
firewalls and VPNs as outsourced “security installations” or functions that offer encryp-
tion services. (Karyda et al. 2006, 407.) These too have been recognized as information 
security services in the categorization.  
The article by Oladapo, Zavarsky, Ruhl, Lindskog and Igonor (2009, 456–457, 460) 
also discusses the outsourcing of information security services. The authors agree with 
the prior notion of Karyda et al. (2006) by mentioning that although outsourcing security 
services is increasing, the security services most sensitive to an organization are rarely 
outsourced – even if outsourcing is supported by organizational policies (Oladapo et al. 
2009; 456, 460). Examples of outsourced security services include physical security, ac-
cess control, audit, intrusion detection, firewall management and configuration manage-
ment, security awareness and training and media protection. Oladapo et al. (2009, 457) 
continue by noting that one of the aims of outsourcing is to decrease the risk towards the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of information and systems. Conse-
quently, maintaining the CIA of information assets is also described as one of the main 
purposes of information security services. However, outsourcing also bears some risks, 
such as decreased control on processes, increased dependency issues, compliance regard-
ing laws, implications of sensitive breaches and IT security maturity within the organiza-
tion. (Oladapo et al. 2009, 456–457.) 
Similarly to Karyda et al. (2006) and Oladapo et al. (2009), Choi and Seo (2005, 624–
626) also discuss managed security services (MSS) but highlight the importance of net-
work security. The authors recognize an extensive amount of information security ser-
vices and begin by listing the aforementioned managed security services, such as security 
maintenance, analysis of security attack events, management support for security equip-
ment and local and remote security control for infrastructure which includes servers, da-
tabases and networks. Analysis of security attack incidents, equipment management and 
operation of security equipment, on the other hand, they refer to as managerial security 
services. Some services, such as security maintenance and consulting, are characterized 
to be both. (Choi & Seo 2005, 624–626.) In addition to these services, the authors propose 
security services that better correspond to the needs of network security; these services 
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consist of managed VPN that refers to offering a virtual private network, managed fire-
wall that refers to running existing firewalls, managed filtering of web content, managed 
intrusion detection systems (IDS), managed antivirus and managed scanning that refers 
to vulnerability analysis (Choi & Seo 2005; 624, 626). 
Moulton and Coles (2003, 204–206) continue with the same topic and discuss pre-
mium-level managed security services; these services are designed for a limited group of 
servers in a wide IT infrastructure utilizing highly sensitive information. Monitoring ser-
vices, intrusion detection and server configuration are named as such services. Addition-
ally, the authors describe that the premium level of security services include server uptime 
and availability monitoring to detect denial-of-service (DOS) attacks and service disturb-
ances, intrusion detection utilizing network and host-based intrusion detection software, 
continuous security software updates based on alerts and recommended server configu-
ration for increased security. (Moulton & Coles 2003, 204–206.) These have been recog-
nized as security services in the categorization. 
Bahl and Wali (2013, 2014), in turn, combine outsourcing with information security 
service quality in two of their articles. The first article (Bahl & Wali 2014, 2, 7–8) con-
siders the impacts of information security governance on information security service 
quality, whereas the second one (Bahl & Wali 2013, 221) surveys the impact of infor-
mation security service quality to organizational performance. In both of their studies, the 
authors name the same information security services; these services include network, ap-
plication, physical and people as required contractually. (Bahl & Wali 2013, 225; 2014, 
21.) Although it is cumbersome to understand the idea of people as services, it is worth-
while to understand the role of them in information security. Without the commitment of 
people in carrying out information security related activities, it is unlikely that all of ben-
efits of those activities could be accomplished. Therefore, people have been included in 
the categorization as a service. On the other hand, the services provided by Bahl and Wali 
(2013, 2014) are rather generic in nature and could, therefore, be interpreted as infor-
mation security classes, such as physical and people related service categories.  
The articles in this section discussed infosec services through outsourcing; it can be 
concluded that, according to the authors, infosec services offer multiple outsourcing pos-
sibilities for organizations. However, despite the benefits of outsourcing, it too bears risks 
and requires a balance with the infosec services produced in-house. The infosec services 
accepted from the outsourcing articles are listed in Table 6. The next section will focus 
on technical and non-technical perspectives on infosec services. 
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Table 6 Outsourcing perspective: Identified infosec services 
Authors Services 
Bahl & Wali 
(2013) 
Application, network, people (as required contractually), physical  
Bahl & Wali 
(2014) 
Application, network, people (as required contractually), physical 
Choi & Seo 
(2005) 
Managed security services (MSS): 
Analysis of security attack events, managed antivirus, managed filtering, managed filtering (of 
web content), managed firewall, managed IDS (intrusion detection system), managed scanning, 
managed scanning (analysis of vulnerability), managed VPN, management support for security 
equipment, operation of security equipment, security maintenance 
Remote and local security control for infrastructure such as networks, servers and databases 
 
Managerial security services: 
Analysis of security attack incidents, equipment management, security consulting 
 
Descriptions: Managed security service(s) (MSS), managerial security services 
Karyda et al. 
(2006) 
Business continuity planning, content filtering services, contingency planning, data archiving, 
data classification, data restoration, disaster recovery, email virus filtering, emergency response, 
encryption services, firewalls, firewall configuration, firewall management, incident management 
(incl. emergency response), intrusion detection systems management, intrusion monitoring, IT au-
diting, managed services for firewalls, management of security systems, monitoring of security 
systems, network boundary protection (incl. managed services for firewalls), network monitoring, 
penetration testing, security education, security policy application, security policy development, 
security training, security upgrades, server management, spam filtering, user access management, 
virus protection, VPN management, VPNs (security installation) 
 
Descriptions: In-house services, managed security services (MSS), outsourced services 
Moulton & 
Coles (2003) 
Host-based intrusion detection software, intrusion detection, intrusion detection software, moni-
toring for server uptime & availability (to detect DOS attacks & service disruption),  
monitoring service(s), network intrusion detection software, security software updates, server 
configuration, server configuration software 
 
Classifications: Premium level (of) managed security services, premium level security services, 
premium (level) services 
Oladapo et 
al. (2009) 
Access control, audit, configuration management, firewall management, intrusion detection, me-
dia protection, physical security, security awareness, security training 
 
Descriptions: Sensitive security services 
 
3.2.5 Technical and non-technical perspectives on security services 
Contrary to the intangible CIA triad perspective presented earlier, some authors focus on 
the technical perspective on information security services that includes mechanisms, such 
as virtual private networks (VPNs), public key infrastructures (PKIs), algorithms and fire-
walls. In addition to the articles focusing on the technical perspective, the aspect of non-
technical services emerged in the systematic literature review. Both of these perspectives 
will be introduced next. 
Similarly to Bahl and Wali (2013, 2014), Xia and Hu (2006) also discuss information 
security service quality but relate it to resource reservation protocol (RSVP). The article 
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does not focus on information security services but presents algorithms as security ser-
vices. As examples of algorithms the authors mention RSA and DES algorithms. (Xia & 
Hu 2006, 51–52.) 
Lin and Zhixin (2010), discuss public key infrastructures in their article. According to 
the authors, PKI is a solution that provides information security services by utilizing 
asymmetric encryption algorithms (Lin & Zhixin 2010, 4). Furthermore, the authors con-
tinue that PKI is utilized in areas, such as key exchange, digital signatures and certificate 
authority (CA) authentication. The infosec services provided by PKI include authentica-
tion PKI that helps communicating parties to authenticate each other, perfect key man-
agement which is linked to encryption certificate and non-repudiation and integrality. In-
tegrality can be provided by a third party and cannot be disputed by the communicating 
parties. In contrast to the articles that regard confidentiality, integrity and availability 
(CIA) as information security services (e.g., Lee et al. 2006, Miguel et al. 2015), availa-
bility, integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation, accountability and controllability are 
seen as security problems concerning e-commerce in this article. (Lin & Zhixin 2010, 4.) 
Key exchange, digital signature and CA authentication will be regarded as information 
security services in this study, whereas integrality will not be included in the categoriza-
tion due to its unclear nature and to the fact that it does not appear in any other article that 
could give evidence on its content. 
Wang, Deng, Lin, Zhang and Yu (2010, 2–3), in turn, name cloud security as an infor-
mation security service type provided by cloud computing. The authors describe the func-
tionalities of the service that include, for example, the detection of divergent behaviour 
of software. Furthermore, Wang et al. (2010, 3–5) note that antivirus systems, threat de-
tection and threat detection systems, anti-spam or spam mail filtering which utilizes dis-
tributed honeypots, threat perception and sender reputation for spam mail inhibition are 
based on cloud security; however, they do not clearly indicate whether these are services, 
solutions or technologies. Meanwhile, Wang et al. (2010, 3) parallel security technologies 
and services and list the seven paramount technologies or services in cloud security: 
email, web and file reputation services, automatic feedback service, relative analysis of 
behaviour service, white list service and data collection service to which feedback con-
tour, honeypot and net crawler technologies are included. In addition to these, the authors 
mention the following services: intelligent security analysis, intelligent analysis and min-
ing service of security log, distributed power mass data storage, sample data collection 
which refers to the collection of suspected virus data, threat processing which refers to 
the handling of collected and analysed virus data and black list service. (Wang et al. 2010, 
2–3.) All of the solutions that have been described as being based on cloud security, will 
be interpreted as information security services in this study. Opposite to other authors 
(e.g., Choi & Seo 2005), Wang et al. (2010, 5) name VPNs, firewalls, intrusion detection 
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systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) as information security techniques 
rather than services. However, these have been included in the service categorization. 
Priescu, Patriciu and Nicolaescu (2009, 433), on the other hand, introduce new net-
work security solutions which include decoy services, such as honeypots or decoys that 
help route attacks away from systems (Bosworth & Kabay 2004 according to Priescu et 
al. 2009, 433), self-healing tools that help in identifying, assessing and repairing vulner-
abilities prior to materializing risks, airgaps that separate trusted networks from the un-
trusted ones, denial-of-service defences and exit controls. According to the authors, these 
solutions should be regarded as additional security resources to the more traditional net-
work security arrangements (Priescu et al. 2009, 432–433). Interestingly, the authors refer 
to these security resources as techniques, services, solutions and tools. Firewalls and en-
cryption, in turn, the authors name as security layers. (Priescu et al. 2009, 432–433.) All 
of the above mentioned examples will be considered as information security services in 
this study. 
In contrast to the technical security services, the aspect of non-technical security ser-
vices was also introduced. Chang and Lee (2003, 27–28) concentrate on the Taiwanese 
information security market and discuss both information security products and services. 
As security services they list consulting, application and system integration for integrating 
networks or applications, certification and certification of the internal computer controls 
of an organization which is connected to standardization; VPNs, firewalls as both hard-
ware and software solutions, intrusion detection, antivirus and antivirus software and en-
cryption, in turn, are referred to as information security related products. Intruder detec-
tion, however, is affiliated with security services in the article. Interestingly, the authors 
name PKI related solutions and security estimation, that helps in identifying errors in a 
system, as both security services and products. Certificate authority, on the other hand, is 
linked to public-key encryption and certification-related services in the article. (Chang 
and Lee 2003, 27–28.) PKI-related security services, public-key encryption and certifica-
tion-related services will be included in the service categorization. However, it remains 
unclear whether certificate authority is intended as a security service in the article; thus, 
it will be excluded from the categorization. It is notable that the solutions categorized as 
products in this article are seen as services by other authors (e.g., Karyda et al. 2006, 
Liping & Lei 2011); therefore, they are regarded as information security services from 
those authors in this study. These findings demonstrate that the division between infor-
mation security products and services is not clear. Although the discussion on technical 
and non-technical security services is not highlighted in the text, the division through 
products and services is noticeable: the services side contains the non-technical solutions, 
such as consulting and certification, whereas the products side includes more concrete 
and technical examples of solutions. 
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This section highlighted the division between technical and non-technical security ser-
vices; furthermore, it also demonstrated that the technical security services dominate the 
named infosec services. Additionally, the section pointed out that the division between 
different terms, such as products and services, is not clear cut. All of the services accepted 
from this section have been presented in Table 7. The next section will focus on a holistic 
perspective on information security services. 
Table 7 Technical and non-technical perspectives on security services: Identified 
infosec services 
Authors Services 
Chang & Lee 
(2003) 
Application integration services, certification, certification (of the internal computer controls 
of an organization), certification related services, consulting, intruder detection, PKI-related 
services, public-key encryption, security estimation, security estimation services, system inte-
gration, system integration services (for integrating applications or networks) 
Lin & Zhixin 
(2010) 
Authentication PKI, CA (certificate authority) authentication, digital signature, key exchange, 
non-repudiation, perfect key management 
Priescu et al. 
(2009) 
Air gaps (solution), denial-of-service defences (DOS) (solution), encryption (layer of secu-
rity), exit controls (solution), firewalls (layer of security), self-healing tools (solution) 
 
Decoy services: Decoys, honeypots (solutions) 
Wang et al. 
(2010) 
Anti-spam filtering, automatic feedback service (technology/service), anti-virus system (based 
on cloud security), black list service, cloud security, data collection service (honeypot, net 
crawler, feedback contour) (technology/service), distributed honeypots (for spam blocking), 
distributed power mass data storage service, email reputation service (technology/service), file 
reputation service (technology/service), firewalls (traditional security technique), IDS (intru-
sion detection system) (traditional security technique), intelligent analysis service of security 
log, intelligent mining service of security log, intelligent security analysis service, IPS (intru-
sion prevention system) (traditional security technique), relative analysis of behaviour service 
(technology/service), sample data collection service, sender reputation (for spam blocking), 
spam mail filtering (based on cloud security), threat detection (based on cloud security), threat 
detection system (based on cloud security), threat perception (for spam blocking), threat pro-
cessing service, VPN (traditional security technique), web reputation service (technology/ser-
vice), white list service (technology/service) 
Xia & Hu 
(2006) 
Algorithms, data encryption standard (DES) algorithm, RSA algorithm 
 
3.2.6 A holistic perspective on security services 
Some articles view information security services from a more comprehensive perspective 
instead of merely focusing on individual services. Similarly to Miguel et al. (2015), 
Schultz (1995) and Sidiroglou, Stavrou and Keromytis (2007) discuss information secu-
rity services from the perspective of providing more holistic services. 
Schultz (1995, 13) focuses on firewalls in his article and discusses circuit-level and 
application firewalls. Schultz labels them as solutions but, at the same time, refers to fire-
wall design and evaluation related consulting as a security service. Schultz’s (1995, 13–
15) stance on firewalls as solutions or products rather than services supports the ideas of 
Chang and Lee (2003) but are contrary to the notions of, for example, Karyda et al. (2006) 
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and Choi and Seo (2005) that recognize firewalls as information security services. In ad-
dition, Schultz introduces the idea of a single, ready-to-use “plug-and-play” information 
security solution (Schultz 1995, 15). This idea could be extended to information security 
services as well as was proposed by Jin et al. (2003) with the unified security services. 
Similarly to Chang and Lee (2003), the author inadvertently distinguishes the non-tech-
nical security services from the technical security solutions in the article. Nevertheless, 
as the terminology used in the article refers to firewalls not only as products but also as 
solutions and as firewalls have been identified as infosec services in other articles (e.g., 
Karyda et al. 2006, Priescu et al. 2009), they will be regarded as security services from 
this article as well. 
Correspondingly to Schultz (1995), Sidiroglou et al. (2007, 1–2) mention “one-stop 
shop” information security services provided by managed security service providers. 
However, they highlight the risks involved as providers lack a holistic enough knowledge 
on the information security threats. Instead, they propose a modular approach to the pro-
vision of information security services that enables flexibility in building the information 
security capabilities of an organization. To support this idea, the authors develop a model 
called mediated overlay services (MOSES) that compiles security services. Sidiroglou et 
al. (2007, 1–2, 6) also list an extensive amount of information security services enabled 
or supported by the model; these services include: 
 antivirus 
 worm, email worm and virus detection 
 anti-spam and spam detection 
 filtering and transparent network-wide filtering 
 automated vulnerability detection and mitigation 
 distributed intrusion detection systems 
 attack inference 
 service availability or resilience 
 VPN provisioning 
 firewall filtering 
 worm vaccine that strives to detect and fix software vulnerabilities 
 large-scale behaviour analysis of, for example, users or traffic 
 WebSOS that helps accessing a web server under a denial-of-service (DOS) at-
tack. 
Interestingly, the authors also discuss non-security services that include services, such 
as software update and backup (Sidiroglou et al. 2007, 6–7). The definition of a non-
security service is not stated very clearly in the article but backup is characterized as a 
service that can offer protection methods against natural and artificial threats. Further-
more, some of the services proposed in the article are also affiliated with products; an 
example of this is antivirus (Sidiroglou 2007, 2). Other products in the article include 
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intrusion detection, VPNs, web security, backup, insider misbehaviour detection, fire-
walls, spam, intrusion prevention, patch management, spam blockers and worm detectors. 
(Sidiroglou 2007, 2.) Similarly to other authors (e.g., Chang & Lee 2003, Liping & Lei 
2011), the article by Sidiroglou et al. (2007) demonstrate the ambiguity in the use of 
terms. The non-security services, WebSOS and solutions defined only as products have 
not been included in the categorization. Both the services and the descriptions of services 
that were accepted from the two articles are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8 Holistic perspective: Descriptions 
Authors Services 
Schultz (1995) Description: Single plug & play information security solution 
 
Application firewalls (solutions), circuit level firewalls (solutions), consulting in fire-
wall design, consulting in firewall evaluation, firewalls (solutions, products) 
Sidiroglou et al. 
(2007) 
Descriptions: Modular approach (security services as modules), one-stop shop for secu-
rity services 
 
Anti-spam, anti-virus, attack inference, automated vulnerability detection, automated 
vulnerability mitigation, distributed intrusion detection systems, email worm detection,  
filtering, firewall filtering, large-scale behaviour analysis (of users, traffic etc.), service 
availability (resilience), spam detection, transparent network-wide filtering, virus detec-
tion, VPN provisioning, worm detection, worm vaccine 
 
Although the articles did not merely focus on the holistic perspective, they did present 
the idea of reviewing the big picture and merging together services instead of focusing 
on individual services. This highlights the fact that organizations should concentrate on 
developing their security capabilities and services as a whole to ensure seamless integra-
tion between the different components of information security. The final section of the 
SLR analysis focuses on the various infosec service categorizations identified from the 
literature. 
3.2.7 Security service classifications 
Some of the articles adopted an overview perspective and provided classifications of in-
formation security services. These articles will be discussed in this section. 
Datta Ray, Harnoor and Hentea (2010; 276, 279) concentrate on a security risk man-
agement theme in a smart power grid context in their article and divide information secu-
rity services into three categories: prevention, detection and response. Services listed into 
prevention are authentication, authorization and access control, whereas detection in-
cludes services, such as traffic pattern, monitoring and anomalies. Response, on the other 
hand, includes decision analysis, signature forensics and backup or redundancies for ser-
vice continuity and restoration. In addition to these IT security services, Datta Ray et al. 
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(2010, 276) mention confidentiality and availability as seminal security services. Inter-
estingly, they also describe the two latter functionalities alongside integrity and non-re-
pudiation as security requirements (Datta Ray et al. 2010, 279) again supporting the con-
troversial use of terms. Integrity and non-repudiation will not be included in the service 
categorization from Datta Ray et al. (2010). 
Interestingly, the division between soft and hard security – that resembles the earlier 
mentioned division of technical and non-technical security services – emerged as a clas-
sification in the articles by Karokola, Kowalski and Yngström (2011a, 2013) and Kovač 
and Trček (2009). Karokola et al. (2011a, 1–2; 2013, 1792–1793), for example, observe 
information security services in an e-government context and present a division between 
technical and socio or non-technical security services. The authors parallel information 
security services to security aspects and list some examples (Karokola et al. 2011a, 1; 
2013, 1794); the technical security aspects include hardware and software solutions, 
whereas the non-technical ones include awareness programmes, administrative and man-
agerial policies and operational and procedural guidelines, contractual and legal docu-
mentation and, finally, cultural and ethical norms (Karokola et al. 2013, 1794). Karokola 
et al. (2011a, 1) list very similar security services in their earlier study from 2011 but, 
instead of legal and contractual documents, they discuss frameworks. Additionally, the 
authors name access control and antivirus mechanisms as examples of software and hard-
ware solutions (Karokola et al. 2011a, 1). Finally, the authors refer to their earlier study 
(Karokola et al. 2011b, 62) and note, that many of the existing information security ma-
turity models lack the non-technical security services (Karokola et al. 2011a; 1). 
Kovač and Trček (2009, 255), in turn, make a division between soft social security 
mechanisms and traditional hard security mechanisms (Rasmusson & Jansson 1996, 1) 
and include information security services in the latter. The authors also categorize differ-
ent information security techniques and mechanisms, such as cryptographic mechanisms 
and techniques, authentication, access control and authorization – that mainly aim to re-
strict access rights, safeguard resources and protect confidentiality, integrity and availa-
bility of information assets – as hard security mechanisms. Additionally, authentication 
and authorization are further detailed as access control mechanisms. Soft security – that 
includes trust and trust and reputation systems – on the other hand, endorses compliance 
with the rules of the society and penalizes breaches against them. Trust and reputation 
systems are described as “dynamic rating systems” by the authors and trust is linked to 
reputation (Kovač & Trček 2009, 256). The description of reputation, on the other hand, 
is borrowed from Jøsang et al. (2007, 621) who state that reputation is a measure of trust-
worthiness based on ratings given by the members of a community. (Kovač & Trček 
2009, 256). The authors note that hard security mechanisms alone are not sufficient but 
soft security is needed to safeguard collaborating parties from fraudulent actions, such as 
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giving false information. (Kovač & Trček 2009, 255.) Even though the authors concen-
trate on mechanisms and techniques instead of information security services, the article 
has been included in the analysis as it introduces the softer side of information security 
and infosec services which is seldom present in the articles, although it enables a more 
comprehensive perspective on information security and related services. The fact that 
other authors (e.g., Asgarnezhad et al. 2010, Miguel et al. 2015), have suggested the se-
curity measures as services further supports the inclusion of them. 
From the article by Vorakulpipat, Siwamogsatham and Kawtrakul (2014) only the ab-
stract is available but, nevertheless, it offers useful insights to the question of information 
security services. The authors discuss information security as a service in the area of 
healthcare and suggest combining two different views – a business oriented and an in-
fosec management system (ISMS) view – on information security services. Furthermore, 
the authors list network services, consulting, software development and helpdesk services 
as third party provided information security services. 
The classifications presented in the above articles demonstrate that information secu-
rity services can be observed from multiple angles ranging from activities to types of 
services. Furthermore, these findings strengthen the earlier notions of the versatile nature 
of infosec services. All of the classifications and services accepted from these articles are 
presented in Table 9. 
Table 9 Identified infosec service classifications 
Authors Services 
Datta Ray et 
al. (2010) 
Classifications: Detection, prevention, response 
 
Anomalies, access control, authentication, authorization, availability, backup for service conti-
nuity & restoration, confidentiality, decision analysis, monitoring, traffic pattern, redundancies 
for service continuity & restoration, signature forensics 
Karokola et 
al. (2011a) 
Classifications: Socio / non-technical security services (or aspects), technical security services 
(or aspects)  
 
Socio/non-technical: Administrative policies, awareness programmes, contractual frameworks, 
cultural norms, ethical norms, legal frameworks, managerial policies, operational guidelines, 
procedural guidelines 
 




Classifications: Socio / non-technical security services (or aspects), technical security services 
(or aspects)  
 
Socio / non-technical: Administrative policies, awareness programmes, contractual documents, 
cultural norms, ethical norms, legal documents, managerial policies, operational guidelines, pro-
cedural guidelines 
 
Technical: Hardware solutions, software solutions 
Kovač & 
Trček (2009) 
Classifications: Hard security, social control mechanisms, soft security mechanisms, soft social 
security mechanism, traditional hard security mechanisms, traditional (security) mechanisms 
 
Hard security: 
Access control (traditional security mechanism), access control techniques, authentication (tra-
ditional security mechanism), authentication techniques, authorization, authorization techniques, 
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cryptographic protocols (traditional security mechanism), cryptographic mechanisms (tradi-
tional security mechanism) 
 
Soft security: 
Reputation systems (social control mechanism), trust (soft social security mechanism), trust sys-
tems (social control mechanism) 
Vorakulpipat 
et al. (2014) 
Classifications: Business-oriented perspective, Information security management system 
(ISMS) perspective 
 
Consulting services, helpdesk services, network services, software development services 
 
The analysis section introduced a breakdown of the articles included into the system-
atic literature review (SLR). The study will next concentrate on discussing the findings 
of the SLR based on the analysis. The findings section will first present an overview of 
the SLR and then examine some of the findings in more detail. 
3.3 Systematic literature review findings 
3.3.1 Overview of the systematic literature review 
Before entering into the detailed findings of the systematic literature review, it is useful 
to obtain an overview of the review and its articles. The SLR consisted of different types 
of material: mainly conference proceedings (23 papers, 63.9% from articles) but also 
journal articles and book sections. Table 10 below demonstrates the division of material 
in the SLR. Both of the articles in the book section category were originally conference 
proceedings. Additionally, four of the journal articles appeared in magazine-like aca-
demic journals. 
Table 10 Types of publications in the systematic literature review 
Type of publication Number of publications % 
Journal articles 11 30.6% 
Conference proceedings 23 63.9% 
Book sections 2 5.5% 
In total 36 100.0% 
 
The year of publication for the articles varied extensively from year 1992 to 2016; a 
compilation of the number of articles based on the year of publication is presented in 
Figure 6. Interestingly, the largest amounts of publications per year appear between years 
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2006–2010, whereas one would have assumed that the amount of publications would in-
crease towards the end of the time period considering the current growing interest towards 
and importance of information security and related topics. 
 
Figure 6 Number of publications per year 
Although the amount of selected articles (36 papers) was sufficient for the research, it 
must be noted that they present only a fraction of the original number of found articles 
(5.5% out of the 656 articles). Consequently, many of the articles that fulfilled the criteria 
did not include any description of information security services and, therefore, did not 
provide any useful content for the research. Additionally, many articles included only 
very limited lists of information security services without any description of them and 
some of the given descriptions were somewhat unclear. A few articles were also omitted 
due to poor quality.  
3.3.2 Definition of an information security service 
As the analysis demonstrates, the articles in the systematic literature review witness a 
wide range of information security services. In the analysis section, the articles had been 
grouped based on similarities in the descriptions and listings of security services. How-
ever, before taking a closer look at the services, it is wise to first observe the definition of 
a security service itself. Interestingly, only few articles included in the systematic litera-
ture review (SLR) provide a definition for the term. Sun and Chen (2008, 199) describe 
information security services as independent software entities and compositions of tech-
nologies that are well-defined and both independent but loosely coupled with other ser-
vices. Oladapo et al. (2009, 457), in turn, note that the prime purpose of security services 
is the safeguarding of confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of information as-
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sets. Kovač and Trček (2009, 255) on the other hand, affiliate infosec services with tradi-
tional security mechanisms. One of the definitions provided comes from an additional 
publication by Buecker et al. (2007, 29), that defines both IT and business security ser-
vices as parts of a SOA reference model. IT security services are defined as “building 
blocks to provide security functions as services”, whereas business security services are 
described as utilizing both the IT security services and policy infrastructure in supplying 
“business specific security capabilities”. 
Based on these limited findings it can be stated, that many of the articles lacked con-
crete definitions of what an information security service actually is. This lack of findings 
evidences the thought that perhaps the definition of a security service is found self-evident 
and, therefore, only few descriptions were given. On the other hand, it could be, that – 
based on the spectrum of services identified in the SLR – the concept is seen as too com-
plex and unambiguous to be placed within tight frames. Next we will focus on the differ-
ent perspectives on security services found during the SLR. 
3.3.3 Perspectives on information security 
After observing the security service term, we can now turn to look at the groups of ser-
vices or perspectives that emerged during the SLR in more detail. Some articles discussed 
outsourced security services, relied on international standards or the CIA triad in defining 
services, provided classifications of services or observed services through holistic or soft 
versus hard perspectives, whereas others presented infosec services as part of the authors’ 
own models or developed new security services. Some of these perspectives will be fur-
ther examined next; the CIA perspective will be discussed first. 
The most popular approach in defining information security services was through the 
three cornerstones of information security: confidentiality, integrity and availability (e.g., 
AbdElnapi et al. 2016, Lee et al. 2006). In addition to this, descriptions with additions or 
variations – such as non-repudiation (e.g., Miguel et al. 2015, Claassen et al. 1992), access 
control (e.g., Deng et al. 1995, Jin et al. 2003), authentication (e.g., Liping & Lei 2011, 
Datta Ray et al. 2010) and authorization (e.g., El Yamany & Capretz 2008, Asgarnezhad 
et al. 2010) – to this triad were presented. Defining information security services similarly 
to information security in general is both an interesting finding and a challenge as the 
definition remains very superficial and provides little understanding of the difference be-
tween these two terms. Perhaps the division can be drawn through scope: information 
security services are presented as single attributes, whereas information security covers 
all of the attributes of confidentiality, integrity and availability. It should also be noted 
that some authors had differing thoughts with the idea of regarding CIA as security ser-
vices: Datta Ray et al. (2010), for example, referred to confidentiality and availability as 
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security services but, at the same time, recognized the two alongside integrity and non-
repudiation as security requirements. Similarly, Oladapo et al. (2009) supported the 
stance by stating that the primary purpose of security services is to preserve CIA. These 
examples showcase how the discussion on what can be considered as a security service 
is not clear or straightforward. 
The standards utilized in the articles included ISO 7498 and ISO 7498-2 (Claassen et 
al. 1992) and ISO/IEC 27002 (Sun & Chen 2008). Similarly to Claassen et al. (1992), 
Shaikh, Sharif and Ahmed (2005, 2) revert to ISO 7498-2 in defining security services 
and list confidentiality, integrity, access control or authorization, authentication and non-
repudiation as infosec services. Furthermore, Shaikh et al. (2005, 2) link confidentiality 
to privacy by stating that the messages delivered should be readable only to the message 
sender and receiver. Integrity, according to the authors, refers to the data being transmit-
ted to the receiver unchanged, and authentication, on the other hand, signifies that “the 
receiver is sure of the sender’s identity”. Shaikh et al. (2005, 2) assimilate authorization 
with access control and refer it to limiting access rights to resources to concern a partic-
ular set of people. In non-repudiation, the authors state, that it is necessary for the receiver 
to be able to verify that a message came from a certain sender. Additionally, the authors 
nominate single sign on (SSO) and user provisioning as higher level services provided by 
security processes. (Shaikh et al. 2005, 2, 6.) The conference paper by Shaikh et al. (2005) 
did not qualify for the review based on the inclusion criteria but it validates the use of 
standards in defining information security services. 
Another perspective that arose during the review was managed security services which 
refers to information security services that have been outsourced to a third party (e.g., 
Karyda et al. 2006, 403). The reasons for outsourcing range from cost reductions to ob-
taining expertise, improving efficiency and mitigating risks towards information and in-
formation system CIA (Oladapo et al. 2009, 456). Although companies are interested in 
achieving increased security and decreased maintenance costs, they may be reluctant to 
outsource the services that they regard as highly sensitive to the organization. In addition 
to outsourcing, the topic of security service quality was present in the articles. Interest-
ingly, only three articles (Bahl & Wali 2013, 2014; Xia & Hu 2006) in the review dis-
cussed information security services from the quality perspective. However, information 
security service quality should be regarded as an important topic as it can affect the overall 
information security capabilities of an organization. 
Many of the articles focused on technical security services overpowering the softer, 
non-technical approach to information security services. However, the technical security 
services alone are not sufficient in providing holistic security to an organization. Chang 
and Lee (2003) and Schultz (1995) made a division between technical products and non-
technical services. Karokola et al. (2011a, 2013) and Kovač and Trček (2009), in turn, 
made an even more visible division between soft and hard security: The prior discussed 
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technical and non-technical security services, whereas the latter introduced traditional 
hard security mechanisms and soft social security mechanisms and interpreted security 
services as traditional hard security mechanisms. Even though Kovač and Trček (2009) 
discussed mechanisms instead of services, the division between hard and soft security can 
be applied to infosec services. The softer perspective is especially important as it does not 
merely promote softer services, such as training and awareness building, but emphasizes 
the influence of social control and norms of the society in information security: The sole 
implementation of technical solutions cannot prevent all misbehaviour related to infor-
mation security but the ideology needs to be implemented into the mindset of the mem-
bers of the organization or society. Soft services promote this endeavour. 
Another interesting finding in the articles was that some authors promoted a more 
comprehensive perspective on information security services contrary to focusing on indi-
vidual services. Miguel et al. (2015) described how the field of security solutions has 
transformed into multidisciplinary and holistic approaches. Schultz (1995, 15) mentioned 
the desire to obtain a single ‘plug-and-play’ solution by reason of limited resources, alt-
hough emphasizing the fact that such a solution would not fit with firewalls due to their 
need for high maintenance. Sidiroglou et al. (2007), in turn, presented a very similar view 
with their notion of ‘one-stop-shop’ security services and by emphasizing the vulnerabil-
ities of the approach if sufficient expertise on security threats is lacking. Instead, the au-
thors presented a modular approach to composing security services that would better 
serve the needs of an organization (Sidiroglou et al. 2007). Furthermore, Jin et al. (2003) 
supported the holistic view by promoting the idea of integrating and properly managing 
implemented security services to counter threats and named authentication and identity 
service as an example of a unified security service. This perspective demonstrates that 
focusing on single solutions is not enough to ensure the security of an organization but a 
more holistic standpoint should be adopted to better serve the overall needs of the organ-
ization. 
Several classifications were also identified during the systematic literature review 
(SLR). In addition to the division of soft and hard security provided by Karokola et al. 
(2011a, 2013) and Kovač and Trček (2009), another classification was introduced by 
Datta Ray et al. (2010) who divide security services into phases that can be described as 
information security threat processing steps. Furthermore, two non-scientific publications 
that presented classifications were found during the SLR process – the first one by 
Buecker et al. (2007) and the second one by Bowen, Hash and Wilson (2006). Buecker et 
al. (2007, 28–37, 43–49) discuss business and IT security services and security policy 
infrastructure as parts of a service-oriented architecture (SOA) reference model of IBM 
and describe these as the primary elements of security. The business and IT security ser-
vices listed in the publication are depicted in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Business and IT security services (adapted from Buecker et al. 2007, 30) 
Additional services mentioned in the publication include message and data protection 
services as subservices to confidentiality and integrity, data and application isolation sup-
port services and cryptography as services for data protection, trust service as part of trust 
management, audit logging services linked to audit services, non-repudiation service for 
digital certified mail and, finally, authorization services (Buecker et al. 2007, 35–36, 42, 
44–46). The division of business and IT security services in the publication supports the 
earlier mentioned perspective of technical and non-technical security services to some 
extent. 
Interestingly, identity has been listed both as a business and an IT service and policy 
related components have been separated from the services into a service policy infrastruc-
ture entity. The publication does mention operating systems security, firewalls, host and 
network intrusion detection, patch management and virus detection as part of secure sys-
tems and networks security service but refers to these as systems and technologies. 
(Buecker et al. 2007, 31–32, 38–43, 46–48.) Thus, they have been excluded from the 
categorization from Buecker et al. (2007). 
The second additional publication provided by Bowen et al. (2006, 116), in turn, pre-
sent three information security service categories, which include management, opera-
tional and technical services. Technical services refer to security controls operated by 
computer systems, whereas management systems refer to the management-led concerns 
and techniques in a computer security program. Operational services, on the other hand, 
refer to controls performed by people instead of a system. Interestingly, the authors dis-
tinguish information security services from products but do not give clear examples of 
such products (Bowen et al. 2006, 113–123). The publications by Buecker et al. (2007) 
and Bowen et al. (2006) emerged during the systematic literature review as additional 
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material that did not qualify for the SLR; therefore, they were later included in the review 
as additional articles. 
All of the above-mentioned classifications support the previously mentioned holistic 
perspective as they guide to observe information security services from a wider perspec-
tive focusing on larger entities instead of singular measures. In conclusion it can be stated, 
that the articles introduced various perspectives on information security. Furthermore, the 
division of perspectives in the analysis section is not clear: In many articles there were 
elements and security services that were also present in other perspectives. Therefore, 
many of the articles could have presented various perspectives. Hence, it can be stated 
that the perspectives presented above are not distinctive but contain overlapping elements. 
3.3.4 Other findings from the SLR 
This section highlights some observations from the point of view of service types and 
individual services. The first observation is that the function of an information security 
service may not be unambiguous. An example of this is certification: Chang and Lee 
(2003) related the service both to organizational certification and to certificate authority 
which is a topic existing in cryptography. Similarly, protocols (e.g., security protocols by 
Tamilarasan et al. 2008, cryptographic protocols by Kovač & Trček 2009) could be linked 
to management of information security on a higher level or to cryptography on a more 
detailed level. In the SLR, the protocol-related security services were linked to cryptog-
raphy based on the contexts presented in the articles. However, this demonstrates that the 
context bears a significant meaning when interpreting the services. Interestingly, in both 
of the examples, the prior could be interpreted as a soft service, whereas the second as 
technical or hard. 
In addition to the previous findings, one should also observe the types of security ser-
vices identified. Most of the services presented were rather concrete, such as firewalls 
(e.g., Karyda et al. 2006), training (e.g., Oladapo et al. 2009), authentication (e.g., Chap-
pell et al. 1999), intrusion detection systems (e.g., Choi & Seo 2005) or antivirus (e.g., 
Sidiroglou et al. 2007). Some, on the other hand, had a more abstract nature, such as 
ethical norms, security awareness or trust. In fact, an interesting finding from the point of 
view of single information security services is the acknowledgement of trust and trust 
systems as soft security mechanisms presented by Kovač and Trček (2009). Although 
trust does not directly seem like a service, the idea is supported by Buecker et al. (2007) 
who list trust and trust management as business security services. Building and managing 
trust within an organization can be regarded as a soft security service. On the other hand, 
trust management includes tangible elements as it includes other more concrete services, 
such as rating systems. The inclusion of tangible and intangible elements is also visible 
66 
in the notion of Buecker et al. (2007, 44–45) who divide trust management into business 
and technical aspects from which the prior refers to applying agreed rules on making 
business, whereas the latter refers to cryptographic measures utilized in achieving trust. 
The lack of concreteness is especially visible in those services that are also utilized in 
depicting information security; these services include confidentiality, integrity, availabil-
ity and non-repudiation. When observing all of these abstract services, the following 
question emerges: Can these services be bought? Perhaps the idea behind these services 
is that an organization is aiming at obtaining the characteristics by buying the service – a 
customer is, for example, trying to achieve trust or confidentiality regarding their infor-
mation assets within the organization. But then again, if these services form the require-
ments for information security, how do they then differ from the main purpose of infor-
mation security? The ideology behind naming the abstract characteristics as services re-
mains unclear; however, these measures have been identified as such in multiple articles 
(e.g., confidentiality by AbdElnapi 2016 and Miguel et al. 2015, integrity by Lee et al. 
2006 and Rachedi & Benslimane 2016, security awareness by Oladapo et al. 2009 and 
norms by Karokola et al. 2011a & 2013). 
Other controversial findings include the acknowledgement of people as an information 
security service by Bahl and Wali (2013, 2014). Perhaps people could be interpreted as 
enablers or parts of the services, such as consulting, awareness building and education, 
from the organizational point-of-view due to their importance in implementing the ser-
vice. Nevertheless, the controversial finding remains somewhat unclear. However, as 
mentioned earlier, perhaps the services presented by Bahl and Wali (2013, 2014) – espe-
cially people and physical – could be regarded as service categories instead. 
Physical security itself is another absorbing aspect to be considered as it can be re-
garded as a contrast to hard and soft security. However, physical security services, such 
as locked doors, guard services and surveillance, did not emerge on a large scale during 
the systematic literature review, nor was the topic discussed in detail in the articles, alt-
hough Oladapo et al. (2009) and Bahl and Wali (2013, 2014) present physical security as 
a security service. On the other hand, access control – which was present in multiple 
articles (e.g., Claassen et al. 1992, Lu et al. 2015 and Peiris et al. 2008) – could be under-
stood as a physical security service. Physical security should not be overlooked as it holds 
an important role in the protection of an organization and all of its assets. 
3.3.5 About the terminology of the articles 
During the systematic literature review (SLR), it became evident that the articles utilized 
a myriad of different but overlapping terms, such as services, tools, techniques, solutions, 
mechanisms, aspects, needs and approaches. Additionally, the form of spelling varied and 
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often only parts of the search terms were present in the articles; an example of this would 
be the use of the term ‘security service’ instead of an information security service. This 
created clear challenges for the systematic literature review as the search for information 
security services and their descriptions required a large deal of manual work and search-
ing with single or partial words instead of utilizing the complete terms. Moreover, the use 
of the shorter term ‘security service’ made it unclear, whether the two terms were utilised 
as synonyms or whether the former was considered to be a broader term concerning se-
curity. Additional challenges were caused by the functionalities of the reference manage-
ment software that did not recognize terms that were divided into two rows with a hyphen. 
Thus, it was difficult to ensure that all the descriptions had been identified from the arti-
cles. Similarly to the use of the term ‘security service’, only the term ‘service’ was uti-
lized, which again made it cumbersome to distinguish whether the article discussed a 
certain information security service or some other service. Omitting the services including 
merely the term ‘service’ instead of a ‘security service’ would have, however, resulted in 
less findings and a narrower view on the topic. In addition, in some cases the lack of the 
term ‘service’ proved it difficult to discern whether the article was discussing an infosec 
service or a description of a function. This can be observed in terms such as ‘authentica-
tion’ and ‘authorization’; both of them can be identified as security services and as activ-
ities. 
These findings prove that a wide range of terms, which are not well-established but 
often used as synonyms, exist in academic literature. In addition to that, drawing a line 
between the different terms and deciding which ones could be included in the categoriza-
tion was often very difficult. Therefore, it remains somewhat unclear, which terms can be 
utilised synonymously to information security services and which carry a clear distinc-
tion. The obscurity in the use of terms supports the fact that it remains ambiguous which 
solutions can be regarded as services and which not. This was also visible in the previous 
discussion of the role of confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) regarding secu-
rity services – should they themselves be regarded as services, requirements or as objec-
tives or properties protected by the services? In this study they are considered as all of 
those attributes. Based on the findings, however, it can be stated, that the terminology in 
use is very fragmented and lacks cohesion. 
Another interesting viewpoint in the SLR was the level of detail regarding the services. 
Some articles utilized generic terms whereas others went into more detail with the ser-
vices. An example of this would be Liping and Lei (2011) that presented terms, such as 
information integrity and message confidentiality and Rachedi and Benslimane (2016) 
that utilized terms, such as relayed nodes authentication and integrity, data integrity and 
end-to-end data confidentiality. The higher level of detail increases the concreteness of 
some of the otherwise abstract services – a matter which was discussed in the previous 
section. 
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3.3.6 The significance of security services in the SLR articles 
In addition to the terminology, attention needs to be directed to the handling of infor-
mation security services in the articles. Based on the review of the articles, information 
security services were often a secondary theme in the contributions and the articles ob-
served the topic from a limited angle. This means that many of the articles did not provide 
a comprehensive view or listing of the services but focused only on those services that 
were relevant and supported the topic of the article. This, in turn, could affect the system-
atic literature review by distorting the results. Some of the articles, on the other hand, 
only mentioned a few services as examples of information security services to give a 
general understanding to the reader. Jeong et al. (2010) and Xia and Hu (2006), for ex-
ample, briefly mention few security services in their articles. Furthermore, the descrip-
tions of information security services in the articles were often very scarce and shallow. 
The cursory handling of the topic also affected the identification of services: Deficient 
descriptions and unclear terms caused problems in the interpretation of information secu-
rity services. Without a clear description of the service, it was sometimes difficult to de-
duct what kind of information security services the authors were referring to. 
By observing the articles in terms of mere numbers, Wang et al. (2010) and Karyda et 
al. (2006) provided the most extensive listings of information security services. Further-
more, the additional publication by Buecker et al. (2007) presented a rather wide listing 
of services. However, if observing only the articles accepted into the SLR based on the 
handling of the topic, Karyda et al. (2006) presented the most comprehensive view on 
information security services as they had included both technical services – such as virus 
protection and disaster recovery – and non-technical services – such as security policy 
development and training – in the broad list of services in their article. Nevertheless, none 
of the articles provided a listing of security services that would have included all of the 
services found during the systematic literature review. On the other hand, this is natural 
as the number of identified services was high. 
Another notable observation was the frequency of the information security services in 
the articles. Some services were presented more often than others; among the most pop-
ular ones were, for example, confidentiality (e.g., Miguel et al. 2015, Peiris et al. 2008 
and Rachedi & Benslimane 2016), authentication (e.g., Chappell et al. 1999 and Claassen 
et al. 1992) and access control (e.g., Oladapo et al. 2009 and Peiris et al. 2008), whereas 
some services (e.g., traffic pattern by Datta Ray et al. 2010, security upgrades by Karyda 
et al. 2006 and media protection by Oladapo et al. 2009) were only present in single arti-
cles. 
As mentioned earlier, the findings from the systematic literature review were utilized 
in building an information security service categorization. Despite the fluctuations in the 
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frequency of information security services in the articles, all security services were han-
dled equally in the categorization, even though some sort of prioritization based on the 
frequency could have been utilized. The equal approach was adopted as the topics of the 
articles may have influenced the types of services presented and as only few articles cen-
tralized on infosec services. The categorization will be presented later in section 3.4. 
However, before immersing into the categorization, we will first discuss the quality of 
the SLR articles in the next section. 
3.3.7 Quality of articles 
The quality of the systematic literature review (SLR) articles is also a matter to be ob-
served. The material in the review varied extensively ranging from articles that expanded 
on security services and presented rather extensive lists of them to articles that adopted a 
shallow approach on the topic and presented only few information security services. Ad-
ditionally, the quality of the text within the articles varied; some articles were well writ-
ten, whereas some were cumbersome to read and understand. This may have had an im-
pact on the security services identified. However, as stated earlier, the quality of the arti-
cles was evaluated during the SLR process and some articles were omitted during the 
SLR due to poor quality. 
From an academic point of view, the quality of the publications was reviewed through 
JUFO publication channel ranking. JUFO ranking, published by Publication Forum (Jul-
kaisufoorumi), promotes the quality assessment of scientific research (Home 2017). The 
ranking evaluates both Finnish and foreign publication channels on a scale from 0 to 3 
from which 2 and 3 represent the publication channels that are most influential or follow 
the highest standards. Level 1, in turn, consists of peer-reviewed publication channels that 
specialize in publishing scientific research results. Furthermore, level 1 is the basis for 
publication channels, whereas level 0 is given to publication channels that do not fulfil 
all of the requirements of level 1. (Evaluations 2017.)  
For most of the articles (31 out of 36), the publication channels were not found in the 
JUFO ranking database. For five of the articles, however, the level of rating for the pub-
lication channel was 1. One of the reasons for the lack of ratings was the fact that JUFO 
ranking only showcased ratings for publications from 2012 onwards. In fact, most of the 
articles (27 out of 36) were published prior to that year (division of publications per year 
was depicted earlier in Figure 6). This could affect the lack of ratings in the articles. Fur-
thermore, for seven of the articles without a rating, the publication channel had received 
a rating of 1 from 2012 or 2013 onwards. For two of those publication channels, the rating 
had been raised to 2 from 2015 onwards. For one of the SLR articles, the publication 
channel had received a rating of 2 between years 2012–2014 and a rating of 3 from 2015 
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onwards. For seven of the SLR articles, the publication channels had received a level 0 
rating from 2012 onwards or later, referring to incomplete fulfilment of level 1 require-
ments. The ratings of the publication channels for the SLR articles have been depicted in 
Table 11. 
Table 11 JUFO ranking 







- - 36 
 
% 86.1% 0.0% 13.9% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
 
From the academic evaluation perspective, the quality of the articles leaves room for 
improvement. However, the ratings from 2012 onwards showcase that many of the pub-
lication channels have later been recognized as meeting the basic level requirements of 
the JUFO ranking and, thus, obtaining sufficient quality. Additionally, it must be noted 
that the lack of found ratings does not automatically signify that the publication channel 
does not have one; this could be caused by the use of search terms. However, this proves 
that the article base included in the systematic literature review was rather divided and 
that the articles have not been published in high-quality publication channels. These re-
sults could support the earlier notions of the inconsistent quality of the articles and of the 
varied handling of the topic in them. 
3.4 Information security service categorization (ISSeCa) 
3.4.1 The ISSeCa building process 
Before presenting the ISSeCa categorization in more detail, it is useful to first observe 
the building process of the model. The categorization was built in the form of a mind 
map. According to Siekkinen (1997), there are various types of concept or mind maps; 
the type utilized in this study represents one of them. However, instead of utilizing sym-
bols, colours or linking phrases, which are notation types utilized in concept maps (Siek-
kinen 1997), the categorization built in this study only includes concepts – the infosec 
services identified in the systematic literature review (SLR) – and links that represent 
relationships between the concepts. Furthermore, there are various strategies for building 
a mind map (e.g., mapping by core idea or author as is presented by Machi and McEvoy 
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(2009, 49–50)). Siekkinen (1997) discusses deductive and inductive approaches to build-
ing mind maps from which the prior first builds the basic structure for the map, whereas 
the latter begins by identifying concepts through a thinking process and based on those 
concepts, determines the main categories to which the concepts are then placed. The strat-
egy used in this study included both inductive and deductive elements as the main and 
subcategories were determined before placing the services into the structure. However, 
the insights from the SLR inevitably influenced the selection of the types of categories. 
In fact, the thinking process behind the building of the mind map can be rather multifac-
eted (Siekkinen 1997). The categorization building process is presented phase by phase 
next; additionally, the whole process is pictured in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 ISSeCa building process 
The building of the categorization began by identifying suitable models for categories. 
Multiple possibilities for the categories were considered: the perspectives identified in 
the SLR (1), self-made categories (2) and the components of the CIA triad (3). However, 
all of the three possibilities had to be abandoned. Firstly, although the SLR perspectives 
offer useful insights into infosec services, they were not chosen as the categories of the 
ISSeCa categorization as they are too generic. Secondly, utilizing a mere self-made cate-
gorization could have caused unbalanced categories and, thus, an unbalanced categoriza-
tion. Thirdly, utilizing confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) as the categories 
proved to be impossible as many services can be construed as supporting several of these 
characteristics. However, this can be interpreted as a prominent finding as it showcases 
that security services are not one-sided but help in enabling information security in a more 
versatile manner. 
After observing the various possibilities for the categories, the 14 security control 
clauses of the ISO 27002 standard were found and chosen as the categories of ISSeCa. 
However, it soon became evident that the high number of categories made the structure 
too scattered: The clarity and usability of the categorization had to be enhanced and, thus, 
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the eight information security categories presented in VAHTI instructions were deter-
mined as the main categories of ISSeCa. Furthermore, the security control clauses of the 
ISO 27002 were then named as the subcategories of the model. 
Even though the chosen models – ISO 27002 standard and the information security 
areas by VAHTI – are non-academic, both the International Organization for Standardi-
zation (ISO) and the Ministry of Finance in Finland are well established. The information 
security areas seem to be mainly utilized in Finnish literature sources but the standards 
by ISO are acknowledged and sought after by organizations worldwide. In fact, according 
to SFS-ISO/IEC 27000 standard, the ISO 27002 standard presents generally accepted 
control targets and best practices for information security mechanisms to be utilized in 
the selection and implementation of security mechanisms needed to obtain information 
security (SFS 2012, 24). Therefore, both frameworks suited the purpose of the categori-
zation well. 
After identifying the main and subcategories, they had to be matched to form the basis 
for the categorization. The matching of the main and subcategories was done based on 
both analysing the descriptions and similarities of the categories in literary sources and 
the researcher's own discretion; more detailed information on the matching is presented 
in the next section (3.4.2) for each main category. In brief it can be stated, that the match-
ing of subcategories and, in fact, the building of the whole categorization follows the 
notions of Machi and McEvoy (2009, 49–50): The authors state that “each of the catego-
ries or parts that make up the core idea should be sketched as subsidiary, or supporting, 
idea”. Thus, the different levels of the categorization construct the higher levels from sub- 
and main services through sub- and main categories up to the main topic of the categori-
zation. An example of this chain is presented in Figure 9 by referring to the Personnel 
security branch from the ISSeCa categorization. 
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Figure 9 ISSeCa branch structure 
After matching the main and subcategories, it was time to focus on the services iden-
tified in the SLR. In order to position the services into the categorization, it was important 
to understand the purpose of the services. However, the context and descriptions of the 
services in the articles were often narrowly presented. Moreover, the researcher did not 
possess extensive background information on the identified services. Therefore, internet 
sources were utilized to more profoundly understand the purpose of individual services 
and to find similarities or interconnections between the services for grouping purposes. 
Similarly, descriptions of the frameworks in both the ISO 27002 standard and VAHTI 
instructions were utilized to guide the grouping of the services. During this phase, the 
services were listed, grouped and, finally, nominated to subcategories in Excel. Novak 
and Cañas (2008, 12) also suggest listing the different concepts identified; however, in-
stead of grouping the services they take the idea further by suggesting listing them from 
generic ones to specific ones to ease the mapping. 
After the service grouping phase, the services were individually transferred to the cat-
egorization mind map. The more generic or comprehensive services were nominated as 
the main services of different branches under subcategories, whereas the more detailed 
services were placed under those main services in the branches. Simultaneously, the bal-
anced nature of the categorization was supported by choosing similar types of services as 
the main services of each branch under a subcategory (e.g., encryption services, firewall 
management and audit services as the main services and the more detailed packet encryp-
tion, firewall configuration and IT auditing as their subservices). This approach to the 
building of the categorization is supported by both Novak and Cañas (2008, 1–2) and 
Siekkinen (1997) from which the latter states that a mind map is construed of a central 
concept which is further divided into main and subconcepts or paths. 
Expert reviews on the categorization were unavailable and, thus, peer reviews from a 
person with several years of experience in the field of IS was utilized instead in order to 
help detect inconsistencies in the placement of services. The forming of the categorization 
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was done iteratively as it was refined based on new found information and increased un-
derstanding on the topic. Additionally, new services were identified from the SLR articles 
and added to the categorization during the process. The iterative nature of the building 
process is supported by Novak and Cañas (2008, 12), who state that the initial concept 
map should always be revised, during which new concepts can be added. According to 
the authors, a finished concept map does not exist. It should also be noted, that the ISSeCa 
categorization presented in this study is only one way of classifying these services; in 
reality, the categorization could have been built in multiple ways. This thought is exam-
ined in more detail in section 3.4.3 when reflecting on the building process. 
3.4.2 Description of ISSeCa 
This section presents the information security service categorization (ISSeCa), which is 
built from the infosec services identified during the systematic literature review. The cat-
egorization is based on two different models: the information security areas presented in 
VAHTI instructions and the security control clauses of the ISO 27002 standard. VAHTI 
instructions, that consist of eight information security areas (Classification of instructions, 
2017), form the main categories, whereas the ISO 27002 standard, which includes 14 
clauses (ISO/IEC 27002, 2013), form the subcategories of the categorization. Both of the 
models have been described in detail in section 2.3. Figure 10 depicts the main categories 
of the ISSeCa information security service categorization. 
 
Figure 10 ISSeCa: Main categories (based on Classification of instructions, 2017) 
In addition to the eight main categories, a category ‘Other’ was included in the cate-
gorization to enable the inclusion of information security services that did not apply to 
any of the existing categories. Next the thesis will further examine these main categories 
and their subsidiaries; furthermore, excerpts of the categorization in picture form will be 
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presented. The entire categorization containing all of the accepted services is available in 
Appendices 1.0–1.5; additionally, Figure 21 presents an overview of ISSeCa at the end 
of this section. It is noteworthy to mention, that terms in italics in the categorization are 
not infosec services identified during the SLR but additional titles to support the structure 
of the categorization. The subcategories follow the numbering utilized in the ISO standard 
(ISO/IEC 27002, 2013); an outlook of the subcategories of ISSeCa has been depicted in 
Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 ISSeCa: Subcategories (based on ISO/IEC 27002, 2013)  
The first main category, Personnel security includes subcategory Human resource se-
curity (7), whereas the second main category, Physical security, includes the subcategory 
Physical and environmental security (11). Human resource security was placed under the 
prior main category as they both address similar, people-related issues; Physical and en-
vironmental security, in turn, was placed under the latter main category as they both han-
dle physical security related topics. Both of the subcategories consist of a limited amount 
of services: The prior category includes softer security services related to people, aware-
ness and security education, whereas the latter focuses on physical security services. 
These services have been pictured in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12 Personnel security & physical security 
The third main category, Administrative information security, includes subcategories 
Information security policies (5), Organization of information security (6), Supplier rela-
tionships (15) and Compliance (18). Information security policies includes services re-
lated to policies and policy management, whereas Compliance concentrates on guidelines 
and documentation, governance, certification and privacy. These subcategories were in-
cluded into this main category as they can be regarded as categories addressing manage-
ment-level information security issues and overall information security management. It 
is noteworthy, that the two remaining subcategories – Organization of information secu-
rity and Supplier relationships – do not include any information security services as no 
suitable services were identified. Nevertheless, the categories were retained in the cate-
gorization to ensure a balanced model. The services of the third main category are de-
picted in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13 Administrative information security 
The fourth main category, Operations security, focuses on the operational side of sys-
tems and includes the highest number of subcategories. These subcategories include Ac-
cess control (9), Operations security (12), System acquisition, development and mainte-
nance (14), Information security incident management (16) and Information security as-
pects of business continuity management (17). The aforementioned subcategories were 
placed under Operations security as they can be regarded as supporting the operative, 
daily management of information security in comparison to the more strategic infor-
mation security management under Administrative information security. These services 
address daily infosec issues, such as access control, security analysis, incident manage-
ment and security upgrades encountered within an organization. On the other hand, en-
suring business continuity is also included in this main category as it can be regarded as 
an important part of operative information security. 
From the above listed subcategories, the category Access control (Figure 14), includes 
services from the areas of access control, identification, authentication and authorization 
as they can be interpreted as forming a group or process of access control related security 
services. The linking and threading of these services was also proposed by multiple au-
thors in the systematic literature review (e.g., authentication and authorization by Kovač 
& Trček 2009 and Asgarnezhad et al. 2010, identification or identity management and 
authentication by Miguel et al. 2015 and Jin et al. 2003 and authorization and access 
control by Shaikh et al. 2005). Furthermore, services regarding user provisioning and 
passwords are included in the subcategory. The second subcategory, Operations security, 
in turn, consists of topics related to operational information security: audit, server and 
configuration management, monitoring, vulnerability management, helpdesk and virus 
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protection services, from which monitoring also includes intrusion detection and behav-
iour analysis related services. Additionally, security system management related services 
are placed into this subcategory. A detailed list of services included in these two subcat-
egories is pictured in Appendix 1.1. 
 
Figure 14 Operations security (part 1) 
From the remaining subcategories of Operations security, System acquisition, devel-
opment and maintenance subcategory, on the other hand, includes services related to the 
management of systems, such as system integration, upgrades and penetration testing. 
Information security incident management, in turn, contains security attack analysis and 
emergency response services. The final subcategory under Operations security, Infor-
mation security aspects of business continuity management, consists of services aimed at 
ensuring business continuity. Examples of these services are backups, contingency plan-
ning and failure control. All of the services positioned in these subcategories are depicted 
in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15 Operations security (part 2) 
The fifth main category, Information material security, includes subcategory Asset 
management (8), which consists of services related to data handling, management, storing 
and protection (Figure 16). These services include, for example, data archiving, restora-
tion and time stamping. Asset management was placed under Information material secu-
rity as the ISO 27002 describes information as one type of business asset to be protected 
against threats (ISO/IEC 27002 2013, vi). The placement of the subcategory under this 
main category is justified as the ISO standard (ISO/IEC 27002 2013, 15–18) includes the 
classification of information and handling and disposal of information stored on media 
within asset management. 
 
Figure 16 Information material security 
The sixth main category, Data-communications security, in turn, includes subcatego-
ries Cryptography (10) and Communications security (13) (Figure 17). The prior includes 
services related to encryption, algorithms, public key infrastructure, digital signature and 
security protocols, whereas the latter consists of services related to networks, filtering, 
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firewalls and virtual private networks. Furthermore, network services contain several top-
ics, such as cloud security, decoy services and threat detection. A complete list of the 
services placed under these subcategories is available in Appendix 1.3. Cryptography and 
Communications security were placed under the Data-communications security main cat-
egory as they both aim at ensuring the safe transfer of information. VAHTI also relates 
encryption, which is placed under Cryptography in ISSeCa, to data transfer safety 
(Valtionhallinnon tietoturvasanasto 2008, 103); this further supports the placement of the 
Cryptography subcategory. 
 
Figure 17 Data-communications security 
The seventh and eighth main categories, Equipment security and Software security, do 
not contain subcategories (Figure 18). The latter is, to some extent, unnecessary as many 
of the security services are software. Nevertheless, these categories have been preserved 
in the categorization as suitable infosec services were identified. Equipment security in-
cludes services related to hardware, equipment in general and maintenance as it refers to 
the maintenance of equipment. The placement of security maintenance is not unambigu-
ous as the service could have been placed under Operations security as well. The services 
placed under Software security, in turn, include software and applications related services 
as they can be regarded as being closely linked to the subcategory. 
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Figure 18 Equipment and software security 
The final main category, Other, in turn, includes the following subcategories: 
 CIA 
 Consulting 
 Trust & norms 
 Classifications & descriptions. 
It is notable that the subcategories in this main category are not based on the ISO 27002 
standard but are determined from the findings of the SLR; all of the ISO subcategories 
have been included in the preceding main categories. The subcategory named ‘CIA’ in-
cludes those information security services that simultaneously describe information secu-
rity: confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation (Figure 19). The category 
also includes the more detailed variations of these services. As these services are highly 
abstract, and thus very different from many of the services identified, they could not be 
positioned under any of the VAHTI main categories. Additionally, services related to 
trust, consulting and consolidated billing have been placed under the main category due 
to their abstract nature or discrepancy form other identified services. 
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Figure 19 Subcategories and services in main category Other (part 1) 
Similarly to CIA, the subcategory ‘Trust & norms’ includes ethical and cultural norms 
and trust, which are abstract services. In addition to those services, Trust & norms in-
cludes trust and reputation systems which refer to the rating of services (Figure 20). Other 
subcategories and services under the main category Other include the above-mentioned 
consulting related services and consolidated billing. Furthermore, the classifications 
found in the systematic literature review have been included under the ‘Classifications & 
descriptions’ subcategory, even though they do not represent individual services. This 
subcategory also includes descriptions or types of services found from the SLR articles. 




Figure 20 Subcategories and services in main category Other (part 2) 
As a conclusion of ISSeCa it can be stated, that the categorization aims at incorporating 
the different types of services identified during the SLR as is visible from the overview 
of the categorization in Figure 21 below. To a large extent, the two information security 
models – VAHTI and ISO – have enabled this. However, the services are not equally 
divided between the categories. In fact, Operations security and Data-communications 
security are the largest categories in the categorization based on the amount of services 
included in them. In terms of subcategories, Operations security and Administrative in-
formation security, in turn, are the largest main categories with five and four subcatego-
ries. The extensiveness of Operations security and Data-communications security cate-
gories demonstrates the dominance of the hard, technically oriented services and, there-
fore, naturally supports the findings of the systematic literature review: The softer secu-
rity services represent a minority in the categorization by being included mainly in the 
Personnel security, Administrative security and Other categories; similarly, the amount 
of physical security services is scarce. On the other hand, the amplitude of Operations 
security is understandable when considering the recommendation of Hakala et al. (2006, 
12) of incorporating operations security in all of the other areas of information security. 
This demonstrates the importance of this security area and, thus, supports its wide scope. 
Next we will reflect on the complexity of the categorization building process. 
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Figure 21 An overview of the ISSeCa categorization 
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3.4.3 Reflections on the forming of the categorization 
The ISSeCa categorization offers one way of presenting the information security services 
identified in the SLR in a structured manner. However, as noted above, this presentation 
is not absolute and various compromises in the building of the categorization had to be 
done. This section provides insights into the perceived diversity of the services during the 
building process. 
First it is useful to note that the positioning of the subcategories and security services 
was not unambiguous due to linkages between the services. The subcategory Supplier 
relationships (15), for example, could have been positioned under Operations security as 
it could be interpreted as operative supplier management in addition to the administrative 
management of suppliers. From the service point of view, there were numerous services 
with multiple possible locations in the categorization. To name a few, examples of such 
services include firewall filtering, which is connected to both filtering and firewalls, mon-
itoring which could refer to the monitoring of systems or services and, thus, be linked to 
both of them, and intrusion detection, traffic patterns and anomalies which could be linked 
to both networks and monitoring. Protocols, on the other hand, could refer to administra-
tive security or cryptography, whereas digital signatures could be affiliated with cryptog-
raphy, algorithms or authentication. Finally, privacy could be linked to either cryptog-
raphy or to the data privacy of individuals, from which the former adopts a technical and 
the latter a more people-oriented perspective. 
A similar situation occurred with different groups of services. The positioning of the 
CIA services, for example, was difficult due to their abstract and networked nature. The 
newly established category Other proved to be the most natural position for these ser-
vices. Managed security services, on the other hand, could have been combined under 
one root in the categorization as they form a distinctive group but, instead, they were 
divided into different categories based on the purpose of each service. 
Another difficulty emerged in the positioning of those services that integrate several 
different services. An example of this are services that combine authentication and integ-
rity described by Rachedi and Benslimane (2016) or the unified authentication and iden-
tity management services introduced by Jin et al. (2003). Despite the multifaceted nature 
of these services, they were only placed into the categorization once and the position was 
determined by the discretion of the researcher. Dotted lines between subcategories could 
have been added to the categorization to demonstrate the linkages between the services. 
However, when tested, this made the categorization confusing and, thus, the lines were 
abandoned. 
These examples prove a widely spread network of linkages between the services. In 
the end, all of the services are connected as they aim at fulfilling the same goal – preserv-
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ing critical information and protecting it against harm. Therefore, the networking of ser-
vices is understandable. In fact, Novak and Cañas (2008, 12) support this insight emerg-
ing in the building of concept maps by noting that it is important to understand that “all 
concepts are in some way related to one another”. On one hand, due to the networked 
nature of the services, the categorization could be interpreted as somewhat artificial and 
incomplete as all of the connected services could not be properly linked in the categori-
zation and as the positioning of the services is debatable. Hakala et al. (2006, 12) support 
this notion of artificiality by stating that, in reality, all of the information security areas 
influence each other and share common factors. On the other hand, the division of these 
areas helps in information security planning (Hakala et al. 2006, 12). In conclusion it can 
be stated, that the categorization provides excellent insights into understanding the nature 
and connectedness of information security services. These findings also support the ear-
lier notion according to which singular services cannot guarantee the security of infor-
mation assets but, instead, a compilation of security services should be gathered and im-
plemented based on the needs of the organization. After presenting the ISSeCa categori-
zation, the study will now concentrate on the survey part of the research. 
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4 SURVEY 
Based on the categorization of information security services created in the previous sec-
tion, a survey including quantitative and qualitative questions was conducted to gather 
more information regarding information security services. This chapter presents the pro-
cess, analysis and results of the survey; we will begin with the description of the survey 
process. 
4.1 Survey process 
The questionnaire for the survey was created in Finnish utilizing Webropol survey and 
analysis tool. The questions were based on the systematic literature review (SLR) results 
and the ISSeCa categorization as the idea was to deepen the earlier obtained knowledge 
regarding information security services. Additionally, prior studies were utilized when 
designing the questions. The survey included cover (Appendix 3.1) and thank you notes 
and two main sections: The first part collected background information, whereas the sec-
ond part focused on content questions. Simpler questions were placed in the beginning of 
the questionnaire to ease respondents and to create a more confident feeling for them 
regarding the questions; this is also recommended by Heikkilä (2008, 49) and Hirsjärvi 
et al. (2003, 190). 
The background questions examined the role of the respondent within the company, 
company size and industry. The classification of company size was based on the division 
utilized by Tilastokeskus (Pienet ja keskisuuret yritykset 2017, Mikroyritys 2017); it in-
cludes four classes based on the number of employees in the company. These four classes 
represent micro companies (less than 10 employees), small companies (10–49 employ-
ees), medium-sized companies (50–249 employees) and large companies (250 employees 
or more). Originally the definition also depends on the turnover or balance sheet total and 
the independence of the company but, for reasons of clarity and for the ease of the re-
spondent, only the size of the company was taken into account in the question. A prior 
information security study conducted for Finnish companies by CGI (CGI – – 2016) was 
utilized when determining the options for both the role of the respondent within the com-
pany and the industry categories. The following options were given for the role question: 
 business executive 
 business expert 
 IT executive 
 IT expert 
 information security executive 
 information security expert 
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 other. 
A condensed list of the industry categories was chosen to support the anonymity of the 
companies as more detailed information might have enabled the identification of the com-
pany. The list of industries utilized in this study includes eight categories as follows: 
 manufacturing and transport 
 trade and services 
 healthcare and welfare 
 banking and insurance 
 IT and communications 
 public administration and defence 
 energy and water 
 other. 
 To ensure the anonymity of the respondents and their companies, the survey was con-
ducted anonymously and no other background information of the companies was col-
lected. 
The content questions consisted of four groups: First group included questions that 
handled information security services and their importance, the second group handled 
managed security services, the third investigated competence and investments related to 
security services and the final group included a question with which the respondent could 
give feedback and ideas. The content questions included both multiple choice and open-
ended, descriptive questions; as the number of questions varied based on the answers of 
the respondent, the questionnaire did not include numbering of the questions. The ques-
tions and the complete questionnaire can be observed in Appendix 3.2. The list of indi-
vidual security services is wide; therefore, to enhance the clarity and usability of the ques-
tionnaire, the main categories of the information security service categorization (ISSeCa) 
were utilized instead; these categories are presented in section 3.4. 
The aim of the survey was not only to find out what kind of information security ser-
vices the companies utilize but also to measure the importance of the services to those 
companies. Additionally, as the components of the CIA triad of information security – 
confidentiality, integrity and availability – clearly emerged as security services, a ques-
tion to investigate services that support these characteristics was also included. The most 
important questions were marked as compulsory to ensure answers to those questions. 
Furthermore, the questionnaire was tested before release. 
The population for the survey consisted of companies operating in Finland, whereas 
the sample comprised 15 responses. The questionnaire was distributed through email and 
LinkedIn and Facebook social media sites between 15.5.–31.5.2017. During this 
timeframe, reminders regarding the post in social media were sent, likes for the post were 
gathered to increase visibility and invitations to answer the survey was distributed via a 
small group of researchers and other actors. This was done to increase the number of 
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responses to the survey. The initial goal was to collect a wide sample of companies across 
Finland by utilizing the network of a partner company, but this proved to be infeasible as 
the company was unable to participate in the survey process. Therefore, the research fo-
cused on companies that could be reached through contact networks and social media 
sites. 
Despite the effort to distribute the survey, it reached a rather low number of 15 re-
sponses. The survey was opened but left unanswered over 130 times; therefore, the re-
sponse rate for the survey was 11.4%, although it is possible that one person has opened 
the questionnaire multiple times. Additionally, the statistics of the post in social media 
included 1331 views, 18 likes and 5 reposts in LinkedIn and 45 views in the Facebook 
page of ICT-portti. ICT-portti is a collaboration programme between companies and uni-
versities within Turku area (ICT-Portti 2017); thus, it has the potential to reach a consid-
erable amount of organizations. Due to the low number of responses, the data of the sur-
vey was analysed in a qualitative manner instead of the originally planned quantitative 
approach and colour coding was utilized to support the process. The analysis of the survey 
will be presented next. 
4.2 Survey analysis 
4.2.1 Background questions 
As mentioned above, the first set of questions consisted of background questions. These 
questions will be handled together next. 
The majority of the companies that the respondents presented, operate in the IT and 
communications industry (9 out of 15 responses). Additionally, companies operating in 
manufacturing and transport, trade and services, healthcare and welfare and other indus-
tries were also present. Furthermore, companies of all sizes were present in the data rang-
ing from micro companies (less than 10 employees) to large companies (over 249 em-
ployees). The largest number of respondents were employed in large companies (5 out of 
15 responses), although the distribution of respondents between different company clas-
ses was quite even. When asking about the role of the respondents within the organization, 
business executives were the largest individual group with approximately half of the re-
spondents (8 out of 15 responses); however, IT executives, business and IT experts and a 
development manager were also present in the survey. 
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4.2.2 Information security services and their importance 
The background questions were followed with the first group of content questions that 
investigated infosec services and their importance to the organization. In the first content 
question, the respondents were asked to describe in their own words, what they under-
stand by information security services. The responses were rather scattered as they ranged 
from technical, individual services, such as the virus protection of a computer, through 
more abstract descriptions of services, such as services that are utilized in protecting in-
formation material to holistic descriptions that include many perspectives, such as people, 
and equipment. We will next explore these answers in more detail. 
The most pronounced perspective in the responses was the holistic perspective. This 
perspective combined people with equipment, properties, software and modes of opera-
tion as is visible in one of the responses: 
 
[An information security service is] a bulbous entity comprising of matters 
and services, where the person is in the core and the whole world on the 
outer circle. 
(A translated response from a business executive) 
 
Related to the holistic perspective is the finding, that information security services 
were described as being integrated in the services utilized, ranging from technical plat-
forms to processes. Additionally, infosec services were described as technical, adminis-
trative and educational solutions that enable the achievement of business goals. 
Describing infosec services with positive terminology related to support was also vis-
ible in many responses: Information security services were referred to as services that 
either protect and safeguard information assets or ensure and improve the information 
security and ICT entity of the company. Furthermore, infosec services were also charac-
terized as protecting not only the information assets but also the usability and functional-
ity of systems. Additionally, the idea of enabling the use of ICT and the protection of 
information assets was extended to both the organization and its personnel and to the 
customers of the organization as is visible in one of the responses: 
 
Information security services are services that ensure the use of the ICT 
entity to both the customer and the staff by protecting and safeguarding 
the capital of the company and the customer, system usability and opera-
bility. 
(A translated response from a business expert) 
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On the other hand, infosec services were also described with more negative terminol-
ogy which is usually associated with control: Information security services were de-
scribed as being utilized in prohibiting and limiting either the transfer of the internal in-
formation assets of an organization to outsiders or the access of malware and outsiders to 
the systems of the organization. Similarly, these services were defined as technical or 
expert services utilized in minimizing or managing the information security risks and 
threats, thus emphasizing a management perspective. 
Interestingly, the presence of the confidentiality-integrity-availability (CIA) triad was 
scarce: One respondent related infosec services to restricting the availability of infor-
mation, whereas another respondent stated that information security services aim at pro-
tecting the secrecy, validity and availability of information assets – properties almost 
identical to CIA: 
 
Services related to IT – especially to information networks, systems and 
equipment – that are used to protect information capital, its availability, 
validity and secrecy. 
(A translated response from an IT expert) 
 
Furthermore, information security services as an outsourced function was mentioned 
in one of the responses. All participants gave an answer to the question; however, one of 
the respondents chose to answer ‘I don’t know’. The aforementioned examples demon-
strate that multiple perspectives in defining security services was presented. 
Next the respondents were asked to estimate how important information security ser-
vices are in ensuring the information security of their organization. Most of the respond-
ents felt that the services are very important (10 out of 15 responses), whereas some re-
garded them as rather important (4 responses). Only one respondent regarded infosec ser-
vices as neither important nor unimportant for ensuring the information security of their 
organization. Infosec services are, thus, seen as important in ensuring information secu-
rity within an organization. 
In the third content question, the respondents were presented with the eight main ser-
vice categories utilized in the information security service categorization (ISSeCa; pre-
sented in section 3.4) based on the infosec areas of VAHTI instructions (Classification of 
instructions 2017). The respondents were asked to determine whether these infosec ser-
vice categories were utilized in their organization and to evaluate their importance for 
ensuring the information security of their organization. According to the responses, all of 
the categories were used in most of the companies. However, equipment, software and 
data-communications security received the most responses advocating their use, thus, 
highlighting them as the most common infosec service categories (each received 13 out 
of 15 responses). This supports the prevalence of technical measures. Physical, personnel, 
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operations and administrative information security, in turn, were among the categories 
that received the most ‘not in use’ responses (3–4 responses each). Yet, it must be noted 
that the differences between the categories regarding the number of responses were scant. 
According to one respondent, none of the service categories were in use in their organi-
zation. Two respondents, in turn, could not specify whether the infosec service categories 
were utilized in their organization: the first one regarding two categories (information 
material and administrative information security categories) and the second one all of 
them. All respondents answered the question. 
When evaluating the importance of the infosec service categories, almost all of them 
were regarded as very important in ensuring the information security of the organization. 
Two of the categories – physical and operations security – however, were regarded as 
either rather or very important. In both of these categories, the responses were divided 
somewhat equally between the two options. It is notable, that in a few responses some of 
the categories were evaluated as neutral or somewhat unimportant. All of the categories 
with least importance (‘not at all important’) were given by the same respondent; these 
three categories included personnel, operations and administrative information security. 
Furthermore, two respondents evaluated administrative information security as ‘rather 
unimportant’, whereas physical and operations security were both evaluated as ‘rather 
unimportant’ by one respondent. Additionally, one respondent could not specify the im-
portance of the administrative information security category. Interestingly, the respond-
ent, according to whom none of the categories were utilized in their organization, re-
garded all of the service categories as very important to ensuring the information security 
of their organization. Similarly, the respondent who could not specify whether the service 
categories were in use, regarded almost all (7 out of 8) categories as very important and 
the final category, operations security, as rather important. All the respondents answered 
the question. Based on the results it can be concluded, that all of the categories were 
regarded as important. 
In the next question, the respondents were asked to describe what kind of information 
security services are utilized to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information within their organization. For confidentiality, services related to access man-
agement, such as identity and identity management services, authentication and multifac-
tor authentication, logs and access control were mentioned. Additionally, encryption-re-
lated services, such as encryption of mass memories and data communications and secure 
shell (SSH) and secure sockets layer (SSL) cryptographic protocols, were mentioned. On 
the other hand, the question was observed through data management: Services, such as 
data classification and subsequent protection methods and the deletion of obsolete infor-
mation material, were named as infosec services utilized in maintaining the confidential-
ity of information. 
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For preserving the second characteristics, integrity, services such as backup on a daily 
or weekly basis and change log based on classification were mentioned. Additional ser-
vices for ensuring information integrity included electronic signature, validation sums 
and software based data storage solutions. Interestingly, one respondent adopted a differ-
ent perspective on the matter instead of focusing on individual services by suggesting that 
information security issues should be taken into consideration in organizational processes 
early on: 
 
Relying on the forming of teams and selection of people already from the 
recruitment phase onwards, often not [relying] on the individual rights. 
(A translated response from a business executive) 
 
For the availability of information, infosec services, such as single sign on, equipment 
backups, software based data storage solutions and cloud services were named. Other 
security services included network management services, closed or redundant networks 
and redundant servers in critical systems and applications, information security software 
in company network and limiting the amount of open network solutions. On the other 
hand, contractual aspects and auditing of suppliers, service providers and internal opera-
tions were also named as security services enabling availability. One of the respondents 
described their data as being globally available due to the nature of their business. An-
other respondent described both integrity and availability as being managed with com-
pany resources. Thus, it could be interpreted that they do not utilize infosec services to 
ensure these information security properties. Only eight participants answered this ques-
tion from which one informed that they are unauthorized to give a detailed answer to the 
question due to KATAKRI Finnish national security auditing criteria restrictions. Fur-
thermore, for integrity, only six answers were given. In conclusion, the companies rely 
mostly on technical services in the preservation of CIA, although examples of non-tech-
nical services were also given. 
4.2.3 Outsourcing related questions 
The second set of content questions focused on outsourcing. In the first question, the 
respondents were asked to evaluate the level of outsourcing of those information security 
service categories they had previously named as being utilized in their company. In all of 
the categories but administrative information security, the services were mainly fully or 
partially outsourced, from which physical, equipment, data-communications and software 
security were categories with most responses supporting outsourcing. In the administra-
tive information security category, in turn, the responses between outsourcing and not 
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outsourcing were equally divided. The majority of respondents answered the question. 
However, for administrative information security and operations security categories (2 
respondents each), as well as for personnel security and information material security 
categories (1 respondent each), the level of outsourcing could not be determined by some 
respondents. 
Next the respondents were asked to give reasons for the outsourcing of security ser-
vices; the respondents were allowed to choose multiple reasons from a predefined list or 
name a reason of their own. The main reasons for outsourcing were the need for flexible 
and scalable information security resources and services and the desire to focus on the 
core competence of the organization. Additionally, cost efficiency and the need for cost 
reductions related to information security and need for wider information security 
knowledge and know-how were among the main reasons for outsourcing infosec services. 
Other reasons for outsourcing included the lack of information security know-how or in-
formation security resources within the organization, desire for better information secu-
rity service management and demands from external parties such as customers or laws. 
Almost all respondents answered the question (14 out of 15 respondents). 
4.2.4 Information security service competence and investments 
The third group of content questions consisted of questions related to information security 
service competence and investments. In the first question, the respondents were asked to 
evaluate the level of information security competence within their organization. Most re-
spondents estimated that the competence within their organization is on a rather or very 
good level, from which the option ‘rather good’ was especially pronounced. Some re-
spondents, however, felt that the level of infosec competence within their organization 
was either on a neutral or rather poor level (5 out of 15 responses in total). One respondent 
chose the option ‘I don’t’ know’. There was, thus, some deviation in the responses. 
Next the respondents were asked to describe the needs of their organization regarding 
information security services and related competence. Regarding the security services, 
the respondents named services, such as data encryption, preparedness for denial of ser-
vice (DOS) attacks, a dashboard service to follow and analyse the information security 
entity of the organization and more comprehensive information security audits to service 
providers. On the other hand, one respondent noted that the EU legislation places strict 
demands regarding, for example, customer privacy – a comment most likely referring to 
the soon to be implemented general data protection regulation (GDPR) regarding privacy. 
It could be interpreted that there is a need for infosec services that support the fulfilment 
of privacy requirements. From a wider perspective, one respondent highlighted the need 
for development: 
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The development of the processes related to ensuring the information se-
curity of the organization. 
(A translated response from a business executive) 
 
Related to the development perspective is the notion of growth: One respondent noted 
that the growth of the company could increase the importance of some processes. The 
responses were, in general, quite fragmented as similar needs did not occur. 
Regarding the competence related to infosec services, in turn, the people perspective 
was pronounced as is portrayed in the following two responses: 
 
The general competence and awareness of staff regarding different infosec 
risks should be improved. 
(A translated caption from a response of a development manager) 
 
The enhancement of the information security knowledge of end users [is] 
most important and insufficient. 
(A translated caption from a response of an IT expert) 
 
The respondents described the need to improve the infosec competence of both staff 
and end users. Additionally, one respondent noted, that the infosec competence is on a 
good level but as departments do not follow information security instructions, the services 
do not function as expected. This implies that the infosec compliance should be improved. 
Another respondent gave an example of the lack of competence by noting that third party 
follow-up services utilizing cookies may endanger information security but this is not 
understood [within the organization]. It was also noted that, due to lack of know-how, it 
is difficult to estimate the fit and adequacy of services which results in relying too heavily 
on the suggestions of a service provider. On the other hand, the need for more time to 
concentrate on information security related issues was also recognized as a development 
area by an IT executive which could imply that more resources towards information se-
curity are needed. However, it was also noted that third parties can help with this problem. 
Finally, the influence of GDPR was also recognized as it acutely poses new demands on 
information security. The service part of the question received 7 responses, whereas the 
service related competence part received 6 responses. One respondent could not answer 
the question due to KATAKRI restrictions. 
Next the respondents were asked to describe how they are going to respond to the 
needs regarding information security services and related competence. Regarding secu-
rity services, the responses were again quite fragmented. For the preparedness for DOS 
attacks, partial outsourcing was mentioned, whereas for the need for more comprehensive 
auditing, finding a new audit partner was proposed. To the services related to privacy 
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requirements, in turn, it was suggested that more decision power should be granted to the 
information security department. Regarding the influence of growth in the importance of 
processes, it was mentioned that the need will be met with internal or managed resources 
when it occurs, but not in advance. Additional means included built-in information secu-
rity in internet of things (IoT) devices. 
The respondents also named means in responding to the competence needs regarding 
security services. Additional training to both users and people responsible within IT was 
suggested regarding the need for both more time for infosec matters and for developing 
end user competence. Regarding GDPR, in turn, both internal and external auditing and 
consulting were suggested as means to respond to those needs. Furthermore, one respond-
ent suggested increasing influence as a means to answer to both the infosec service and 
related competence needs. The service part of the question received 6 responses, whereas 
the service related competence part received 4 responses. Interestingly, in both of the two 
previous questions regarding security services and competence, the non-technical, softer 
needs and measures – such as auditing, training and compliance – were emphasized; this 
is contrary to the notions regarding the earlier questions of the survey. 
The respondents were also asked to evaluate how much their organization is planning 
to invest in information security services within the next 12 month compared to earlier 
investments. Most respondents stated that the level of investments will be the same as 
earlier, although some respondents answered that the level of investments will be some-
what or considerably higher (4 responses out of 15 in total). All of the participants an-
swered the question; 2 respondents chose the option ‘I don’t’ know’. The next section 
will observe the feedback of the survey. 
4.2.5 Feedback on the survey 
In the final question group of the survey, the respondents were allowed to give feedback 
and share ideas regarding the survey. The question received 2 responses. The first re-
sponse asked for an additional ‘partially in use’ option in addition to the ‘in use’ and ‘not 
in use’ options – most likely referring to the question of information security service cat-
egory use within the organization. The respondent continued that most categories are par-
tially in use with known deficiencies. This was further supported by the respondent’s 
notion that even outsourced information security services are not fully implemented but 
the level of implementation is decided based on costs. This is a valid feedback and could 
be taken into consideration in future surveys that further investigate the topic. The more 
detailed options could provide more in-depth knowledge on the use of information secu-
rity services; however, it could also make the data more fragmented and results difficult 
to interpret. For this survey, the current options seemed adequate. 
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The second feedback noted that due to restrictions set by customers, giving answers to 
some of the questions was impossible. This notion also emerged in the responses and is a 
valid finding when considering the low rate of participants in the survey. The low re-
sponse rate of the survey and reasons for it will be further discussed later in section 5.2. 
We will further describe the findings of the survey next. 
4.3 Survey findings 
4.3.1 An overview of the survey 
Although the amount of respondents in the survey remained low, some findings can be 
deduced from the data. The main findings of the survey are first capsulized in the below 
table (Table 12) and then discussed in more detail. 
Table 12 Main findings of the survey 
Topic Main findings 
Basic information 
on respondents 
 respondents: diverse; half of the respondents were business executives 
 company size: diverse; companies of all sizes included 
 field of business: mainly IT and communications field 
Infosec service  
description 
 many perspectives presented: Mainly holistic, although other aspects, (e.g., 
technical, developmental) were present; contradictory terminology of support 
and control (positive / negative) 




 all categories regarded as important; softer categories among those that re-
ceived most ‘not important’ and ‘not in use’ responses, while categories that 
received most ‘in use’ responses were all technical 
Outsourcing  most categories at least partially outsourced 
 multiple reasons for outsourcing; mainly need for scalable resources and de-
sire to focus on core competence 
Infosec importance, 
level & investments 
 infosec services regarded as important 
 information security mostly on a good level; the majority is not planning to 
increase investments in information security 
Infosec service & 
competence needs 
 fragmented needs; non-technical needs and measures emphasized (especially 




First, it is useful to notice that most of the respondents represented business manage-
ment instead of information security management. This is logical especially in small com-
panies where key roles bear larger areas of responsibility; nevertheless, the data indicated 
that the division of companies based on size in the sample was quite equal. Closer exam-
ination, however, revealed that most of the respondents with business management status 
represented micro or small companies. The only information security expert in the survey, 
in turn, represented a large company. These findings indicate that the survey could not 
reach the persons responsible for information security issues in larger companies to the 
extent needed or such persons were unwilling to participate in the survey. It is also note-
worthy, that instead of achieving a balanced representation of different fields of business, 
most of the companies in the survey operate in the IT and communications sector. This 
could lead to more informed answers and higher emphasis on infosec issues than would 
from companies operating in other fields. This is due to the fact that IT companies are 
likely to have a better understanding of information security as it often represents one of 
their core businesses. 
The organizations estimated that their information security is on a rather good level 
and were not planning to increase their investments in the matter. At the same time, in-
formation security services were regarded as rather or very important for ensuring infor-
mation security within the organization. Consequently, the companies did identify both 
soft and technical development areas regarding information security and related compe-
tence, although the softer side was more pronounced in the responses. Furthermore, all of 
the infosec service categories from the information security service categorization (IS-
SeCa) were in use in most of the companies and regarded as important.  
The services of the infosec service categories were mostly at least partially outsourced 
due to willingness to concentrate on the core competence of the company, need for flex-
ible and wider resources and infosec competence and cost reductions. Therefore, out-
sourcing was also regarded as a means for increasing infosec competence. One of the 
respondents, on the other hand, highlighted an important factor regarding investments in 
information security: The level of information security might not be executed to the max-
imum level possible but, rather, is optimized based on costs.  
Interestingly, while the survey was being executed, the WannaCry ransomware attack 
spread to companies worldwide. It was expected that the responses might indicate an in-
creased willingness to invest in information security but this assumption did not emerge 
from the responses. The initial expectation with the question regarding the importance of 
infosec service categories was that it would yield more in-depth results by demonstrating 
clearer differences between the categories. The question might have produced better in-
sights if the respondents would have been asked to set the categories in order of priority 
as it might have indicated greater division between them. On the other hand, the results 
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indicate that infosec services as a whole are regarded as important for safeguarding infor-
mation security. This also supports the notion that a more comprehensive approach to 
maintaining information security is needed. The key findings of the survey will be dis-
cussed in more detail next in three categories: definitions, use and needs. Definitions sec-
tion focuses on discussing how information security services were defined in the survey, 
whereas Use section focuses on the security services reported as being used in the organ-
izations. Needs section, in turn, focuses on aspects related to future information security 
needs and measures to correspond to those needs. 
4.3.2 Definitions of infosec services 
When examining the depictions of information security services, the first finding is that 
information security services were described through both positive terminology related 
to support and more negative terminology related to control. They were characterized as 
ensuring, safeguarding and improving information security but, at the same time, as lim-
iting and prohibiting access to information assets from unauthorized parties or malware. 
Another approach to infosec services was to describe them as means of managing busi-
ness risks and cyber threats. This demonstrates that the terminology portrays infosec ser-
vices through various lenses. 
In addition to the support and control aspects, a holistic perspective highlighting the 
comprehensive nature of information security services was present in the responses; this 
description was prevalent in the responses. The holistic approach suggested combining 
the technical side, such as technical solutions and equipment with people, training and 
modes of operations. Furthermore, the holistic perspective supported the notion of ser-
vices as entities that are composed of these differing components. Likewise, other au-
thors, such as Soomro, Shah and Ahmed (2016, 223) in their article concerning a literature 
review on information security management, endorse the view of a holistic approach. 
Related to the holistic approach is the integration of information security issues into 
the organizational processes early on. In fact, information security issues should be taken 
into account already in the assessment and development phases of information systems 
or outsourced services (Effective information security 2009, 27). This is a valuable notion 
as building information security within information systems and processes may prove 
difficult later on. Furthermore, addressing information security issues once an infor-
mation system has already been developed may prove to be very expensive and some-
times impossible (Effective information security 2009, 27). Thus, when the infosec issues 
are taken into consideration already in the early stages, it will be easier to fit them with 
the requirements of the system or process. 
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In addition to the aforementioned approaches, a development perspective also emerged 
from the responses as some respondents described infosec services as services that im-
prove information security and highlighted the development of information security re-
lated processes. Furthermore, it was mentioned that growth could change the importance 
of organizational processes and, thus, influence the security service needs of the organi-
zation. Consequently, information security is not a static condition but a continuously 
evolving process (ENISA 2006, 8). This is a rather interesting finding, as the develop-
mental approach did not emerge as evidently in the systematic literature review. The ex-
istence of the soft, holistic and development approaches indicates that business may have 
a rather developed understanding of information security services – at least within these 
organizations. 
However, it is noteworthy that the CIA perspective – referring to identifying confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability as infosec services – was substantially weaker in the sur-
vey than how it emerged in the systematic literature review. Similar properties were 
linked to security services in only two responses; however, none of the responses actually 
identified CIA components as information security services. In this sense, business ap-
pears to have a somewhat differing image of information security services compared to 
academia. This difference is also visible in the definitions of information security services 
provided by the SLR and the survey: Based on the perspectives presented above, it could 
be argued that the survey provided a wider definition of information security services 
than the narrow, technical and CIA infused definitions found during the systematic liter-
ature review (SLR) presented in 3.3.2. 
4.3.3 Use of infosec services 
When moving on from the definitions of information security services and observing the 
security services identified in the survey, the amount of such services was quite limited 
compared to the findings of the SLR. Furthermore, although the division of soft and hard 
security services was visible in the answers, the technical side was more pronounced in 
the responses. This indicated that organizations are mainly utilizing technical services in 
preserving CIA. This is a controversial finding when compared to the fact, that many 
respondents had described information security services more as holistic. An exception 
to this rule was demonstrated by one respondent who suggested that integrity should be 
taken into account already in the personnel recruitment phase, thus emphasizing the fact 
that information security should not concentrate on technical solutions but a wider ap-
proach should be adopted. 
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When further examining the categories that are used by the organizations, similar find-
ings occurred. Although all categories were in use and regarded as important, the catego-
ries that achieved most ‘in use’ responses were all technical, whereas the categories that 
can be interpreted as more non-technical (personnel and administrative information secu-
rity), were both among the ones that received most responses of not being in use and not 
regarded as important. Although the number of responses is scant and evidence subtle, 
this observation is in line with the findings of the systematic literature review (SLR) and 
the named security services regarding the prevalence of technical information security 
services. The two remaining categories that received responses of not being in use, phys-
ical and operations security, were also evaluated as slightly less important than the other 
categories. This again supports the prevalence of technical information security. 
Furthermore, the narrow approach in naming security services is an interesting finding, 
as information security is generally regarded as covering all of the three aspects of CIA 
and, thus, making it a comprehensive approach. It is also a notable finding when com-
pared to the general perceived importance of all of the infosec categories according to the 
respondents. However, the mode of the research has most likely had an impact on the 
results as respondents were not asked to name infosec services in general but to give 
examples of services relevant to their organization instead. Additionally, the lack of in-
formation security expert participants could also explain the narrow results. It is notewor-
thy, that interviews might have provided more in-depth findings on the security services 
questions than what the open-ended survey questions were able to offer. 
4.3.4 Needs regarding infosec services 
The results of the survey reveal a division in the acknowledgement of security services: 
The holistic perspective was pronounced in the definition of infosec services, whereas the 
services utilized to preserve information CIA were mainly technical as was discussed in 
the two previous sections (sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). Yet, the future needs and measures 
regarding information security services and related competence emphasized the softer 
perspective. This supports the notion that having technical information security services 
in place is not sufficient but it is of utmost importance to engage people – staff, end users 
and suppliers – in following the security instructions and requirements of the organiza-
tion. This notion is supported by other authors as was discussed in section 2.2: ENISA 
stated that the personnel of an organization expose the organization to higher infosec risks 
than outsiders (ENISA 2006, 8), whereas von Solms and van Niekerk (2013, 101) dis-
cussed the human aspect in cyber security by stating that people can be seen both as a 
vulnerability and an asset to be safeguarded in cyberspace. 
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The amount of means to answer the infosec service needs presented, in turn, was quite 
scarce; additionally, the suggestions were quite generic. This indicates that the respond-
ents may not yet have identified suitable measures in responding to the infosec demands 
of the organization. However, the suggestions corresponded to the notions regarding the 
identified needs by highlighting softer measures, such as auditing, training and increased 
authority. Furthermore, utilizing outsourcing and increased influence of information se-
curity were mentioned. Additionally, GDPR related needs where identified in some re-
sponses, which demonstrates that at least some organizations in the survey are consider-
ing needed measures to respond to those needs. These findings support the notion that the 
importance of information security and the need to invest in it has been identified. 
On the other hand, from the financial investment perspective, the results indicated that 
only few organizations were planning to invest more in information security services and 
most companies were planning to maintain previous level of investment. The finding fol-
lows the earlier notions of the study conducted by CGI (CGI – – 2016) presented in sec-
tion 1.1 according to which half of the organizations participating in their study were not 
planning to invest more in information security, despite the fact that the companies rec-
ognized both the increased risk of a cyber attack and the need to prepare for such. Inter-
estingly, a global study conducted by Ernst & Young (Path to cyber resilience – – 2016, 
15) in 2016 however noted that, according to 61% of the respondents, budget restrictions 
were regarded as a major challenge for the infosec operations and their input within the 
company. Yet, 53% of the respondents reported that their budgets had increased within 
the last year, whereas 55% reported an increase in the spending within the next year. 
Therefore, the study by Ernst & Young (Path to cyber resilience – – 2016, 15) indicates 
that the amount spent on information security globally is on the rise. This demonstrates, 
that on a global scale companies are more willing or prepared to invest in information 
security compared to their equivalents in Finland. Static investments in infosec and re-
lated services, in turn, may require a new way of allocating resources within information 
security to enable the additional contributions to soft security or to answer the emerging 
infosec threats yet to be identified. On the other hand, the current expenditure on infor-






5.1 Discussion of the key findings 
In this section, the key findings of the systematic literature review (SLR) and the survey 
will be merged together to answer the research questions presented in section 1.3. The 
following research questions were placed in the beginning of this study: 
 What are information security services and how they can be categorized? 
 What are the information security services that are used in companies of different in-
dustries in Finland? 
The first research question is two-fold: It aimed at both finding what information se-
curity services are and how these services can be characterized. This study strived to de-
scribe information security services based on the depictions of security services in the 
SLR and survey and the definitions of a service presented earlier in section 2.4. 
Based on the prior discussion on the generic nature of services by Kotler and Keller 
(2011) and Levitt (1981) presented in section 2.4, information security services can be 
regarded as perishable, variable, inseparable and intangible: Infosec services occur only 
when they are being produced or maintained and cannot be stored, the quality of service 
may vary based on the provider, the infosec services are often produced and consumed at 
the same time and, finally, they usually cannot be experienced prior to purchase. 
Additionally, based on the SLR findings, information security services can be de-
scribed as services that protect and ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information. These infosec services can include different types of services, such as tech-
nical, non-technical and physical security services; furthermore, information security ser-
vices can be concrete (e.g., training, virus protection) or abstract (e.g., trust, awareness). 
Furthermore, information security services are often provided by third parties, thus par-
tially or fully outsourced by the organization. 
Furthermore, from the survey results it can be added, that information security services 
are entities that can be integrated in other services and processes and that comprise not 
only of technical security but also of people and modes of operation; as the services inte-
grate multiple aspects, they can be regarded as holistic. Additionally, they bear many 
functions of support and control as they protect, ensure and improve information security, 
information assets and the operability of systems, but at the same time, limit and prohibit 
unauthorized access to the assets and manage infosec risks. 
This conclusion proves that business and academia both have a very fragmented view 
on information security services and a solid definition of an information security service 
does not exist – thus, it consists of various characteristics depending on the viewpoint of 
the observer. However, this is understandable as there is a wide range of different security 
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services based on their nature and function; additionally, the services may answer to dif-
ferent types of needs, although the ultimate aim – ensuring information security – is the 
same for all of them. Perhaps due to the versatility of these services, only few clear defi-
nitions of these services were found in academic literature: When considering the com-
prehensiveness of information security as a concept, providing an unambiguous definition 
proves cumbersome if not impossible. 
When observing the nature of information security services, multiple insights were 
identified. Information security services were characterized through soft and hard ap-
proaches, from which the prior emphasized non-technical aspects, such as awareness, 
trust and education, and the latter the technical aspects and solutions to information secu-
rity. In overall, the hard, technical perspective was pronounced in the research, although 
the survey clearly presented the holistic and soft perspectives as well. Outsourcing infor-
mation security services was also an approach present both in the SLR and in the survey: 
As was evidenced in the survey, the services are often partially outsourced and the reasons 
for outsourcing vary. Furthermore, outsourcing enables an organization to focus on its 
core business and to ensure its information security with the help of external expertise. 
Another important perspective on infosec services that was present in both the SLR and 
the survey is the holistic one; this was also utilized in the building of the information 
security service categorization. A variation of this approach is the integration of different 
infosec services which was presented in the SLR. The development perspective that high-
lighted the need for evolution regarding information security and related processes, in 
turn, emerged from the survey. It can be stated that all of these perspectives complement 
each other as they present various viewpoints to information security and, at the same 
time, indicate that information security is a puzzle consisting of multiple pieces that need 
to be fitted together in an organizational context. Only by building a consistent puzzle 
can an organization achieve a coherent network of information security. Furthermore, the 
puzzle cannot be built static but needs to be altered and enhanced based on the current 
and future needs of the organization. 
The most substantial controversy in the results of the SLR and the survey was the 
reference to confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) as information security ser-
vices. The CIA triad has traditionally been regarded as the description of information 
security. However, the results of the SLR pronounced confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability as information security services. This evidences a divergence in the interpretations 
of infosec services between academia and business – the latter does not recognize these 
attributes as services. The identification of CIA as security services raises concerns: How 
can information security and corresponding services – or in other words, the aim of in-
fosec and the means to achieve it – be distinguished from each other? It was earlier sug-
gested in section 3.3.3 that the scope of the terms could be utilized in separating the def-
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initions from each other: Information security refers to all of the attributes of CIA simul-
taneously, whereas as services they are independent. As such these services are rather 
abstract when compared to the more concrete infosec services identified during the re-
search. 
Other abstract services also emerged during the research. The existence of the abstract 
services, such as trust and ethical norms, also raised concerns as they are very different 
form the concrete ones by nature: Abstract services cannot be bought, however, they can 
be achieved. These services demonstrate similar problems to CIA: identifying them as 
something to be obtained would make it cumbersome to separate them from the aim of 
information security. Perhaps then it would be better to regard the categorization as a 
collection of aspects to be considered when planning information security instead of fo-
cusing on the nature of single services. It can be concluded, that the inclusion of the ab-
stract services into the ISSeCa categorization is debatable. Therefore, these findings of 
the controversial nature of infosec services remain to be further examined and solved by 
future research. 
The second part of the first research question was concerned with a categorization of 
information security services; this categorization was built based on the findings of the 
systematic literature review. The categorization, named ISSeCa, utilizes two types of cat-
egories from prior literature: main categories from VAHTI instructions and subcategories 
from ISO 27002 standard. The ISSeCa categorization presents a holistic approach to in-
formation security, consisting of areas such as physical, personnel, operations, equip-
ment, software, information material, data-communications and administrative infor-
mation security. The ISSeCa categorization is presented in detail in section 3.4 and Ap-
pendices 1.0–1.5. Furthermore, the comprehensive nature of the categorization is sup-
ported with the findings of the survey that acknowledged the need for a holistic approach 
to information security services. This notion of the holistic approach confirms the phrase 
that an entity is more than the sum of its parts. It is noteworthy to mention, however, that 
ISSeCa only presents one method of categorizing infosec services and various other so-
lutions could be presented. 
The second research question focused on resolving what kind of information security 
services are utilized in companies in Finland. The answer to this question was searched 
through a survey. However, only 15 responses were obtained through the survey and, 
thus, these results cannot be generalized to the population of companies operating in Fin-
land. Nevertheless, the results indicated that, within the group of respondents, the infor-
mation security services presented through categories were all utilized and regarded as 
important within the organizations attending the survey. Therefore, these organizations 
utilize security services that correspond to the needs in areas of physical, administrative, 
personnel, information material, software, equipment, data-communications and opera-
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tions security – as either outsourced or produced in-house. From these categories, soft-
ware, data-communications and equipment security were most often in use in the partic-
ipant organizations. Furthermore, these categories were also among the ones regarded as 
very important for ensuring information security within the organization. When asking 
about the future needs regarding infosec services and related competence, however, the 
softer services and measures were emphasized. This interesting controversy could indi-
cate, that organizations have adopted and value the harder, technical security services but 
are embracing the fact that softer, non-technical ones are also needed. It could, therefore, 
be concluded that the organizations are currently utilizing hard security services but rec-
ognize the need for softer ones as they perceive information security services in a holistic 
manner. 
Another interesting finding in the survey was that, despite the importance of infor-
mation security services and the identified development areas, the organizations were not 
planning to invest more in information security in the future; a result that was also pre-
sented in the study conducted by CGI (CGI – – 2016) in section 1.1. This could cause 
problems in the future as new threats emerge and require the allocation of appropriate 
resources and investments in information security. On the other hand, it was noted that 
the level of information security is optimized based on costs. 
5.2 Limitations and future research 
This section discusses the limitations of the study and proposes directions for future re-
search. The topic will be handled by first discussing the study in general, then the sys-
tematic literature review (SLR), then the survey and, finally, the infosec service catego-
rization. 
The delimiting of the study posed challenges as the topic of the study was too wide in 
the beginning and had to be narrowed down during the research process. This was due to 
the fact that the study belonged to a larger research programme given as an assignment 
from the client. Hirsjärvi et al. (2003, 72) contribute to the discussion by stating that es-
pecially qualitative research often requires the researcher to focus or redirect their work 
during data collection. Specifying the research questions and narrowing down the topic 
of research are, in fact, among the major challenges of students when writing theses 
(Heikkilä 2008, 24). Therefore, the changes and delimitations to the study can be regarded 
as natural during the thesis process. Additionally, the SLR and the forming of the infor-
mation security service categorization (ISSeCa) proved to be much more laborious than 
initially expected. Despite theoretical knowledge, as the researcher had not conducted an 
SLR before, she lacked knowledge on the best practices on how to conduct such a re-
search that can only be accumulated through experience. Additional challenges to the 
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research was posed by a rigorous work schedule of the researcher that slowed down the 
thesis process. 
The results of the systematic literature review demonstrate that the terminology related 
to information security services is not well established and leaves room for future re-
search. The incoherent use of terms made it difficult to determine whether the description 
refers to a service or a function and when terms other than service should be included in 
the research. The use of different terms was largely dependent on the context and, thus, 
demanded careful consideration of the inclusion or exclusion of these terms. On the other 
hand, the inclusion of the abstract infosec services – especially CIA – raises concerns on 
whether the authors possess differing perceptions on the identity of a service itself. Based 
on the results it is suggested, that the SLR could be extended to cover a broader set of 
search terms and that future research would aim at finding a categorization between the 
different terms utilised. It remains unclear, whether a clear division between the different 
terms can be drawn and whether the authors draw a distinctive line between the various 
terms. This presents opportunities for an interesting future research. 
The systematic literature review evidenced that the list of utilised search terms was not 
comprehensive as a wide range of other terms was discovered. On the other hand, as the 
review was only a part of the Master’s thesis, some delimiting had to be done. Some 
prominent terms to include would have been ‘cyber security service’, ‘managed security 
service’, ‘information technology service’ and ‘information system security service’; the 
two latter were included in the review by using abbreviations ‘IT’ and ‘IS’. However, the 
use of the term cyber security might obscure the division of information and cyber secu-
rity further if a clear distinction between the two terms is necessary to maintain. In fact, 
many of the services themselves could be regarded as cyber security services as they can 
be utilized in safeguarding more than just the information assets of an organization. The 
use of the term ‘security service’ could also be considered as it was present in many arti-
cles. However, including the term might pose problems in identifying whether the article 
refers to information security services or security services in general. 
Similarly to the search terms, only a limited amount of six databases was utilized in 
the systematic literature review. Extending the review to cover more databases would 
increase the amount of articles and possibly produce more findings. Finding an equilib-
rium between useful findings, the amount of material to be included and the resources 
available, though, is a balancing act. 
In the future, the time range of the SLR articles to be included could also be limited. 
This study did not exploit the delimitation of the time range to keep the number of articles 
sufficient but this was considered as on option during the systematic literature review. 
The delimitation would be especially useful if a wider range of search terms or databases 
was utilized. That way the SLR materials could be limited to include only the most recent 
articles and findings. 
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The quality of the SLR articles sets another limitation to the study. As noted earlier, 
most of the articles had a low or non-existent JUFO ranking. Therefore it must be stated, 
that there is likely room for improvement in the quality of the articles in the review. Ar-
ticles and other publications with higher JUFO rankings might present more fruitful ma-
terial for the research. 
The type of the publications included in the research also sets a limitation to the study. 
All of the publications included in the systematic literature review were recognized as 
scientific literature and most of them were conference proceedings. By including more 
books, articles and non-scientific literature, the results of the SLR could have been more 
comprehensive. As the development of digitalisation and information technology accel-
erates, the scientific literature may not be able to keep up with the pace and, thus, it may 
not include the most recent developments in the information security field. Therefore, 
including non-scientific findings and publications from the business side into the review 
could yield valuable results. This notion is supported by the findings from the survey 
conducted to business representatives; additional insights to the topic of infosec services 
were derived from the survey. 
During the systematic literature review, a large amount of articles was excluded from 
the review as they did not fulfil the initial requirements set in the SLR. However, the 
articles that discussed the topic could have contributed to the findings of the literature 
review. This idea is supported by Piper (2013, 4) who notes that it might be better to 
decide on the exclusion of articles based on the whole article, not just the abstract which 
might have journal-specific limitations. Yet, it must be stated that the inclusion of addi-
tional articles is very laborious as the manual handling and screening of the articles de-
mands lots of time and effort. Nevertheless, this is an option to be explored in the future. 
The survey also bore some limitations; these limitations are first mirrored through the 
low response rate. Although the survey was distributed through various channels and peo-
ple, it only raised 15 responses. Firstly, the main reason for the low number of responses 
could be that the survey did not reach the eligible group of respondents – people con-
cerned with or responsible for the information security of an organization. The cause for 
this could be, that the research was unable to reach the most suitable distribution channels. 
Secondly, another reason for the low response rate might be that the people responsible 
for the infosec issues within the organization were unwilling or unauthorized to answer 
the survey. This notion was supported with the feedback given in the survey that men-
tioned the restrictions for providing infosec service related information. Moreover, or-
ganizations have likely been reluctant to disclose this kind of discrete information that is 
vital to the protection of the company – especially to parties not well known. Furthermore, 
the WannaCry ransomware attack, which occurred simultaneously with the survey, may 
have caused companies to be either extremely careful with disclosing information or oth-
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erwise occupied with infosec issues. Thirdly, infosec services may be outsourced espe-
cially in smaller companies and, thus, the management of the company does not have 
sufficient knowledge or understanding on how exactly their infosec issues have been ar-
ranged. It is also possible that information security service as a concept is seen as unfa-
miliar. 
Furthermore, other reasons for the low response rate can be identified. As mentioned 
in section 4.1, the initial idea was to distribute the survey via a large partner company 
with an extensive contact network that would have enabled contacting a wide sample of 
companies operating in Finland; however, this proved infeasible. The original plan could 
have yielded more responses due to the good reputation and contacts of the partner com-
pany. Utilizing social media in the distribution of the survey, in turn, can be problematic 
as the survey is then available to all people and not specifically targeted to the intended 
sample. This could explain both the high number of views in social media (1331 views) 
and the rather high number of times the survey was opened but left unanswered (over 130 
times). As the questions were somewhat specific, the people opening the survey may have 
noticed that they do not have sufficient expertise to answer the survey. The inclusion of 
mandatory and open-ended, descriptive questions may also have lowered the willingness 
to answer the survey – especially by people working in high and demanding roles with a 
busy schedule. The unwillingness to answer may have been strengthened by the inclusion 
of questions measuring two issues; the problem with such questions was acknowledged 
but they were included to increase the usability and fluency of the survey. 
The social media invitation itself was quite welcoming which could also have tempted 
people to open the survey only to receive more information on the Digiwars programme. 
Additionally, the survey itself was very traditional which could have reduced the motiva-
tion to answer it after the expectations of the social media invitation. Another problem 
with the use of social media is, that the number of respondents from the same organization 
cannot be limited and, thus, it is possible that representatives of the same organization 
have answered the survey and distorted the data. This is a non-desirable result concerning 
the survey and should be more thoroughly considered in the future. A higher response 
rate might have been achieved by lengthening the response time. However, this was done 
once and it did not significantly increase the results. Finally, it might be that some people 
do not regard the topic as interesting or see the research as bringing value to their organ-
ization and, thus, the survey has been left unanswered. 
From the perspective of the quality of the data collected in the survey, some notions 
can also be made. If more responses would have been achieved, the responses included 
in the survey analysis could have been limited based on the role of the respondent. On the 
other hand, as employees in small companies bear larger areas of responsibility, this might 
have omitted some relevant responses. Thus, limiting responses based on the role of the 
respondent is debatable. 
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One notable limitation in the survey is that it did not measure the location of the com-
panies. As social media was utilized in the distribution of the survey, these locations may 
be unevenly distributed referring to selection bias. Additionally, the use of social media 
may pose the research to voluntary bias as LinkedIn permits anyone with an access to the 
survey to answer it. Additionally, the use of LinkedIn might favour younger, educated 
users. This is supported by the recent statistics of Finnish LinkedIn users that state that 
52.9% of the users in Finland are, in fact, under 35 years old, although the largest indi-
vidual user group represents older users (ages 35–54; 40% of Finnish LinkedIn users) 
(Laine 2017). These facts cause concerns to the reliability and validity of the research. 
The location question was not included in the survey, however, to minimize the amount 
of identifiable information and to guarantee the anonymity of the respondents. 
Another factor influencing the quality of the survey is the fact that professional trans-
lators were not utilized in the survey data analysis phase. This might have enabled a more 
precise analysis, although the questionnaire was presented to the respondents in its origi-
nal language in Finnish and, thus, problems materializing due to that could not have oc-
curred. However, specialized IT terms that were translated from English to Finnish in the 
questionnaire may have caused misinterpretations among the survey respondents. To 
avoid this, short descriptions of the service categories were provided. Another quality 
factor influencing the research is that investigator triangulation was not utilized in the 
data analysis which might have yielded richer and more precise results. However, the use 
of data triangulation instead has benefited the research. In the future, replacing the survey 
with interviews might prove fruitful as they enable more in-depth discussions on the topic. 
On the other hand, finding interviewees for the interviews might prove difficult as it 
would most probably require personal contacts in advance in order for organizations to 
be willing to disclose such discrete information. The selection between a survey and in-
terviews was carefully considered during the study process and the conclusion was that a 
survey would better help in answering the research questions and the assignment given 
by the client. However, utilizing interviews in the future to deepen the results could be 
considered. 
The building of the information security service categorization also pose some chal-
lenges. As mentioned earlier, ISSeCa is only one subjective interpretation of the infor-
mation security services entity. The networked nature of the services made the building 
of the categorization difficult. Furthermore, as the topic was new to the researcher and 
partly very technically-oriented, the construction of the categorization proved cumber-
some. Thus, the building of the information security service categorization has been a 
learning experience into information security. Collaboration and discussions with an ex-
pert in the field might have made the thesis process more fluent. Furthermore, an expert 
could have been asked to evaluate the categorization or to build a categorization of their 
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own, which could then have been compared to ISSeCa. This type of investigator triangu-
lation would increase the credibility of the categorization and the research in general. 
An additional limitation to the categorization is caused by the fact that the identified 
infosec services were handled as equal in the categorization despite their status or fre-
quency in the literature. Therefore, those services that were described as categories in the 
articles, were placed under the Other main category, instead of nominating them as main 
categories in the categorization. The hierarchy, in turn, was built based on information 
obtained from the SLR articles, the ISO 27002 standard and VAHTI infosec area descrip-
tions, information searched from the internet and the researcher’s own perception. Per-
haps in the future, a more precise hierarchy of the identified services could be built. Fur-
thermore, as discussed earlier in section 3.4.3, the services are interlinked by nature, and 
thus, their relations could be better depicted in the categorization in the future. This notion 
is supported by Novak and Cañas (2008, 12) who recommend using cross-links between 
concepts from different branches to demonstrate the connections of those services. How-
ever, one should be selective with the linking of concepts due to the natural connectedness 
of those concepts.  
In addition to the ideas for future research presented above, other broader topics for 
future research could be considered. A new research avenue could be adopted by focusing 
on the information security service related competence or infosec service outsourcing; 
both are topics that were touched upon in the research. In fact, Pelkonen et al. (2016) have 
studied the cyber competence in Finland and present a concept map that resembles the 
categorization built in this study regarding cyber security technologies. Outsourcing, in 
turn, is a timely topic as it was recently reported that due to a neglectful outsourcing 
contract, the discrete information of the Swedish transport authority – including the driv-
ing licence register, secret criminal records of the police and the internal data-communi-
cations of various Swedish authorities – were accessible to people to whom a security 
clearance had not been conducted (Onali 2017). This highlights the fact that companies 
may not always understand the contents of their outsourcing contracts and may be unable 
to control the compliance of the provider towards the contract. Therefore, the infosec risks 
related to information security service outsourcing may prove to be a fruitful research 
area in the future. Other interesting research directions could include the topic of soft 
services and their impact on the overall information security of an organization and future 
security services to tackle new security threats. 
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5.3 Implications for practice 
This research provides multiple useful insights for practice. Firstly, the ISSeCa categori-
zation provides a checklist for organizations from which they can either search for indi-
vidual services or, most importantly, with which they can find ways to build a holistic 
network of security services. Thus, the categorization helps organizations in discovering 
whether they have considered all necessary areas of infosec services, or whether there are 
areas yet to be included in their information security service palette. 
Furthermore, the categorization helps organizations in understanding that mere tech-
nical solutions are not sufficient but one needs to consider other aspects of information 
security services as well: physical and soft services, people as part of information security 
and a holistic perspective in building the information security capabilities of the organi-
zation. In addition to understanding the multifaceted nature of infosec services, it is of 
utmost importance for organizations to engage their staff and other stakeholders to follow 
and adopt the information security instructions of the organization; without true commit-
ment, all the benefits of security services will not materialize. Consequently, as stated 
earlier, people pose one of the greatest threats on information security. Therefore, it is a 
matter that needs to be taken into account by all organizations. The holistic perspective, 
in turn, provides companies with the understanding that single solutions are not sufficient 
in ensuring information security. Instead, combinations of security services are needed to 
answer to the security needs of an organization. These notions are supported by von Solms 
and von Solms (2004, 372–375) who list the lack of information security awareness 
among users, lack of understanding information security as a business matter instead of a 
technical matter and the lack of understanding the fact that information security consists 
of multiple dimensions as among the ten deadly sins regarding information security man-
agement. 
It is this understanding that helps organizations build their information security puzzle 
and fit all the needed pieces of the puzzle together to make it complete. However, com-
plete in this context does not refer to final or static – instead, it refers to the puzzle as 
fulfilling the current needs of the organization. Yet, the organization has to look out for 
the future and adjust this palette to those upcoming needs when discovered. This signifies 
the fact, that information security is constantly evolving based on the needs of the com-
pany; if static, it may quickly outdate itself. Thus, organizations have to simultaneously 
plan and optimize the level of investments in infosec services and prepare themselves for 
future needs. 
The final insight for practice is the inclusion of information security into systems and 
processes early on. Considering infosec related issues already at the early stages of plan-
ning will help in creating a better fit with the processes or systems and information secu-
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rity, which, in turn, will lead to more fluent processes and a better functioning organiza-
tion. Information security and corresponding services is a topic concerning all organiza-
tions nowadays – therefore, it is a matter not to be taken too lightly. 
5.4 Implications for research 
In addition to practical implications, the research also presents insights for research. 
Firstly, the systematic literature review (SLR) offers a glance to the discussion on infosec 
services in academic literature and provides a comprehensive list of security services 
identified in it. Additionally, the SLR sheds light on the inconsistencies in the topic and 
offers various opportunities for future research. Furthermore, the research presents the 
discrepancies regarding infosec services between business and academia. This study 
proves that the field of security services is still rather undeveloped and lacks coherence. 
Researchers agree neither with the definition of infosec services nor with what kind of 
services exist. Therefore, investigating these topics further in the future is recommended. 
Furthermore, the categorization provides an approach to handling the infosec service 
entity in a logical manner – it presents a graphic way of rationally organizing the network 
of security services. The ISSeCa categorization provides a starting point both for under-
standing the infosec service network and for deepening understanding of the dependen-
cies between the services. 
The research also offers an initial definition for a security service by combining the 
findings from academic articles and publications with the insights from business practi-
tioners. However, the description is still very wide and could be capsulized further – an-
other opportunity for future studies. 
The initial idea was to research the term ‘information security commodity’ given by 
the client, but already at very early stages of the systematic literature review it became 
evident that the term is not widely utilised in academic literature. Therefore, the term was 
changed to ‘information security service’ as it was thought to provide more comprehen-
sive and intriguing results. Based on the findings of this study, the use of the term ‘infor-
mation security commodity’ would require consolidation and, therefore, the usage of the 
term is not recommended. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS  
This thesis aims at shedding light on the topic of information security services. It inves-
tigates how an information security service can be described and what kind of security 
services are identified in literature. Furthermore, the thesis presents a categorization of 
the identified infosec services as an attempt to present the network of security services in 
a structured manner. Based on the results of the research, a consensus on the definition 
and types of security services is yet to be achieved. This is due to the fact, that the range 
of infosec services is wide and multiple perspectives on the services exist. Furthermore, 
to some extent, academia is still describing infosec services by confidentiality, integrity 
and availability – similarly to the description of information security itself. 
The study also presents the results of a survey conducted in companies operating in 
Finland. Although the results cannot be generalized to a larger population, they provide 
insights on the outlook of organizations towards infosec services. In fact, according to the 
results, the companies regard infosec services as important in ensuring the information 
security of the organizations and utilize a balanced set of infosec service categories in this 
endeavour. However, despite the increasing security threats, most companies are not plan-
ning to invest more in information security services in the future. This may cause prob-
lems in the future if the organizations are not committed to developing their information 
security service palette. Furthermore, both similarities and differences were identified in 
the way business described and named security services. 
The study concludes that companies should adopt a holistic approach in building their 
information security service palette, where different services are fitted together like the 
pieces of a puzzle. This puzzle, however, is not built static but needs to be altered based 
on the emerging organizational needs. The findings of this study provide a fertile ground 
for future research in the areas of information security services, such as soft services, 
outsourcing related security threats and security service related competence. Thus, this 
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APPENDIX 1.0 ISSeCa information security categorization 
 
Terms in italics are not information security services identified during the systematic lit-








APPENDIX 1.2 Main categories: Personnel, Physical, Administrative information and 
















APPENDIX 2.1 ISSeCa services by category 
 
Category Information security service Authors 
Additional articles & articles referring 
to terms other than 'service' have been 
separated in the cell with extra space 
Administrative information secu-
rity / 18 Compliance 
Certification (of the internal com-
puter controls of an organization) 
Chang & Lee (2003) 
Administrative information secu-
rity / 18 Compliance 
Governance, risk and compliance Buecker et al. (2007)  
Administrative information secu-
rity / 18 Compliance 
Legal documents, contractual docu-
ments 
Karokola et al. (2013) 
Administrative information secu-
rity / 18 Compliance 
Legal frameworks, contractual 
frameworks 
Karokola et al. (2011a) 
Administrative information secu-
rity / 18 Compliance 
Operational guidelines, procedural 
guidelines 
Karokola et al. (2011a), Karokola et 
al. (2013) 
Administrative information secu-
rity / 18 Compliance 
Privacy protection Jin et al. (2003) 
Administrative information secu-
rity / 18 Compliance / Privacy pro-
tection 
Anonym (for privacy protection) Jin et al. (2003) 
Administrative information secu-
rity / 18 Compliance / Privacy pro-
tection 
Pseudonym (for privacy protection) Jin et al. (2003)  
Administrative information secu-
rity / 18 Compliance / Privacy pro-
tection 
Session privacy Liping & Lei (2011) 
Administrative information secu-
rity / 5 Information security poli-
cies 
Administrative policies, managerial 
policies 
Karokola et al. (2011a), Karokola et 
al. (2013) 
Administrative information secu-
rity / 5 Information security poli-
cies 
Business process and policy man-
agement 
Buecker et al. (2007)  
Administrative information secu-
rity / 5 Information security poli-
cies 
Security policy development, secu-
rity policy application  
Karyda et al. (2006) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy 
Certification Chang & Lee (2003) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy 
Cryptographic algorithms Tamilarasan et al. (2008) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy 
Cryptographic mechanisms Kovač & Trček (2009) (traditional 
security mechanisms) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy 
Digital signature Lin & Zhixin (2010) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy 
Digital signature services Liping & Lei (2011) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy 
Encryption Keeratiwintakorn & Krishnamurthy 
(2006) 
 
Asgarnezhad et al. (2010) (crypto-
graphic technique), Priescu et al. 
(2009) (layer of security) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy 
Encryption service(s) Karyda et al. (2006), Keeratiwinta-
korn & Krishnamurthy (2006), Li-
ping & Lei (2011) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy 
PKI Liping & Lei (2011) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy 
Public key infrastructure(s) Liping & Lei (2011), Miguel et al. 
(2015) (solution) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy 
Security protocols Tamilarasan et al. (2008) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy  
Algorithms Xia & Hu (2006) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy  
Cryptographic techniques  Asgarnezhad et al. (2010) 
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Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy  
Cryptography Buecker et al. (2007)  
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Algorithms 
AES algorithm Tamilarasan et al. (2008) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Algorithms 
Data encryption standard (DES) al-
gorithm 
Xia & Hu (2006) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Algorithms 
DES algorithm Tamilarasan et al. (2008) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Algorithms 
Digest algorithms (e.g., MD5) Deng et al. (1995) (mechanism to 
provide services) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Algorithms 
RSA algorithm Xia & Hu (2006), Tamilarasan et al. 
(2008) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Algorithms 
Symmetric algorithm(s), asymmet-
ric algorithm(s), hash algorithm(s) 
Tamilarasan et al. (2008) (types of 
algorithms) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Certification 
CA (certificate authority) authenti-
cation 
Lin & Zhixin (2010) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Certification 
Certificates Liping & Lei (2011) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Certification 
Certification-related services Chang & Lee (2003) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Certification 
Security services to certificate man-
agement 
Liping & Lei (2011) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Cryptosystems 
Symmetric cryptosystems (e.g., 
DES), public-key cryptosystems 
(e.g., RSA) 
Deng et al. (1995) (mechanisms to 
provide services) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Digital signature 
Applications with digital signatures Liping & Lei (2011) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Digital signature 
Digital signatures (for security ser-
vices) 
Peiris et al. (2008)  
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Digital signature 
Signature forensics Datta Ray et al. (2010) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Encryption 
Applications with transparent data 
encryption 
Liping & Lei (2011) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Encryption 
Encryption in pervasive networks Keeratiwintakorn & Krishnamurthy 
(2006) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Encryption 
Information encryption Lu et al. (2015) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Encryption 
Packet encryption Keeratiwintakorn & Krishnamurthy 
(2006) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Encryption 
Public-key encryption Chang & Lee (2003) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / PKI 
Authentication PKI Lin & Zhixin (2010) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / PKI 
Key exchange Lin & Zhixin (2010) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / PKI 
Key recovery Liping & Lei (2011) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / PKI 
Perfect key management Lin & Zhixin (2010) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / PKI 
PKI security services Liping & Lei (2011) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / PKI 
PKI-related services Chang & Lee (2003) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / PKI 
Security services to key manage-
ment 
Liping & Lei (2011) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Security protocols 
Cryptographic protocols Kovač & Trček (2009) (traditional 
security mechanisms) 
Data-comms security / 10 Cryptog-
raphy / Security protocols 
Secure socket layer (SSL) technol-
ogy 
El Yamany & Capretz (2008) (tradi-
tional security technique) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security 
Filtering Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security 
Firewall management Karyda et al. (2006), Oladapo et al. 
(2009) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security 
Network services Vorakulpipat et al. (2014) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security 
VPN management Karyda et al. (2006) 
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Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security  
Message protection services Buecker et al. (2007)  
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Filtering 
Black list service Wang et al. (2010) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Filtering 
Content filtering services Karyda et al. (2006) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Filtering 
Email virus filtering Karyda et al. (2006) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Filtering 
Managed filtering (of web content), 
managed filtering 
Choi & Seo (2005) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Filtering 
Spam filtering Karyda et al. (2006) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Filtering 
Transparent network-wide filtering Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Filtering 
White list service Wang et al. (2010) (technology/ser-
vice) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Filtering  
Firewall filtering Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Filtering / 
Spam filtering 
Anti-spam, spam detection Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Filtering / 
Spam filtering 
Spam mail(s) filtering (based on 
cloud security), anti-spam filtering 
Wang et al. (2010) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Firewall mgt 
Firewall configuration Karyda et al. (2006) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Firewall mgt 
Firewalls Karyda et al. (2006) 
 
Priescu et al. (2009) (layer of secu-
rity), Schultz (1995) (solutions, 
products), Wang et al. (2010) (tradi-
tional security technique) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Firewall mgt 
Managed services for firewalls Karyda et al. (2006) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Firewall mgt / 
Firewalls 
Circuit-level firewalls, application 
firewalls 
Schultz (1995) (solutions) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Firewall mgt / 
Firewalls 
Managed firewall Choi & Seo (2005) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices 
Air gaps Priescu et al. (2009) (solution) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices 
Cloud security (security service 
provided by cloud computing)  
Wang et al. (2010)  
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices 
Data collection services: honeypot, 
net crawler, feedback contour 
Wang et al. (2010) (technology/ser-
vice) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices 
Decoy services: honeypots, decoys  Priescu et al. (2009) (solutions) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices 
Denial-of-service (DOS) defences Priescu et al. (2009) (solution) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices 
Exit controls Priescu et al. (2009) (solution) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices 
IP security (IPSEC, internet proto-
col security) services, IPSEC ser-
vice 
Chappell et al. (1999) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices 
Network boundary protection (incl. 
managed services for firewalls) 
Karyda et al. (2006) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices 
Self-healing tools Priescu et al. (2009) (solution) 
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Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices 
Threat detection (based on cloud 
security) 
Wang et al. (2010) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices  
Network monitoring Karyda et al. (2006) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices / Data collection & decoy 
services 
Distributed honeypots (for spam 
blocking) 
Wang et al. (2010) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices / Data collection & decoy 
services 
Sample data collection service Wang et al. (2010) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices / Network monitoring 
Traffic pattern Datta Ray et al. (2010) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices / Network monitoring / Traf-
fic pattern 
Anomalies Datta Ray et al. (2010) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices / Reputation services 
Sender reputation (for spam block-
ing) 
Wang et al. (2010)  
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices / Reputation services 
Web reputation service, email repu-
tation service, file reputation ser-
vice 
Wang et al. (2010) (technology/ser-
vice) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices / Threat detection 
Automatic feedback service Wang et al. (2010) (technology/ser-
vice) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices / Threat detection 
Threat detection system (based on 
cloud security), threat processing 
service (based on cloud security) 
Wang et al. (2010) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / Network ser-
vices / Threat detection 
Threat perception (for spam block-
ing) 
Wang et al. (2010) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / VPN mgt 
Managed VPN Choi & Seo (2005) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / VPN mgt 
Virtual private networks El Yamany & Capretz (2008) (tradi-
tional security technique) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / VPN mgt 
VPN provisioning Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security / VPN mgt 
VPN(s) Karyda et al. (2006) (security instal-
lation), Wang et al. (2010) (tradi-
tional security technique) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security/Network ser-
vices 
Network Bahl & Wali (2013), Bahl & Wali 
(2014) 
Data-comms security / 13 Commu-
nications security/Network ser-
vices 
Network change control service Sun & Chen (2008) 
Equipment security Hardware solutions Karokola et al. (2011a), Karokola et 
al. (2013) 
Equipment security  Management support for security 
equipment, operation of security 
equipment, equipment management 
Choi & Seo (2005)  
Equipment security  Security maintenance Choi & Seo (2005) 
Information material security / 8 
Asset management 
Data archiving, data restoration Karyda et al. (2006) 
Information material security / 8 
Asset management 
Data classification Karyda et al. (2006) 
Information material security / 8 
Asset management 
Data protection and disclosure con-
trol 
Buecker et al. (2007)  
Information material security / 8 
Asset management 
Distributed power mass data stor-
age 
Wang et al. (2010) 
Information material security / 8 
Asset management 
Media protection Oladapo et al. (2009) 
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Information material security / 8 
Asset management 
Time stamping Miguel et al. (2015) 
Information material security / 8 
Asset management / Data protec-
tion & disclosure control 
Data protection services Buecker et al. (2007)  
Information material security / 8 
Asset management / Data protec-
tion & disclosure control / Data 
protection services 
Data isolation support Buecker et al. (2007)  
Information material security / 8 
Asset management / Time stamp-
ing 
Timestamps Deng et al. (1995) (mechanism to 
provide services) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring 
Remote & local security control for 
infrastructure: databases, networks, 
servers 
Choi & Seo (2005) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
/ Monitoring 
Privileged ID monitoring service, 
ID activity monitoring service 
Sun & Chen (2008) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security 
Audit Claassen et al. (1992), Jin et al. 
(2003), Oladapo et al. (2009) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security 
Audit service(s) Asgarnezhad et al. (2010), El Ya-
many & Capretz (2008), Miguel et 
al. (2015) 
 
Buecker et al. (2007)  
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security 
Configuration management Oladapo et al. (2009) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security 
Helpdesk services Vorakulpipat et al. (2014) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security 
Managed scanning (analysis of vul-
nerability), managed scanning 
Choi & Seo (2005) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security 
Management of security systems  Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security 
Monitoring Datta Ray et al. (2010) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security 
Monitoring service(s) Moulton & Coles (2003) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security 
Server management Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Audit 
External connection review service Sun & Chen (2008) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Audit 
IT auditing Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Audit 
Security audit Claassen et al. (1992), Deng et al. 
(1995) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Managed scanning 
Automated vulnerability detection, 
automated vulnerability mitigation 
Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Management of security 
systems 
Secure systems and networks Buecker et al. (2007)  
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring 
Intruder detection Chang & Lee (2003) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring 
Intrusion detection systems man-
agement 
Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring 
IPS (intrusion prevention system) Wang et al. (2010) (traditional secu-
rity technique) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring 
Monitoring for service uptime & 
availability (to detect DOS attacks 
& service disruption) 
Moulton & Coles (2003) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring 
Monitoring of security systems Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring / Behaviour 
analysis 
Large-scale behaviour analysis (of 
users, traffic etc.) 
Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring / Behaviour 
analysis 
Relative analysis of behaviour ser-
vice 
Wang et al. (2010) (technology/ser-
vice) 
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Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring / Intrusion 
detection systems mgt 
Distributed intrusion detection sys-
tems 
Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring / Intrusion 
detection systems mgt 
IDS (intrusion detection system) Wang et al. (2010) (traditional secu-
rity technique) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring / Intrusion 
detection systems mgt 
Intrusion detection Deng et al. (1995), Lu et al. (2015), 
Moulton & Coles (2003), Oladapo et 
al. (2009) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring / Intrusion 
detection systems mgt 
Intrusion monitoring Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring / Intrusion 
detection systems mgt 
Managed IDS (intrusion detection 
system) 
Choi & Seo (2005) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring / Intrusion 
detection systems mgt / Intrusion 
detection 
Host-based intrusion detection soft-
ware 
Moulton & Coles (2003) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring / Intrusion 
detection systems mgt / Intrusion 
detection 
Intrusion detection software Moulton & Coles (2003) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Monitoring / Intrusion 
detection systems mgt / Intrusion 
detection 
Network intrusion detection soft-
ware 
Moulton & Coles (2003) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Security analysis 
Audit logging service Buecker et al. (2007)  
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Security analysis 
Intelligent mining service of secu-
rity log 
Wang et al. (2010) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Security analysis 
Intelligent security analysis service, 
intelligent analysis service of secu-
rity log 
Wang et al. (2010) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Security analysis 
Security estimation, security esti-
mation services 
Chang & Lee (2003) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Security analysis  
Decision analysis Datta Ray et al. (2010) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Server mgt 
Server change control service Sun & Chen (2008) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Server mgt 
Server configuration Moulton & Coles (2003) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Server mgt / Server con-
figuration 
Server configuration software Moulton & Coles (2003) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Virus & worm protection 
Antivirus mechanism Karokola et al. (2011a) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Virus & worm protection 
Antivirus system (based on cloud 
security)  
Wang et al. (2010)  
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Virus & worm protection 
Anti-virus, virus detection Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Virus & worm protection 
Managed antivirus  Choi & Seo (2005) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Virus & worm protection 
Virus protection Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 12 Operations 
security / Virus & worm protection 
Worm vaccine, worm detection, 
email worm detection  
Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Operations security / 14 System 
acquisition, development & 
maintenance 
Application integration services Chang & Lee (2003) 
Operations security / 14 System 
acquisition, development & 
maintenance 
Application isolation support Buecker et al. (2007)  
Operations security / 14 System 
acquisition, development & 
maintenance 
Penetration testing Karyda et al. (2006) 
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Operations security / 14 System 
acquisition, development & 
maintenance 
Security upgrades Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 14 System 
acquisition, development & 
maintenance 
System integration services (for in-
tegrating applications or networks), 
system integration 
Chang & Lee (2003) 
Operations security / 16 Infor-
mation security incident mgt 
Analysis of security attack events, 
analysis of security attack incidents 
Choi & Seo (2005) 
Operations security / 16 Infor-
mation security incident mgt 
Emergency response Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 16 Infor-
mation security incident mgt 
Incident management (incl. emer-
gency response) 
Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 16 Infor-
mation security incident mgt / 
Analysis of security attack events 
& incidents 
Attack inference Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Operations security / 17 Infor-
mation security aspects of business 
continuity mgt 
Backup for service continuity & 
restoration 
Datta Ray et al. (2010) 
Operations security / 17 Infor-
mation security aspects of business 
continuity mgt 
Business continuity planning Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 17 Infor-
mation security aspects of business 
continuity mgt 
Contingency planning Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 17 Infor-
mation security aspects of business 
continuity mgt 
Disaster recovery Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 17 Infor-
mation security aspects of business 
continuity mgt 
Failure control Miguel et al. (2015) 
Operations security / 17 Infor-
mation security aspects of business 
continuity mgt 
Redundancies for service continu-
ity & restoration 
Datta Ray et al. (2010) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol 
Access control Claassen et al. (1992), Datta Ray et 
al. (2010), Deng et al. (1995), Jin et 
al. (2003), Liping & Lei (2011), Lu 
et al. (2015), Miguel et al. (2015), 
Oladapo et al. (2009), Peiris et al. 
(2008) 
 
Jeong et al. (2010) (method), Kovač 
& Trček (2009) (traditional security 
mechanism), Shaikh et al. (2005) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol 
Access control service Deng et al. (1995) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol 
Authorization AbdElnapi et al. (2016), Asgar-
nezhad et al. (2010), Datta Ray et al. 
(2010), Jin et al. (2003) 
 
Kovač & Trček (2009) (security 
techniques), Shaikh et al. (2005) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol 
Authorization service(s) Asgarnezhad et al. (2010), El Ya-
many & Capretz (2008) 
 
Buecker et al. (2007)  
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol 
Identification Miguel et al. (2015) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol 
Identity and access Buecker et al. (2007)  
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol 
Passwords Liping & Lei (2011) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol 
Unified authentication and identity 
management 
Jin et al. (2003) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol 
User provisioning Shaikh et al. (2005) 
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Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol  
Authentication Asgarnezhad et al. (2010), Chappell 
et al. (1999), Claassen et al. (1992), 
Datta Ray et al. (2010), Deng et al. 
(1995), Jin et al. (2003), Liping & 
Lei (2011), Miguel et al. (2015), 
Peiris et al. (2008), Rachedi & 
Benslimane (2016), Tamilarasan et 
al. (2008) 
 
Kovač & Trček (2009) (traditional 
security mechanism), Shaikh et al. 
(2005) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol  
Authentication service(s) Asgarnezhad et al. (2010), Deng et 
al. (1995), El Yamany & Capretz 
(2008), Jin et al. (2003) 
 
Buecker et al. (2007)  
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Access control 
Access control mechanism Karokola et al. (2011a) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Access control 
Access control techniques Kovač & Trček (2009) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Access control 
Access controls: Mandatory access 
control, discretionary access con-
trol 
Deng et al. (1995) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Access control 
Directory management service Sun & Chen (2008) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Access control 
Network access control service Sun & Chen (2008) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Access control 
Object access control Deng et al. (1995) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Access control 
Privilege management Jin et al. (2003) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Access control 
Single sign on Shaikh et al. (2005) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Access control 
Single-sign-on (SSO) Jin et al. (2003) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Access control 
User access management  Karyda et al. (2006) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
Authentication techniques Kovač & Trček (2009) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
Client authentication Deng et al. (1995) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
Data origin authentication Claassen et al. (1992) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
End-to-end authentication and in-
tegrity service 
Rachedi & Benslimane (2016) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
Host authentication Claassen et al. (1992) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
Identity authentication Lu et al. (2015) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
Message authentication Keeratiwintakorn & Krishnamurthy 
(2006) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
Message authentication service(s) Deng et al. (1995), Keeratiwintakorn 
& Krishnamurthy (2006) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
Message origin authentication Deng et al. (1995) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
Mutual authentication Rachedi & Benslimane (2016) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
Object authentication Deng et al. (1995) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
Peer entity authentication Claassen et al. (1992) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
Process authentication Claassen et al. (1992) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
Relayed-nodes authentication and 
integrity service  
Rachedi & Benslimane (2016) 
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Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authentication 
User authentication Claassen et al. (1992) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authorization 
Authorization and privacy services Buecker et al. (2007)  
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Authorization 
Authorization techniques Kovač & Trček (2009) (security 
techniques) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Identification 
Biometric identification Jin et al. (2003) (authentication 
mechanism) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Identification 
ID management, identity manage-
ment 
 
Jin et al. (2003) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Identification 
Identity management services  
Jin et al. (2003) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Identification 
Identity service(s) Asgarnezhad et al. (2010) 
 
Buecker et al. (2007)  
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Identification / Biometric 
identification 
Biometric models Miguel et al. (2015) (solution) 
Operations security / 9 Access con-
trol / Unified authentication & 
identity mgt 
Unified authentication and identity 
management service(s), authentica-
tion and identity management ser-
vice 
Jin et al. (2003) 
Other Consolidated billing  Jin et al. (2003) 
Other Consulting Chang & Lee (2003) 
Other Consulting services Vorakulpipat et al. (2014) 
Other / CIA Availability AbdElnapi et al. (2016), Datta Ray et 
al. (2010), Lee et al. (2006), Miguel 
et al. (2015), Wahab et al. (2013) 
Other / CIA Confidentiality AbdElnapi et al. (2016), Asgar-
nezhad et al. (2010), Chappell et al. 
(1999), Claassen et al. (1992), Kee-
ratiwintakorn & Krishnamurthy 
(2006), Lee et al. (2006), Miguel et 
al. (2015), Peiris et al. (2008), 
Rachedi & Benslimane (2016), Ta-
milarasan et al. (2008), Datta Ray et 
al. (2010) 
 
Shaikh et al. (2005), Buecker et al. 
(2007) 
Other / CIA Confidentiality and integrity ser-
vices 
Buecker et al. (2007)  
Other / CIA Confidentiality service(s) Asgarnezhad et al. (2010), Rachedi 
& Benslimane (2016) 
 
Buecker et al. (2007) 
Other / CIA Integrity AbdElnapi et al. (2016), Claassen et 
al. (1992), Lee et al. (2006), Liping 
& Lei (2011), Miguel et al. (2015), 
Peiris et al. (2008), Rachedi & Bens-
limane (2016), Tamilarasan et al. 
(2008) 
 
Shaikh et al. (2005), Buecker et al. 
(2007)  
Other / CIA Integrity services Asgarnezhad et al. (2010) 
 
Buecker et al. (2007)  
Other / CIA Non-repudiation AbdElnapi et al. (2016), Claassen et 
al. (1992), Lin & Zhixin (2010), Mi-
guel et al. (2015), Peiris et al. (2008), 
Tamilarasan et al. (2008) 
 
Shaikh et al. (2005) 
Other / CIA Non-repudiation service(s) Buecker et al. (2007)  
Other / CIA / Availability Service availability (resilience) Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Other / CIA / Confidentiality Connection confidentiality Claassen et al. (1992)  
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Other / CIA / Confidentiality Connectionless confidentiality Claassen et al. (1992) 
Other / CIA / Confidentiality Data confidentiality Wahab et al. (2013) 
Other / CIA / Confidentiality End-to-end data confidentiality Rachedi & Benslimane (2016) 
Other / CIA / Confidentiality Message confidentiality Liping & Lei (2011), Deng et al. 
(1995) 
Other / CIA / Confidentiality Message confidentiality protections Deng et al. (1995) 
Other / CIA / Confidentiality Message confidentiality services Deng et al. (1995) 
Other / CIA / Confidentiality Selective field confidentiality Claassen et al. (1992) 
Other / CIA / Confidentiality Traffic flow confidentiality Claassen et al. (1992) 
Other / CIA / Integrity Connection integrity with recovery Claassen et al. (1992) 
Other / CIA / Integrity Connection integrity without recov-
ery 
Claassen et al. (1992) 
Other / CIA / Integrity Connectionless integrity Claassen et al. (1992) 
Other / CIA / Integrity Data integrity AbdElnapi et al. (2016), Rachedi & 
Benslimane (2016), Wahab et al. 
(2013) 
Other / CIA / Integrity Information integrity Liping & Lei (2011) 
Other / CIA / Integrity Message integrity  Deng et al. (1995) 
Other / CIA / Integrity Message integrity protections Deng et al. (1995) 
Other / CIA / Integrity Message integrity services Deng et al. (1995) 
Other / CIA / Integrity Selective field connection integrity Claassen et al. (1992) 
Other / CIA / Integrity Selective field connectionless in-
tegrity 
Claassen et al. (1992) 
Other / CIA / Non-repudiation Non-repudiation (delivery), non-re-
pudiation of delivery 
Claassen et al. (1992), Peiris et al. 
(2008) 
Other / CIA / Non-repudiation Non-repudiation (origin), non-repu-
diation of origin 
Claassen et al. (1992), Peiris et al. 
(2008) 
Other / CIA / Non-repudiation Non-repudiation of submission Peiris et al. (2008) 
Other / CIA / Non-repudiation Non-repudiation service for digital 
certified mail 
Buecker et al. (2007)  
Other / CIA / Non-repudiation Transaction non-repudiation ser-
vices 
Liping & Lei (2011) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Classifications 
3 Information security service cate-
gories: prevention, detection, re-
sponse 
Datta Ray et al. (2010) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Classifications 
Business oriented perspective on 
information security services 
Voralkupipat et al. 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Classifications 
Business security services Buecker et al. (2007) (information 
security component) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Classifications 
Information security management 
system (ISMS) perspective on in-
formation security services 
Voralkupipat et al. 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Classifications 
IT security services Buecker et al. (2007) (information 
security component) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Classifications 
Management services Bowen et al. (2006) (information se-
curity service category) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Classifications 
Operational services Bowen et al. (2006) (information se-
curity service category) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Classifications 
Socio / non-technical security ser-
vices  
Karokola et al. (2011a), Karokola et 
al. (2013) 
(security services or aspects) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Classifications 
Soft social security mechanism, 
soft security mechanisms, social 
control mechanisms 
Kovač & Trček (2009) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Classifications 
Technical security services Karokola et al. (2011a), Karokola et 
al. (2013) 
(security services or aspects) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Classifications 
Technical services Bowen et al. (2006) (information se-
curity service category) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Classifications 
Traditional hard security mecha-
nisms, traditional (security) mecha-
nisms, hard security 
Kovač & Trček (2009) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Descriptions 
"One-stop shop" security services Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Descriptions 
Energy efficient security service(s) Keeratiwintakorn & Krishnamurthy 
(2006) 
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Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Descriptions 
Holistic models, multidisciplinary 
approaches (to security solutions) 
Miguel et al. (2015) (solution) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Descriptions 
In-house security services Karyda et al. (2006) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Descriptions 
Managed security service(s) (MSS) Choi & Seo (2005), Karyda et al. 
(2006) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Descriptions 
Managerial security services Choi & Seo (2005) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Descriptions 
Modular approach (security ser-
vices as modules)  
Sidiroglou et al. (2007) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Descriptions 
Outsourced security services Karyda et al. (2006) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Descriptions 
Premium level (of) managed secu-
rity services, premium level secu-
rity services, premium (level) ser-
vices 
Moulton & Coles (2003) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Descriptions 
Sensitive security services Oladapo et al. (2009) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Descriptions 
Single plug & play information se-
curity solution 
Schultz (1995) 
Other / Classifications & descrip-
tions / Descriptions 
Unified security services, unified 
management service 
Jin et al. (2003) 
Other / Consulting Consulting in firewall design, con-
sulting in firewall evaluation 
Schultz (1995) 
Other / Consulting Security consulting Choi & Seo (2005) 
Other / Trust & norms Ethical norms, cultural norms Karokola et al. (2011a), Karokola et 
al. (2013) 
Other / Trust & norms Trust management Buecker et al. (2007) 
Other / Trust & norms / Trust mgt Reputation systems (ratings, rating 
systems) 
Kovač & Trček (2009) (social con-
trol mechanism) 
Other / Trust & norms / Trust mgt Trust service Buecker et al. (2007)  
Other / Trust & norms / Trust mgt Trust, trust systems (ratings, rating 
systems) 
Kovač & Trček (2009) (social con-
trol mechanisms) 
Personnel security / 7 Human re-
source security 
People (as required contractually) Bahl & Wali (2013), Bahl & Wali 
(2014) 
Personnel security / 7 Human re-
source security 
Security awareness Oladapo et al. (2009) 
Personnel security / 7 Human re-
source security / Security aware-
ness 
Awareness programmes Karokola et al. (2011a), Karokola et 
al. (2013) 
Personnel security / 7 Human re-
source security / Security aware-
ness 
Security education Karyda et al. (2006) 
Personnel security / 7 Human re-
source security / Security aware-
ness 
Security training Karyda et al. (2006), Oladapo et al. 
(2009) 
Physical security / 11 Physical & 
environmental security  
Physical Bahl & Wali (2013), Bahl & Wali 
(2014) 
Physical security / 11 Physical & 
environmental security  
Physical security Oladapo et al. (2009) 
Software security Application Bahl & Wali (2013), Bahl & Wali 
(2014) 
Software security  Software solutions Karokola et al. (2011a), Karokola et 
al. (2013) 
Software security / Software solu-
tions 
Security software updates Moulton & Coles (2003)  
Software security / Software solu-
tions 




APPENDIX 2.2 ISSeCa services by author 
 
Authors Services 
AbdElnapi et al. 
(2016) 
Authorization, availability, confidentiality, data integrity, integrity, non-repudiation 
Asgarnezhad et al. 
(2010) 
Audit services, authentication, authentication services, authorization, authorization ser-
vice(s), confidentiality, confidentiality service(s), cryptographic techniques, encryption 
(cryptographic technique), identity services, integrity services 
Bahl & Wali (2013) Application, network, people (as required contractually), physical  
Bahl & Wali (2014) Application, network, people (as required contractually), physical 
Bowen et al. (2006) Classifications: Management services, operational services, technical services 
Buecker et al. (2007) Classifications: Business security services (information security components), IT secu-
rity services (information security components) 
 
IT security services: 
Application isolation support, audit service(s), audit logging service, authentication ser-
vice(s), authorization and privacy services, authorization services, confidentiality ser-
vices, confidentiality, confidentiality and integrity services, cryptography, data isolation 
support, data protection services, identity service(s), integrity, integrity services, mes-
sage protection services, non-repudiation service(s), non-repudiation service for digital 
certified mail 
 
Business security services: 
Business process and policy management; data protection and disclosure control; gov-
ernance, risk and compliance; identity and access; secure systems and networks; trust 
management; trust service 
Chang & Lee (2003) Application integration services, certification, certification (of the internal computer 
controls of an organization), certification related services, consulting, intruder detection, 
PKI-related services, public-key encryption, security estimation, security estimation ser-
vices, system integration, system integration services (for integrating applications or 
networks) 
Chappell et al. (1999) Authentication, confidentiality, IP security (IPSEC) services, IPSEC service 
Choi & Seo (2005) Descriptions: Managed security service(s) (MSS), managerial security services 
 
Managed security services (MSS): 
Analysis of security attack events, managed antivirus, managed filtering, managed fil-
tering (of web content), managed firewall, managed IDS (intrusion detection system), 
managed scanning, managed scanning (analysis of vulnerability), managed VPN, man-
agement support for security equipment, operation of security equipment, security 
maintenance 
 
Remote and local security control for infrastructure such as networks, servers and data-
bases 
 
Managerial security services: 
Analysis of security attack incidents, equipment management, security consulting 
Claassen et al. (1992) Access control, audit, security audit 
 
Authentication, user authentication, process authentication, host authentication, peer en-
tity authentication, data origin authentication 
 
Confidentiality, connection confidentiality, connectionless confidentiality, selective 
field confidentiality, traffic flow confidentiality 
 
Non-repudiation, non-repudiation (origin), non-repudiation (delivery) 
 
Integrity, connection integrity with recovery, connection integrity without recovery, se-
lective field connection integrity, connectionless integrity, selective field connectionless 
integrity 
Datta Ray et al. 
(2010) 
Classifications: Detection, prevention, response 
 
Anomalies, access control, authentication, authorization, availability, backup for service 
continuity & restoration, confidentiality, decision analysis, monitoring, traffic pattern, 
redundancies for service continuity & restoration, signature forensics 
Deng et al. (1995) Access control, access control service, object access control 
Access controls: Mandatory access control, discretionary access control 
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Authentication, authentication service, client authentication, message authentication ser-
vices, message origin authentication, object authentication 
 
Message confidentiality, message confidentiality protections, message confidentiality 
services 
 
Message integrity, message integrity protections, message integrity services 
 
Intrusion detection, security audit 
 
Digest algorithms (e.g., MD5) (mechanism to provide services) 
Public-key cryptosystems (e.g., RSA) (mechanism to provide services) 
Symmetric cryptosystems (e.g., DES) (mechanism to provide services) 
Timestamps (mechanism to provide services) 
El Yamany & 
Capretz (2008) 
Audit service, authentication service, authorization service 
 
Secure sockets layer (SSL) technology (traditional security technique), virtual private 
networks (traditional security technique)  
Jeong et al. (2010) Access control (method) 
Jin et al. (2003) Descriptions: Unified management service, unified security services  
 
Access control, audit, anonym (for privacy protection), authentication, authentication 
service(s), authorization, biometric identification (authentication mechanism), consoli-
dated billing, ID management, identity management, identity management services, pri-
vacy protection, privilege management, pseudonym (for privacy protection), single-
sign-on (SSO), unified authentication and identity management, unified authentication 
and identity management service(s), authentication and identity management service 
Karokola et al. 
(2011a) 
Classifications: Socio / non-technical security services (or aspects), technical security 
services (or aspects)  
 
Socio/non-technical: Administrative policies, awareness programmes, contractual 
frameworks, cultural norms, ethical norms, legal frameworks, managerial policies, oper-
ational guidelines, procedural guidelines 
 
Technical: Access control mechanism, antivirus mechanism, hardware solutions, soft-
ware solutions 
Karokola et al. (2013) Classifications: Socio / non-technical security services (or aspects), technical security 
services (or aspects)  
 
Socio / non-technical: Administrative policies, awareness programmes, contractual 
documents, cultural norms, ethical norms, legal documents, managerial policies, opera-
tional guidelines, procedural guidelines 
 
Technical: Hardware solutions, software solutions 
Karyda et al. (2006) Descriptions: In-house services, managed security services (MSS), outsourced services  
 
Business continuity planning, content filtering services, contingency planning, data ar-
chiving, data classification, data restoration, disaster recovery, email virus filtering, 
emergency response, encryption services, firewalls, firewall configuration, firewall 
management, incident management (incl. emergency response), intrusion detection sys-
tems management, intrusion monitoring, IT auditing, managed services for firewalls, 
management of security systems, monitoring of security systems, network boundary 
protection (incl. managed services for firewalls), network monitoring, penetration test-
ing, security education, security policy application, security policy development, secu-
rity training, security upgrades, server management, spam filtering, user access manage-
ment, virus protection, VPN management, VPNs (security installation) 
Keeratiwintakorn & 
Krishnamurthy (2006) 
Descriptions: Energy efficient security service(s) 
 
Encryption, encryption in pervasive networks, encryption service, confidentiality, mes-
sage authentication, message authentication service, packet encryption  
Kovač & Trček 
(2009) 
Classifications: Hard security, social control mechanisms, soft security mechanisms, 




Access control (traditional security mechanism), access control techniques, authentica-
tion (traditional security mechanism), authentication techniques, authorization, authori-
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zation techniques, cryptographic protocols (traditional security mechanism), crypto-
graphic mechanisms (traditional security mechanism) 
 
Soft security: 
Reputation systems (social control mechanism), trust (soft social security mechanism), 
trust systems (social control mechanism) 
Lee et al. (2006) Availability, confidentiality, integrity 
Lin & Zhixin (2010) Authentication PKI, CA (certificate authority) authentication, digital signature, key ex-
change, non-repudiation, perfect key management 
Liping & Lei (2011)  Access control, applications with digital signatures, applications with transparent data 
encryption, authentication, certificates, digital signature services, encryption services, 
information integrity, integrity, key recovery, message confidentiality, passwords, PKI, 
public key infrastructure, PKI security services, security services to certificate manage-
ment, security services to key management, session privacy, transaction non-repudiation 
services  
Lu et al. (2015) Access control, identity authentication, information encryption, intrusion detection 
Miguel et al. (2015) Descriptions: Holistic models, multidisciplinary approaches to security solutions (solu-
tion) 
 
Access control, audit service, authentication, availability, biometric models (solution), 
confidentiality, failure control, integrity, non-repudiation, identification, public key in-
frastructures (solution), time stamping 
Moulton & Coles 
(2003) 
Classifications: Premium level (of) managed security services, premium level security 
services, premium (level) services 
 
Host-based intrusion detection software, intrusion detection, intrusion detection soft-
ware, monitoring for server uptime & availability (to detect DOS attacks & service dis-
ruption),  
monitoring service(s), network intrusion detection software, security software updates, 
server configuration, server configuration software 
Oladapo et al. (2009) Descriptions: Sensitive security services 
 
Access control, audit, configuration management, firewall management, intrusion detec-
tion, media protection, physical security, security awareness, security training 
Peiris et al. (2008) Access control, authentication, confidentiality, digital signatures (for security services), 
integrity, non-repudiation, non-repudiation of delivery, non-repudiation of origin, non-
repudiation of submission 
Priescu et al. (2009) Air gaps (solution), denial-of-service defences (DOS) (solution), encryption (layer of 
security), exit controls (solution), firewalls (layer of security), self-healing tools (solu-
tion) 
 
Decoy services: Decoys, honeypots (solutions) 
Rachedi & 
Benslimane (2016) 
Authentication, confidentiality, confidentiality service, end-to-end authentication and 
integrity service, end-to-end data confidentiality, data integrity, integrity, mutual au-
thentication, relayed nodes authentication and integrity service 
Schultz (1995) Description: Single plug & play information security solution 
 
Application firewalls (solutions), circuit level firewalls (solutions), consulting in fire-
wall design, consulting in firewall evaluation, firewalls (solutions, products) 
Shaikh et al. (2005) Access control (authorization), authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudia-
tion, single sign on, user provisioning 
Sidiroglou et al. 
(2007) 
Descriptions: Modular approach (security services as modules), one-stop shop for secu-
rity services 
 
Anti-spam, anti-virus, attack inference, automated vulnerability detection, automated 
vulnerability mitigation, distributed intrusion detection systems, email worm detection,  
filtering, firewall filtering, large-scale behaviour analysis (of users, traffic etc.), service 
availability (resilience), spam detection, transparent network-wide filtering, virus detec-
tion, VPN provisioning, worm detection, worm vaccine 
Sun & Chen (2008) Directory management service, external connection review service, ID activity monitor-
ing service, network access control service, network change control service, privileged 
ID monitoring service, server change control service 
Tamilarasan et al. 
(2008) 
Authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, security protocols 
 
AES algorithm, cryptographic algorithms, DES algorithm, RSA algorithm 
Asymmetric algorithm(s), hash algorithm(s), symmetric algorithm(s) (types of algo-
rithms) 
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Wahab et al. (2013) Availability, data confidentiality, data integrity  
Wang et al. (2010) Anti-spam filtering, automatic feedback service (technology/service), anti-virus system 
(based on cloud security), black list service, cloud security, data collection service 
(honeypot, net crawler, feedback contour) (technology/service), distributed honeypots 
(for spam blocking), distributed power mass data storage service, email reputation ser-
vice (technology/service), file reputation service (technology/service), firewalls (tradi-
tional security technique), IDS (intrusion detection system) (traditional security tech-
nique), intelligent analysis service of security log, intelligent mining service of security 
log, intelligent security analysis service, IPS (intrusion prevention system) (traditional 
security technique), relative analysis of behaviour service (technology/service), sample 
data collection service, sender reputation (for spam blocking), spam mail filtering 
(based on cloud security), threat detection (based on cloud security), threat detection 
system (based on cloud security), threat perception (for spam blocking), threat pro-
cessing service, VPN (traditional security technique), web reputation service (technol-
ogy/service), white list service (technology/service) 
Vorakulpipat et al. 
(2014) 
Classifications: Business-oriented perspective, Information security management sys-
tem (ISMS) perspective 
 
Consulting services, helpdesk services, network services, software development services 
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